Campbell v. City of Boston

• Citation: 195 N.E. 802,290 Mass. 427
• Parties: CAMPBELL v. CITY OF BOSTON.
• Decision Date: 01 May 1935
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

290 Mass. 427

195 N.E. 802

CAMPBELL v. CITY OF BOSTON.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

May 1, 1935

Exceptions from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Brown, Judge.

Action of contract by Francis A. Campbell against the City of Boston, where there was a finding for plaintiff in the sum of $608.25, and defendant saved exceptions.

Exceptions overruled.

See also, 283 Mass. 365, 186 N.E. 577.

J. M. Maloney, of Boston, for plaintiff.

H. E. Foley, Corp. Counsel, and H. M. Pakulski and L. H. Weinstein, Asst. Corp. Counsel, all of Boston, for defendant.

RUGG Chief Justice.

This is an action of contract brought by the clerk of the Superior Court for civil business for the county of Suffolk, to recover $606.51 alleged to have been unlawfully and against his protests deducted from his annual salary as such clerk. No witnesses were called. The case was presented on statements by counsel in open court. The defendant admitted that the plaintiff was duly elected clerk of the Superior Court; that his annual salary of $6,800 was payable in monthly instalments of $566.65; that the plaintiff's bills were duly audited and allowed by the auditor of the defendant; and that the deductions of the were made for the months of March, 1932, to April, 1933, by order of the mayor of the defendant and against the protests of the plaintiff. The plaintiff admitted that the deductions from his salary so made by order of the mayor were made as contributions to public welfare.

The defendant relies entirely upon St. 1933, c. 121, § 6. It is in these words: ‘ All action heretofore taken by said city of Boston or any of the officials thereof in making deductions from salaries of officers and employees paid from the treasury of the city of Boston as contributions to public welfare is hereby ratified and confirmed and shall have the same force and effect as if they were reductions made under the provisions of this act.’ That act took effect upon its passage and was approved on April 11, 1933. It authorized deductions similar to those made from the plaintiff's salary here in controversy. All the deductions here in suit were made before the operative date of that act.

The first question for decision is whether section 6 according to the correct meaning of its words applies to the deductions made in the salary of the plaintiff before it took effect. It is a general rule of interpretation that all statutes are prospective in their operation unless a contrary intent appears by necessary implication from their words, context or objects. Legislation commonly looks to the future and not to the past except statutes relating to remedies and not affecting substantive rights. Hanscom v. Malden & Melrose Gas Light Co., 220 Mass. 1, 3, 107 N.E. 426, Ann.Cas. 1917A, 145.The words of section 6 plainly manifest a legislative intent that deductions theretofore made from salaries of officers payable from the treasury of the city of Boston for purposes of contributions to public welfare are ratified and confirmed even though such deductions were made against the protests of such officers. The phrase of the section is comprehensive and does not admit of implied exceptions exempting from its scope officers who gave no assent whatever to such deductions.

It remains to determine whether the statute as thus interpreted violates any right secured to the plaintiff under the Constitution. Every rational presumption is indulged in favor of the validity of an act of the General Court. Enforcement of such legislative enactment will not be refused unless its conflict with some provision of the Constitution is established beyond reasonable doubt. Perkins v. Inhabitants of Westwood, 226 Mass. 268, 271, 115 N.E. 411; Commonwealth v. S. S. Kresge Co., 267 Mass. 145, 166 N.E. 558.The plaintiff is a public officer in the performance of whose duties the whole community has an interest. He is in no sense the agent or servant of the defendant. The obligation to pay his salary rested upon the defendant by virtue of statute and not by virtue of any express or implied contract. Walker v. Cook, 129 Mass. 557; Cook v. Springfield, 184 Mass. 247, 68 N.E. 201.

It was held in Campbell v. City of Boston, 283 Mass. 365, 186 N.E. 577, which arose between the same parties upon facts existing before the enactment of St. 1933, c. 121, § 6, that the mayor of Boston had no authority to order any portion of the plaintiff's salary to be withheld against his protest and used as a contribution to the public welfare or unemployment relief, and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover in an action at law the portions of his salary so withheld. It is plain, therefore, that at the time of the enactment of St. 1933, c. 121, the plaintiff had an absolute and vested right to the portions of his salary theretofore withheld, and that they were then presently due and payable to him. They were his property. That right was not subject to any limitation, contingency, or delay. His services as public officer had been rendered. The law specified his compensation in unmistakable terms. He was entitled to the amount so fixed. It was a right protected by the Constitution. State of Mississippi v. Miller, 276 U.S. 174, 48 S.Ct. 266, 72 L.Ed. 517; Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579, 54 S.Ct. 840, 78 L.Ed. 1434.

The effect of St. 1933, c. 121, § 6, is not to postpone the payment of the amount due the plaintiff, but simply to take it away from the plaintiff altogether and devote it as a contribution to the public welfare. It undertakes to transfer by pure legislative flat the vested property right of the plaintiff to the public treasury. It is not a tax statute but a compulsory gift statute. Among the guarantees contained in the Constitution of this Commonwealth is the right ‘ of acquiring, possessing, and...