Polk County v. Mena Star Co.

• Decision Date: 17 October 1927
• Docket Number: 246
• Citation: 298 S.W. 1002,175 Ark. 76
• Parties: POLK COUNTY v. MENA STAR COMPANY
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

298 S.W. 1002

175 Ark. 76

POLK COUNTY v. MENA STAR COMPANY

No. 246

Supreme Court of Arkansas

October 17, 1927

Appeal from Polk Circuit Court; B. E. Isbell, Judge; affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

Mark P Olney, for appellant.

Minor Pipkin, for appellee.

H. W Applegate, Attorney General, amicus curiae.

OPINION

MCHANEY, J.

This appeal involves another construction of Amendment No. 11 to the Constitution of this State. Appellee, Mena Star Company is a printing establishment in the city of Mena, Polk County, Arkansas, and in the year 1926, by order of the county board of election commissioners of said county, printed election supplies for the general State election in October and the congressional election in November, consisting of ballots, poll-books, tally sheets, etc., the bill for which amounted to $ 114.50. The appellee, G. F. Bickle, is the sheriff of said county and, as such officer, had charge of the prisoners charged with crime in said county who were confined in the county jail, and incurred charges against the county in the lawful sum of $ 19 for feeding them. Both appellees presented their claims to the county court, which were disallowed, and they thereupon, within apt time, appealed to the circuit court. The cause was submitted to the circuit court upon these claims and an agreed statement of facts, which is as follows:

"It is agreed that, at the end of the fiscal year 1924, Polk County was indebted in a large amount upon outstanding county warrants, which were legal obligations of said county, and that bonds have never been issued to liquidate said indebtedness.

"That, for the year 1925, the revenues accruing to said county for said year exceeded the allowance by the county court of said county of claims accruing during said year, but that, during said year, a large amount of the warrants which were outstanding at the close of the fiscal year 1924 were presented to and paid by the county treasurer of said county out of the revenues of said year 1925, and that, by reason of said payments, the revenues for said year were not sufficient to pay all warrants issued upon allowances for said year 1925.

"That, for the year 1926, the revenues accruing to said county for said year amounted to the total sum of $ 33,054.72, and that allowances by the county court for said year of claims against said county amounted to the sum of $ 19,717.53, and that additional obligations of said county were contracted during said year to the amount of $ 8,453.48, but that such claims as were presented therefor were not allowed, for the reason that, at the time of their presentation, the funds of the county had been exhausted by reason of the fact that there had previously been presented to and paid by the county treasurer of said county the sum of $ 14,399.61 of warrants of the 1925 issue; that the total revenues of said county for the year 1926 exceeded the total amount of the legal obligations of said county which accrued during said year in the sum of $ 4,883.74, and that the claims of the claimants herein were among the obligations of said county which accrued during said year.

"That the claims of the claimants herein were not presented to the court for allowance until April 15, 1927, and that, at the time of their presentation, there were, and still are, sufficient revenues of said county of the year 1927 to pay said claims as well as all other legal obligations which were incurred by said county during the year 1926, in addition to the claims that have been presented for allowance during the year 1927, the said obligations for the year 1926 unpaid amounting to the total sum of $ 8,453.48 as aforesaid.

"That the claim of the claimant, the Mena Star Company, is for printing the ballots, poll-books and other election supplies ordered from claimant by the election commissioners of said county and used by them in the conduct of the general elections held in said county during said year 1926, and were used for said purpose; that the amount of said claim is correct, and that said claim has not been paid, and that the amount thereof is $ 114.50.

"That the claim of the claimant, G. F. Bickle, is for services rendered by him during the year 1926 as sheriff of said county for keeping and feeding prisoners confined in the jail of said county, which, under the law, he was required to keep and feed, and that said claim is correct in amount, and has not been paid, and that the amount thereof is $ 19.

"That said claims were duly and in due form of law presented to the county court of said county for allowance and were by the court disallowed, from which orders of disallowance said claimants have duly prosecuted their appeals to the circuit court of said county."

Thereupon the circuit court rendered judgment allowing both claims, made an order directing the county clerk to draw his warrant on the treasurer in payment thereof, and directed the certification of its judgment to the county court, to be spread upon its records. An appeal was prayed and granted, so the case is here for our determination.

As heretofore stated, it becomes necessary again to construe Amendment No. 11, the pertinent parts of which are as follows:

"The fiscal affairs of counties, cities and incorporated towns shall be conducted on a sound financial basis, and no county court or levying board or agent of any county shall make or authorize any contract or make any allowance for any purpose whatsoever in excess of the revenue from all sources for the fiscal year in which said contract or allowance is made; nor shall any county judge, county clerk, or any other county officer, sign or issue any scrip, warrant or make any allowance in excess of the revenue from all sources for the current fiscal year; nor shall any city council, board of aldermen, board of public affairs, or commissioners of any city of the first or second class, or any incorporated town, enter into any contract or make any allowance for any purpose whatsoever, or authorize the issuance of any contract or warrants, scrip or other evidence of indebtedness, in excess of the revenue for such city or town for the current fiscal year; nor shall any mayor, city clerk, or recorder, or any other officer or officers, however designated, of any city of the first or second class, or incorporated town, sign or issue any scrip, warrant or other certificate of indebtedness, in excess of the revenue from all sources for the current fiscal year. Provided, however, to secure funds to pay indebtedness outstanding at the time of the adoption of this amendment, counties, cities and incorporated towns may issue interest-bearing certificates of indebtedness or bonds with interest coupons for the payment of which a county or city tax, in addition to that now authorized, not exceeding three mills, may be levied for the time as provided by law until such indebtedness is paid."

This court has already had this amendment under consideration in the same or different phases in the following cases: Brickhouse v. Hill, 167 Ark. 513, 268 S.W. 865, where the amendment was held adopted; Kirk v. High, 169 Ark. 152, 273 S.W. 389; Matheny v. Independence Co., 169 Ark. 925, 277 S.W. 22; Babb v. El Dorado, 170 Ark. 10, 278 S.W. 649; Jewett v. Norris, 170 Ark. 71, 278 S.W. 652; Nelson v. Walker, 170 Ark. 170, 279 S.W. 11; Airheart v. Winfree, 170 Ark. 1126, 282 S.W. 963; Martin v. State ex rel. Saline Co., 171 Ark. 576, 286 S.W. 873; McGregor v. Miller, 173 Ark. 459, 293 S.W. 30; Independence Co. v. Lester, 173 Ark. 796, 293 S.W. 743; Dixie Culvert Mfg. Co. v. Perry Co., 174 Ark. 107, 294 S.W. 381; Ivy v. Edwards, 174 Ark. 1167, 298 S.W. 1006. It will therefore be readily seen that this court has been called upon to answer different questions arising under, because of, or out of this amendment a goodly number of times since it was declared adopted in Brickhouse v. Hill, supra, decided February 16, 1925.

Before proceeding to a discussion of the issues involved in this case, it may be well to bear in mind a few of the fundamental rules of construction relating to constitutional amendments, in connection with the original Constitution, and also the language of § 2 of this Amendment, which specifically provides that it shall repeal only such provisions of the Constitution as are in conflict with the provisions of this Amendment. In Kirk v. High, supra, this court said:

"The rule by which amendments to the Constitution are to be construed was stated in the case of Hodges v. Dawdy, 104 Ark. 583, 149 S.W. 656, where it was said: 'The amendment being the last expression of the popular will in shaping the organic law of the State, all provisions of the Constitution which are necessarily repugnant thereto must, of course, yield, and all others remain in force. It is simply fitted into the existing Constitution, the same as any other amendment, displacing only such provisions as are found to be inconsistent with it. Like any other new enactment, it is a "fresh drop added to the yielding

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