Campbell v. Arkansas State Hospital, 5-1360

• Decision Date: 04 November 1957
• Docket Number: No. 5-1360,5-1360
• Citation: 306 S.W.2d 313,228 Ark. 205
• Parties: R. A. CAMPBELL, County Judge, Appellant, v. ARKANSAS STATE HOSPITAL, Appellee.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Page 313

306 S.W.2d 313

228 Ark. 205

R. A. CAMPBELL, County Judge, Appellant, v. ARKANSAS STATE HOSPITAL, Appellee.

No. 5-1360.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Nov. 4, 1957.

J. Frank Holt, Prosecuting Atty., Little Rock, for appellant.

Pope, Pratt & Shamburger, Little Rock, for appellee.

ROBINSON, Justice.

This is a suit for a declaratory judgment, the issue being whether a county is required by law to reimburse the State Hospital for necessary maintenance for persons charged with a criminal offense who have been committed to the hospital by the circuit court for a mental examination. The Circuit Court held that the County is liable for such maintenance, and the County Judge has appealed.

Initiated Act 3 of 1937, Acts 1937, p. 1388 authorizes the circuit court to send to the State Hospital for mental examinations persons who have been charged with a crime and are awaiting trial.

Ark.Stats. § 43-1301 provides:

'* * * The state hospital shall be reimbursed by the county for such observation at the same rate as that established for the maintenance of patients under the provisions of Act 241 Ark.Acts of 1943 (Ark.Stats. (1947) Section 58-230). * * *' Act 415 of the Acts of 1955 (Ark.Stats. § 59-230.1, Pocket Supp.) provides:

'The Business Manager of the State Hospital shall periodically ascertain the per capita cost of maintenance of patients and shall render monthly statements of charges therefor to the guardian or other person whose duty it is to provide care, maintenance or support of each patient, and he shall diligently attempt to collect such charges.'

Judge Mitchell Cockrill of the Pulaski Circuit Court, Third Division, wrote an opinion as follows:

'The First Division Pulaski Circuit Court (Criminal Division) in the course of criminal actions pending before it committed some twenty-seven persons to the State Hospital when those persons who had been charged with a crime raised the defense of insanity. Such a commitment procedure is authorized by Initiated Act 3, Ark.Acts of 1936 as amended by Act 237, Ark.Acts of 1955 (Ark.Stat. (1947) Pocket Supp. § 43-1301); which act provides that the State Hospital 'shall be reimbursed by the county * * * at the same rate as that established for the maintenance of patients under the provisions of Act 241, Ark.Acts of 1943 (Ark.Stat. (1947) Pocket Supp. § 59-230.1).' The commitment of the Pulaski Circuit Court, First Division, was in the usual course of handling the criminal proceedings by the State, then pending before it, and was necessary in the discharge of its duties.

'The State Hospital accordingly billed the County $50 for each of twenty-seven persons committed for an observation and report. The total amount claimed by the State Hospital is $1,350. The State Hospital charged Pulaski County 'at the same rate as that established for the maintenance' of other patients. No more than 90 days was charged to the County for any one patient.

'There is no objection to the rate charged and no question of the reasonableness of the charge of $50 per month per patient; nor is there any contention that the State Hospital acted in excess of the authority conferred by Act 415, § 4(a), Ark.Acts of 1955 (Ark.Stat. (1947) Pocket Supp. § 59-230.1). There is no contention that the act authorizing the hospital to fix the charges is unconstitutional for lack of adequate standards to guide the determination, and none could be raised, for the charge could be determined by simple accounting and mathematical computations. Judge Campbell's defense and contention seems to be that the Legislature cannot constitutionally impose a charge on the County since by Section 28 of Article 7, Ark.Const. he is given 'exclusive original jurisdiction in all matters relating to * * * the disbursement of money for county purposes, and in every other case that may be necessary to the internal improvement and local concerns of the respective counties.'

'The defendant makes the further contention that, what the Legislature cannot do, namely, bind the County Court in its area of exclusive jurisdiction, neither can it delegate to the State Hospital Board the power to do.

'The defendant bases his entire argument on Section 28 of Article 7 of the Arkansas Constitution and certain statements from the opinion of our late Chief Justice Griffin Smith, in the case of Campbell v. Little Rock School District, 222 Ark. 615, 262 S.W.2d 267.

'If we assume that the County Court has 'exclusive original jurisdiction' then there would be no difficulty in deciding:

'1. That the Act under consideration is unconstitutional.

'2. That the Act fixing and requiring payment of grand juror fees is unconstitutional.

'3. That the general salary acts of the county officials are unconstitutional.

'4. That the Act requiring the county court to defray the expenses of the several courts of record is unconstitutional.

'5. That the Act imposing the costs of primary elections on the counties is unconstitutional; and on ad infinitem.

'The crucial question is whether the County Court has 'exclusive jurisdiction'. Our court has stated, in Price v. Madison County Bank, 90 Ark. 195, 118 S.W. 706: 'We think that it was only intended by them [the framers of the Constitution] that the county court should have jurisdiction when the subjects enumerated in Sec. 28 of Art. 7 were directly affected. This construction is borne out by the decisions of our court.'

'Our Supreme Court, in the case of Adams v. Whittaker, 210 Ark. 298, 195 S.W.2d 634, had under consideration the question of the Legislature's power to impose upon the county the expense of a primary election. In a lengthy opinion discussing many facets involving such a problem, our court said, among other things:

"Section 28 of Article 7 defines the jurisdiction of the county courts, and gives them jurisdiction over matters of 'local concern' of their respective counties. There is nothing about this act [requiring the payment of expenses of a primary election] involving the jurisdiction of the county court, except indeed to order the payment of the expenses of the election for which the act provides.'

'The court then proceeded to quote from a prior opinion in the case of Little Rock v. North Little Rock, 72 Ark. 195, 79 S.W. 785: "It thus appears that the local concerns over which the county court is given exclusive jurisdiction are those which relate specifically to county affairs, such as public roads, bridges, ferries and other matters of the kind mentioned in the section referred to * * *"

'The Court concluded that the Legislature had the power to impose the expenses of an election on the counties and such an Act is not unconstitutional under Art. 7, § 28, of the Constitution.

'The Court has also held counties liable for the expenses of municipal courts created by ordinance which were adopted under authority of a legislative Act, as against the contention that such Acts were violative of the provisions of Art. 7, § 28, Ark. Const. Crawford County v. City of Van Buren, 201 Ark. 798, 146 S.W.2d 914, and Jackson County v. Pickens, 208 Ark. 15, 184 S.W.2d 591.

'The Supreme Court, in the case of Jeffery v. Trevathan, 215 Ark. 311, 220 S.W.2d 412, again reviewed some of the prior holdings and stated:

"(a) In Cain v. Woodruff Co[unty], 89 Ark. 456, 117 S.W. 768, it was claimed that a legislative enactment, requiring the county to pay the sheriff seventy-five cents per day for feeding each prisoner, was void as violative of the county court's power under said Art. VII, § 28 of the Constitution. In holding the Act valid, we said:

"'The Legislature, unless restricted by the Constitution, has full and plenary powers to adopt such policies and prescribe the duties which it demands of officers in carrying out such policies which it deems best for the peace and welfare of the People. Straub v. Gordon, 27 Ark. 625; Carson v. St. Francis Levee District, 59 Ark. 513, 27 S.W. 590.

"'Aside from the restriction of the State or Federal Constitutions, the Legislature is unfettered in the exercise of legislative power. The question as to whether the enactment is wise or expedient belongs exclusively for the General Assembly to determine. State v. Martin, 60 Ark. 353. [30 S.W. 421, 28 L.R.A. 153]

""The Constitution regards the county courts as political and corporate bodies that are to be controlled and regulated in their discretion by the acts of the General Assembly, and not as independent of or superior to it. As political and corporate bodies, they are required to conform their action to the rule of the Legislature, and in the exercise of their jurisdiction to proceed in the mode and manner prescribed by law. County of Pulaski v. Irvin, 4 Ark. 475; Hudson v. Jefferson County Court, 28 Ark. 359.''

"(b) In Crawford County v. City of Van Buren, 201 Ark. 798, 146 S.W.2d 914, it was claimed that a legislative enactment requiring the quorum courts to appropriate money for municipal court purposes was violative of the said Art. VII, § 28 of the Constitution. In holding the legislative enactment to be valid, we said, in referring to §§ 28 and 30 of Art. VII:

"'We do not think, however, that these sections of the Constitution operate to deprive the general assembly of the power to impose duties upon counties and to require counties to pay therefor. Our cases are to the contrary. For instance, in the case of Polk County v. Mena Star Co., 175 Ark. 76, 298 S.W. 1002, there is an enumeration of various items of expenses imposed upon counties by legislative enactment. In the case of Burrow, County Judge v. Batchelor, 193 Ark. 229, 98 S.W.2d 946, there was involved an act of the general assembly requiring all counties to pay salaries of circuit court and grand jury stenographers. This act was upheld, * * *"

'Act 77, § 6, Ark. Acts of 1879, Pope's Digest § 2527, now codified as Ark.Stat. (1947), § 17-409, has been considered and discussed in many cases. In Polk County v. Mena Star Co., supra, it...