Cameron v. State

• Decision Date: 20 December 1991
• Docket Number: Nos. S-3474,S-3510,s. S-3474
• Citation: 822 P.2d 1362
• Parties: Karl B. CAMERON, Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. STATE of Alaska, Alaska Power Authority, Inc., and Ebasco Services, Inc., Appellees and Cross-Appellants.
• Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Page 1362

822 P.2d 1362

Karl B. CAMERON, Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. STATE of Alaska, Alaska Power Authority, Inc., and Ebasco

Services, Inc., Appellees and Cross-Appellants.

Nos. S-3474, S-3510.

Supreme Court of Alaska.

Dec. 20, 1991.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 27, 1992.

William J. Soule, Law Office of William J. Soule, Anchorage, for appellant and cross-appellee.

Elliott T. Dennis, Pletcher, Weinig, Lottridge & Moser, Anchorage, for appellees and cross-appellants.

Before RABINOWITZ, C.J., and BURKE, MATTHEWS, COMPTON and MOORE, JJ.

OPINION

MATTHEWS, Justice.

Karl B. Cameron appeals a judgment entered on statute of limitations grounds in favor of the State of Alaska, Alaska Power Authority, Inc., and Ebasco Services, Inc. (hereinafter "the State") and the award of costs to the State. We affirm. The State cross-appeals the trial court's determination in limine to prohibit Cameron's former wife from testifying concerning "any acts, words or conduct which occurred during the marriage." Because we have affirmed the dismissal of Cameron's claim, this issue is moot.

FACTS ¹

From 1965 through 1983, Cameron worked as a miner digging tunnels. From late 1982 until September 1983, Cameron worked in tunnels excavated as part of the Terror Lake Hydroelectric Project in Kodiak. On four days in February 1983, Cameron was exposed to particularly heavy concentrations of rock dust, diesel exhaust, and dynamite-blasting by-products. During this heavy exposure, he had difficulty breathing. Cameron claims that there was continuous poor air quality in the tunnels while he worked on the Terror Lake Project. In October or November of 1983, Cameron first started having chronic difficulty in breathing. Cameron, who had suffered a back injury on the job and was not working at this time, attributed this difficulty to being out of shape and perhaps the cold weather.

Through February 1984, Cameron had "experienced a lot of problems with breathing," and his condition grew progressively worse. On February 27, 1984, when his condition had become "real severe," he went to see Dr. Norman J. Wilder, a pulmonary disease specialist. At that time, Cameron attributed his breathing problems to the working conditions in the tunnels at the Terror Lake Project. Cameron, in filling out the history portion of a "Physician's Initial Report of Work Injury or Occupational Disease" form, responded to the question "Workman's Statement of Cause of Injury or Illness" as follows: "Powder Smoke from Rolling Rock Blast That Was Vented Through T.B.M. Heading." He also stated to Dr. Wilder that he thought his condition was caused by exposure to blasting fumes and rock dust in the tunnels.

In a deposition, Dr. Wilder stated:

Initially I found evidence to suggest bronchospasm, a respiratory distress I thought was probably asthma, and questioned a relationship to prior exposures.... I could not be sure at the time whether that tunnel experience is what led directly to his wheezing, led directly to his asthma or not....

(Emphasis added.) It is not clear whether Cameron actually asked Dr. Wilder whether the exposure caused his breathing difficulties or if in fact anything was said about the subject. ² In any case, Dr. Wilder indicated that at such an early point he would not have given a definitive response if Cameron had directly asked him if a causal relationship existed.

On March 7, 1984, Cameron learned from Dr. Wilder that he had asthma. Cameron had no further contact with Dr. Wilder until December 1984, at which time he was "back with severe wheezing." On January 18, 1985, Cameron completed a notice of injury to the State initiating a workers' compensation claim for his asthma condition.

Although the severity of his illness was at least partially masked by continuous treatment with steroids, Cameron's condition worsened over time. On May 7, 1985, Dr. Wilder stated in a letter requested by Cameron that, "I feel there is more evidence to suggest Mr. Cameron's breathing difficulties [are] indeed a direct result of occupational exposure, [than] to take the opposite standpoint and say that he was destined to develop asthma anyway...." In deposition testimony, Dr. Wilder indicated that he made the causal connection between Cameron's exposure and his breathing difficulties for the first time in the May 7 letter.

On March 14, 1986, Cameron filed his complaint pro se, ³ ten months after Dr. Wilder's May 7 letter, and more than two years after Cameron's initial visit to Dr. Wilder of February 27, 1984. The State moved for summary judgment seeking dismissal on statute of limitations grounds on January 20, 1989. The superior court granted the State's motion. The court determined that March 7, 1984, the date Cameron was advised by Dr. Wilder that he had a lung condition, was the date that Cameron's cause of action accrued. Taking that date as the date when the statute of limitations began to run, Cameron missed the filing deadline by only one week.

At a hearing to determine costs, Cameron objected to the taxation of certain costs on the grounds that they would not have been incurred if the State had promptly moved for summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds. Nevertheless, the costs were awarded.

DISCUSSION

I. Did the Court Err in Granting Summary Judgment on Statute of Limitations Grounds?

Both parties agree that AS 09.10.070 requires that Cameron's claim be brought within two years of the accrual of his cause of action. See Yurioff v. American Honda Motor Co., 803 P.2d 386, 388 (Alaska 1990); Silverton v. Marler, 389 P.2d 3, 5 (Alaska 1964). Under the traditional, and at one time absolute, ⁴ "damages rule," accrual of a cause of action is established at the time of the injury. Pedersen v. Zielski, 822 P.2d 903, 906 (Alaska 1991); Russell v. Municipality of Anchorage, 743 P.2d 372, 375 (Alaska 1987) (citing Gudenau & Co. v. Sweeney Ins., 736 P.2d 763, 766-67 (Alaska 1987)).

The "discovery rule" developed as a means to mitigate the harshness that can result from the damages rule's preclusion of claims where the injury provided insufficient notice of the cause of action to the plaintiff. ⁵ To accomplish this, the discovery rule balances two competing policies: the defendant's right to repose; and, the basic fairness of insuring a plaintiff's right to seek relief in court. Hanebuth, 694 P.2d at 146 (limitation period not intended to "be interpreted to reach unjust and absurd results").

The statute of limitations protects the defendant by limiting the time a plaintiff has to respond once the cause of action accrues. As a statute of repose, the statute of limitations "avoid[s] the injustice which may result from the prosecution of stale claims ... [and] protect[s] against the difficulties caused by lost evidence, faded memories and disappearing witnesses." Haakanson v. Wakefield Seafoods, Inc., 600 P.2d 1087, 1090 (Alaska 1979) (quoting Byrne v. Ogle, 488 P.2d 716, 718 (Alaska 1971) and citing AS 09.10.010). The statute of limitations provides the plaintiff with a reasonable period in which to pursue and preserve the cause of action. Until the plaintiff is on notice of the cause of action, the plaintiff can neither pursue nor preserve it.

Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Stiles, 756 P.2d 288 (Alaska 1988), sets forth an exposition of Alaska's discovery rule:

[T]he statute of limitations does not begin to run until the claimant discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, the existence of all elements essential to the cause of action. Hanebuth v. Bell Helicopter Int'l, 694 P.2d 143, 144 (Alaska 1984). Thus we have said "the relevant inquiry is the date when [the claimant] reasonably should have known of the facts supporting her cause of action." Russell, 743 P.2d at 375. See also Demoski v. New, 737 P.2d 780, 788 (Alaska 1987); Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456, 464 (Alaska 1986). We look to the date when a reasonable person has enough information to alert that person that he or she has a potential cause of action or should begin an inquiry to protect his or her rights. Sharrow v. Archer, 658 P.2d 1331, 1334 (Alaska 1983).

....

... [When a person has] notice of facts " 'sufficient to prompt a person of average prudence to inquire,' ... [the person] should be deemed to have notice of all facts which reasonable inquiry would disclose." Russell, 743 P.2d at 376 (quoting Vigil v. Spokane County, 714 P.2d 692, 695 (Wash.App.1986).

Id. at 291-92.

This is a formulation of the discovery rule that will work for most, but not all cases. Most notably it mentions two accrual dates: (1) the date when plaintiff reasonably should have discovered the existence of all essential elements of the cause of action; and, (2) the date when the plaintiff has information which is sufficient to alert a reasonable person to begin an inquiry to protect his rights. The dates are different, since the point when the elements of a cause of action are discovered may come after and as a result of a reasonable inquiry. The inquiry, in turn, may be a time-consuming process.

In Mine Safety and in other cases, ⁶ we held that the inquiry notice date, rather than the date when the inquiry should have produced knowledge of the elements of the cause of action, was the date from which the statutory period began to run. Id. at 292. The Mine Safety formulation of the discovery rule therefore contains a seed which can produce unjust results. A reasonable inquiry, once triggered by inquiry notice, may not produce knowledge of the elements of a cause of action within the statutory period, or it may produce knowledge of the elements of a cause of action only relatively late in the statutory period. Either way it is possible that a litigant may be deprived of his right to bring a lawsuit before he has had a reasonable opportunity to do so.

In the case of Palmer v. Borg-Warner Corp., 818 P.2d 632 (Alaska 1990), the argument was made that even though inquiry notice may have...