Williams v. Kemp
| Decision Date | 28 January 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 43151,43151 |
| Citation | 255 Ga. 380,338 S.E.2d 669 |
| Parties | WILLIAMS v. KEMP. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Steven R. Kiersh, Buckman, Saul & Kiersh, Washington, D.C., Thomas West, Atlanta, for Harold Glenn Williams.
Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Paula K. Smith, Asst. Atty. Gen., for Ralph Kemp, Warden.
The applicant, Harold Glenn Williams, was convicted of burglary and murder, and he was given the death penalty for the murder conviction. His convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal in Williams v. State, 250 Ga. 553, 300 S.E.2d 301 (1983). He has now filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus, complaining, among other things, that the trial court's instructions to the jury on malice and on presumption of intended consequences were unconstitutionally burden-shifting under Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979). The superior court denied the petition, and we denied the application for certificate of probable cause to appeal. However, the United States Supreme Court granted the applicant's petition for writ of certiorari, and the case has been remanded to us for reconsideration in light of Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985), which was decided after our previous denial of the application to appeal in this case. We have granted the application by order; however, for reasons which follow, we affirm the judgment denying habeas relief.
The questions for decision are: Under what circumstances, if any, can Sandstrom error be harmless? Was any Sandstrom error harmless in this case? In answering these questions, it is necessary at the outset to undertake a review of Franklin and its progenitors. We will then state our holdings concerning the impact of these decisions upon the facts of the case under review.
Sandstrom was convicted under Montana law of "deliberate homicide." Mont.Code Ann. § 45-5-102. Under this Montana statute, criminal homicide constitutes "deliberate homicide" if it is committed "purposely or knowingly." At trial, Sandstrom admitted that he had killed the victim, but he argued that he did not do so "purposely or knowingly" due to a personality disorder aggravated by alcohol consumption.
At trial, the trial judge charged the jury that, " '[t]he law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts.' " 442 U.S. at p. 513, 99 S.Ct. at p. 2453. The defense objected to this charge on the ground that it had the effect of shifting the burden of proof on the issue of purpose or knowledge to the defense in violation of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975) and Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977). On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the complained-of instruction only required the defendant to produce some evidence that he did not intend the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts, but did not require the defendant to disprove that he acted purposely or knowingly. Sandstrom v. Montana, 176 Mt. 492, 580 P.2d 106 (1978).
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court, in a unanimous vote, reversed. The Court held that a reasonable juror could have interpreted the instruction, that the law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts, in either of two impermissible ways.
First, it was held that a reasonable juror could have interpreted the instruction "as an irrebuttable direction by the court to find intent once convinced of the facts triggering the presumption." 442 U.S. at p. 517, 99 S.Ct. at p. 2456. Under the Court's view, this would constitute a mandatory or conclusive presumption which would relieve the state of the burden of proving an element of the crime, i.e., that the homicide was committed purposely or knowingly; it would thereby conflict with the overriding presumption of innocence with which the law endows the accused and it would invade the factfinding function of the jury, in violation of Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952) and United States v. United States Gypsum Company, 438 U.S. 422, 98 S.Ct. 2864, 57 L.Ed.2d 854 (1978).
Second, the Supreme Court in Sandstrom held that the jury may have interpreted the instruction "as a direction to find intent upon proof of the defendant's voluntary actions (and their 'ordinary' consequences), unless the defendant proved the contrary by some quantum of proof which may well have been considerably greater than 'some' evidence--thus effectively shifting the burden of persuasion on the element of intent." (Emphasis in original.) 442 U.S. at p. 517, 99 S.Ct. at p. 2456.
Thus, the Court indicated that it would not be constitutionally impermissible merely to require the defendant to come forward with some evidence contrary to the presumption, i.e., to place on the defendant a burden of producing evidence or a burden of production. However, the Supreme Court held that the jury in Sandstrom's case could have interpreted the presumption referred to in the complained-of instruction as meaning "that upon proof by the state of the slaying, and of additional facts not themselves establishing the element of intent, the burden was shifted to the defendant to prove that he lacked the requisite mental state." 442 U.S. at p. 524, 99 S.Ct. at p. 2459. Such a presumption, said the Court, is constitutionally infirm under Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra, and Patterson v. New York, supra, as well as In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970).
Importantly, in Sandstrom the Court also held that instructions to the jury, that the accused was presumed innocent until proven guilty and that the state had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant caused the death of the deceased purposely or knowingly, were not "rhetorically inconsistent" with the complained-of instruction. 442 U.S. at p. 518, n. 7, 99 S.Ct. at p. 2456, n. 7. Thus, the Court held that the other jury instructions did not alter the possibility that the jury could have interpreted the complained-of instruction as creating a mandatory presumption or shifting the burden of persuasion with respect to an element of the crime to the defendant. As stated by the Court, 442 U.S. at p. 518, n. 7, 99 S.Ct. at p. 2456, n. 7.
Finally, in Sandstrom it was also argued that any error in the charge was harmless under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). Since this issue, as well as other issues, was not considered by the Montana Supreme Court, the case was remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the Montana Supreme Court, noting that intent was the main issue at trial, held that it could not assert that the erroneous instruction could not reasonably have contributed to the jury verdict. Montana v. Sandstrom, 184 Mt. 391, 603 P.2d 244 (1979).
In Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 103 S.Ct. 969, 74 L.Ed.2d 823 (1983), the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to reconcile the conflicting approaches which the courts of this country had taken in resolving the question concerning the circumstances under which a Sandstrom error can be deemed harmless.
At the time of the opinion in Johnson, there existed in state and federal courts basically three approaches to the question of whether Sandstrom error could be harmless. Under the first approach, a Sandstrom error would be considered harmless if the evidence of guilt was overwhelming. Under the second approach, the Sandstrom error would not be held harmless if the erroneous charge concerned a disputed issue in the case. Under the third approach, Sandstrom error was never considered to be harmless. See cases cited in Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S., supra, at p. 75, n. 1, 103 S.Ct., at p. 971, n. 1.
Johnson and four cohorts abducted a woman. Each of them raped her, after which Johnson bound her hands with wire and threw her over a bridge in a temperature of 23-28 degrees Fahrenheit with a wind-chill factor of negative 10 degrees Fahrenheit. They then took the victim's car, and they were subsequently arrested while they were in or near the car.
Johnson's cohorts pleaded guilty. Johnson was charged with, and convicted of, attempted murder, kidnapping, robbery, and sexual assault. His defense was that the woman had consented to travel with the group and to have sex with them, and that Johnson did not intend to kill the woman or keep her car.
The trial court gave the jury general instructions concerning the presumption of innocence and the state's burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of each element of the crime. In addition, the trial judge charged the jury that, " 'A person's intention may be inferred from his conduct and every person is conclusively presumed to intend the natural and necessary consequences of his acts ...' " 460 U.S., supra, at p. 78, 103 S.Ct., at p. 973. In charging the jury on the elements of the crime of attempted murder, the court again instructed the jury concerning the conclusive presumption. However, as to the kidnapping charge, the trial court instructed the jury that, "what a man's intention has been is necessarily very largely a matter of inference ..." Id. at p. 79, n. 6, 103 S.Ct. at p. 973, n. 6.
On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court reversed Johnson's attempted murder and robbery convictions because of the...
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