Cameron v. Miles.
Decision Date | 21 September 2011 |
Docket Number | No. A11A1161.,A11A1161. |
Citation | 716 S.E.2d 831,311 Ga.App. 753,11 FCDR 2977 |
Parties | CAMERON et al.v.MILES. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Hollowell, Foster & Herring, Stanley E. Foster, Jolanda Evon Herring, Atlanta, for appellants.Precious Anderson–Scott, David A. Webster, for appellee.DILLARD, Judge.
Marion Cameron and Cameron & Miles, P.C. appeal the trial court's grant of a motion to strike their answer and counterclaim, as well as the court's decision to award attorney fees to Monica Miles. For the reasons noted infra, we reverse the trial court's grant of the motion to strike and vacate and remand on the issue of attorney fees.
The record shows that Monica Miles sued Marion Cameron and Cameron & Miles, P.C. (collectively “Cameron”), seeking dissolution of a corporation; alleging breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary duty, stubborn litigiousness; and requesting attorney fees. Cameron answered and filed a lengthy counterclaim with numerous allegations. The parties thereafter engaged in discovery, and Miles eventually filed a motion to compel, contending that Cameron refused to respond to discovery requests.1 Cameron opposed the motion to compel and later sought to extend the discovery period by 90 days.
Miles opposed Cameron's motion to extend discovery and filed a motion to strike Cameron's answer and counterclaim, in which she also sought attorney fees. Cameron did not file a response to Miles's motion to strike, though she did respond to another outstanding motion and requested that the case be placed on the trial court's next available hearing calendar to address various pending motions.
The trial court granted Cameron's request for a hearing, after which the court orally granted Miles's motion to strike. Cameron, however, was not notified when the final written order was entered, and the trial court thereafter denied her motion to set aside the order. On a previous appeal to this Court, we reversed this denial and directed the trial court to reenter judgment,2 which it did.
The trial court's decision to strike Cameron's answer and counterclaim was based upon the “pleadings, motions submitted by counsel for the Plaintiff, the testimony presented by counsel during the hearing, and the arguments of counsel, and all matters of record.” In its very summary order, the trial court stated that it was granting the motion to strike after finding that Cameron had failed to respond to same. And based on the answer and counterclaim being stricken, the court then entered a default judgment in favor of Miles. The court also awarded attorney fees in the amount of $25,000. This appeal by Cameron follows.
1. Cameron first argues that the trial court erred in striking her answer and counterclaim because the stated reason behind the court's decision did not warrant the use of this harsh sanction. We agree.
7 the trial court in the case sub judice explicitly stated in its order that it struck Cameron's answer and counterclaim—and, accordingly, entered default judgment—based solely upon Cameron's failure to respond to the motion to strike. In doing so, the trial court erred.
In so holding, we note that the hearing at which the trial court orally granted Miles's motion was not transcribed, leaving us with no transcript to review on appeal. And while it is generally true that in the absence of a transcript “[w]e must presume the rulings of the trial court are supported by the evidence,” 8 this principle only applies if consideration of the transcript is essential to the resolution on appeal.9 But here, the trial court's error appears on the face of its summary order, making a review of the transcript unnecessary to warrant a reversal on this enumeration of error.
As we have previously held, “[t]he failure of a nonmoving party to file responsive material ... does not automatically entitle the moving party to judgment” because “[t]here is no such thing as a default judgment on the pleadings.” 10 For this reason, we conclude that the trial court's grant of the motion to strike for its stated basis was an abuse of discretion. 11 Thus, although Miles now contends that the trial court did not strike the answer and counterclaim due solely to Cameron's failure to respond to the motion and that it was instead granted for the reasons given in the actual motion to strike, the explicit language of the trial court's order (and Miles's own subsequent filings 12) suggests otherwise. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order striking Cameron's answer and counterclaim and the entry of default judgment.
2. Cameron further argues that the trial court erred in awarding Miles $25,000 in attorney fees with no hearing or motion on same, and with no factual or statutory basis for the award contained in the trial court's order. We agree that the trial court's order is deficient in this respect and therefore vacate and remand for clarification.
The parties dispute under which statutory basis the trial court awarded the attorney fees, whether Miles requested attorney fees, and whether the issue was properly addressed during the untranscribed hearing. What is undisputed is that the trial court's order does not specify a statutory basis or findings of fact to support the attorney-fees award. And given our analysis and holding supra in Division 1 ( ), we are unable to conclude under what authority or factual basis the trial court awarded attorney fees.13 We therefore vacate the trial court's grant of this award and remand for further clarification of this order.14
Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court's grant of the motion to strike Cameron's answer and counterclaim and the entry of default judgment, and we vacate the grant of attorney fees and remand with direction.
Judgment reversed in part and vacated in part, and case remanded with direction.
SMITH, P.J., and MIKELL, J., concur.
1. It does not appear that the trial court ever ruled on this motion.
FN2. Cameron v. Miles, 304 Ga.App. 161, 163, 695 S.E.2d 691 (2010).
FN3. E.g., Heath v. Beech, 300 Ga.App. 756, 756(1), 686 S.E.2d 283 (2009); Edenfield & Cox, P.C. v. Mack, 282 Ga.App. 816, 816, 640 S.E.2d 343 (2006).
FN4. Wetherington v. Koepenick & Horne, Inc., 153 Ga.App. 302, 304(2), 265 S.E.2d 107 (1980) (citation and punctuation omitted); see also Flott v. Southeast Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 274 Ga.App. 622, 623(2), 617 S.E.2d 598 (2005) .
FN5. Barron v. Spanier, 198 Ga.App. 801, 801, 403 S.E.2d 88 (1991) (citations omitted); see also Green v. Snellings, 260 Ga. 751, 752(1), 400 S.E.2d 2 (1991) ().
FN6. Schrembs v. Atlanta Classic Cars, Inc., 261 Ga. 182, 182, 402 S.E.2d 723 (1991) (citation omitted); see also Rucker v. Blakey, 157 Ga.App. 615, 615–16, 278 S.E.2d 158 (1981) ( ).
FN7. See, e.g., Green, 260 Ga. at 752(1), 400 S.E.2d 2 ( ); Flott, 274 Ga.App. at 625(2), 617 S.E.2d 598 ( ); Lightwerk Studios, Inc. v. Door Units of Ga., Inc., 191 Ga.App. 756, 756–57(1), 382 S.E.2d 699 (1989) (...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Wellstar Health Sys., Inc. v. Kemp
...fraud, or other unlawful end.”). 20.Moody, 654 F.2d at 800(II). 21. (Footnotes and punctuation omitted.) Cameron v. Miles, 311 Ga.App. 753, 754–755(1), 716 S.E.2d 831 (2011). See also 22. (Punctuation omitted.) R.A. Siegel Co. v. Bowen, 246 Ga.App. 177, 180(2), 539 S.E.2d 873 (2000), quotin......
-
Brooks v. Hayden
...award and remanding the case when, inter alia , the trial court failed to make "necessary factual findings"); Cameron v. Miles , 311 Ga. App. 753, 756-57 (2), 716 S.E.2d 831 (2011) (vacating an attorney-fee award and remanding for further clarification when the trial court did not provide, ......
-
State v. Walker
...fatal to the State's appeal, as the error is apparent from the face of the trial court's order. See generally Cameron v. Miles , 311 Ga. App. 753, 755 (1), 716 S.E.2d 831 (2011) (finding transcript not essential where trial court's error appears on the face of its order).2 We note that if t......
-
Am. Radiosurgery, Inc. v. Rakes
...avoid summary judgment by pointing to contradictory evidence in the record on an issue that makes no difference to the legal analysis”). 13.Cameron v. Miles, 311 Ga.App. 753, 754(1), 716 S.E.2d 831 (2011) (punctuation and footnotes omitted). 14. See generally Green v. Snellings, 260 Ga. 751......