Hanscom v. Malden & Melrose Gaslight Co.

Decision Date31 December 1914
Citation220 Mass. 1,107 N.E. 426
PartiesHANSCOM v. MALDEN & MELROSE GAS LIGHT CO. et al; MALDEN & MELROSE GAS LIGHT CO. v. CHANDLER.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Case Reserved from Superior Court, Middlesex County; Charles F Jenney, Judge.

Suit by Edgar F. Hanscom, trustee, against the Malden & Melrose Gaslight Company. Cause reserved for the full court; there being also reserved for it a motion for final decree and execution filed by the plaintiff in the suit of Malden & Melrose Gaslight Company against Frank E. Chandler. Decrees directed.

COUNSEL

Adams & Blinn, of Boston, for plaintiff.

Chas T. Gailagher and Geo. B. Hayward, both of Boston, for Margaret E. Crowdis, and another.

Johnson Clapp & Underwood and Robt. P. Clapp, all of Boston, for Malden & Melrose Gaslight Co.

Chas T. Gallagher and Geo. B. Hayward, both of Boston, for Chandler's administrators.

OPINION

RUGG, C.J.

The Malden & Melrose Gaslight Company made an attachment of the real estate of Frank E. Chandler in October, 1906, in a suit in equity (211 Mass. 226, 97 N.E. 906). On August 18, 1911, Chandler made conveyance of much of that real estate to Arthur W. Newell by deed absolute in form, subject to the attachments, and at the same time they executed a memorandum of agreement setting forth the fact of the conveyance and stipulating that it was made as collateral security to protect the Fourth National Bank, now the Fourth-Atlantic National Bank, for all loans then or thereafter made by the bank to Chandler, with power to sell and account for the proceeds, after satisfying all such indebtedness to the bank, to said Chandler or his heirs, executors or administrators. Chandler died on June 30, 1913, largely indebted to the bank. The plaintiff Hanscom has been appointed trustee in place of Mr. Newell, who has died. Rescript in the suit of the Malden & Melrose Gaslight Co. v. Chandler, affirming the decree of the superior court, was made

on March 2, 1912. No final decree has been entered, but the plaintiff in that suit is now pressing for a decree.

Hanscom, as trustee, brings this suit to restrain the Malden & Melrose Gaslight Company from undertaking to make levy on the real estate formerly of Chandler, to declare appears by necessary implication Chandler and for other relief. It is in substance a suit to remove the cloud on his title.

The Fourth-Atlantic National Bank has filed a 'stipulation' agreeing to be bound by the decree to be entered. This is irregular. A person should be made a party to a suit in equity if he is to be affected by the proceeding.

The principal question hinges on the effect of St. 1913, c. 305, which became operative on its passage on March 19, 1913. That was after the attachment and after the conveyance by Chandler to Newell, but before the death of Chandler. This act amended R. L. c. 167, § 112, by adding to the provision that attachments of real and personal estate of a debtor not theretofore levied upon are dissolved by his death (with an exception not here material) the limitation that 'no attachment of property, real or personal, shall be so dissolved upon that part of the property which the debtor had alienated before his decease.'

The first matter to be decided is whether the statute, according to its right interpretation, applies to the facts of the case at bar. The general rule of interpretation is that all statutes are prospective in their operation, unless an intention that they shall be retrospective appears by necesary implication from their words, context or objects when considered in the light of the subject-matter, the pre-existing state of the law and the effect upon existent rights, remedies and obligations. Doubtless all legislation commonly looks to the future, not to the past, and has no retroactive effect unless manifestly required by unequivocal terms. It is only statutes regulating practice, procedure and evidence, in short, those relating to remedies and not affecting sustantive rights, that commonly are treated as operating retroactively, and as applying to pending actions or causes of action. Mulvey v. Boston, 197 Mass. 178, 83 N.E. 402, 14 Ann.Cas. 349; Adams v. Adams, 211 Mass. 198, 97 N.E. 982; American Locomotive Co. v. Hamblen, 217 Mass. 513, 105 N.E. 371.

The general rule that statutes are prospective only in their effect has been applied to statutes respecting suits on bonds for breach of liberty in prison yards, Call v. Hagger, 8 Mass. 423; evidence of an advancement, Whitman v. Hapgood, 10 Mass. 437; limitations of actions against executors and administrators, King v. Tirrell, 2 Gray, 331; Page v. Melvin, 10 Gray, 208; confirmation of illegal railroad location, Com. v. Old Colony & Fall River R. R., 14 Gray, 95; extension of equity jurisdiction, Buck v. Dowley, 16 Gray, 555; remedies against estates of deceased persons, Garfield v. Bemis, 2 Allen, 445; recovery of illegal assessments, Gerry v. Stoneham, 1 Allen, 319; abolishing usury as a defense, North Bridgewater Bank v. Copeland, 7 Allen, 139; Whitten v. Hayden, 7 Allen, 407; complaints for support of bastard children, Wheelwright v. Greer, 10 Allen, 389; validation as a corporation seal of a mere impression upon paper, Bates v. Boston & New York Central R. R., 10 Allen, 256; sales of intoxicating liquor, Hotchkiss v. Finan, 105 Mass. 86; settlements and support of paupers, Somerset v. Dighton, 12 Mass. 383; Com. v. Sudbury, 106 Mass. 268; Cambridge v. Boston, 130 Mass. 357; Abington v. Duxbury, 105 Mass. 287; Worcester v. Barre, 138 Mass. 101; suits against married women as if they were single and exonerating husband from liability for judgment in such suits, Hill v. Duncan, 110 Mass. 240; Towle v. Towle, 114 Mass. 167; McCarty v. De Best, 120 Mass. 89; special judgment where the defendant has given bond to dissolve attachment, and becomes bankrupt, Fickett v. Durham, 119 Mass. 159; Barnstable Sav. Bank v. Higgins, 124 Mass. 115; Mosher v. Murphy, 121 Mass. 276; removal of defense in personal injury suits of traveling on the Lord's Day, Bucher v. Fitchburg R. R. Co., 131 Mass. 156, 41 Am.Rep. 216; Read v. Boston v. Albany R. R., 140 Mass. 199, 4 N.E. 227; the admission of dying declarations upon indictments for procuring miscarriage, Commonwealth v. Homer, 153 Mass. 343, 26 N.E. 872; restricting the number of places licensed for the sale of intoxicating liquors, Com. v. Hayes, 149 Mass. 32, 20 N.E. 456; the curing of certain defects in notices required in claims for personal injuries, Shallow v. Salem, 136 Mass. 136; Dalton v. Salem, 139 Mass. 91, 28 N.E. 576; the creation of an action of tort for death caused by negligence, Kelley v. Boston & Maine R. R., 135 Mass. 448; Holland v. Lynn & Boston R. R. Co., 144 Mass. 425, 11 N.E. 674; Gunn v. Cambridge R. R. Co., 144 Mass. 430, 11 N.E. 678; bonds to be given to probate courts, Conant v. Newton, 126 Mass. 105; statements to be filed for mechanics' liens, Pierce v. Cabot, 159 Mass. 203, 34 N.E. 362; Revocation of will by marriage, Swan v. Sayles, 165 Mass. 177, 42 N.E. 570; Ingersoll v. Hopkins, 170 Mass. 401, 49 N.E. 623, 40 L.R.A. 191; divorces, Burt v. Burt, 168 Mass. 204, 207, 46 N.E. 622; damages accruing from fire set by locomotive, Wild v. Boston & Maine R. R., 171 Mass. 245, 50 N.E. 533; violation of building ordinances, Com. v. Roberts, 155 Mass. 281, 29 N.E. 522, 16 L.R.A. 400; restrictions of time within which suit may be brought for assessment against policy holders of a mutual insurance company, Sanford v. Hampden Paint & Chemical Co., 179 Mass. 10, 60 N.E. 399; approval by public boards, Haverhill v. Marlborough, 187 Mass. 150, 72 N.E. 943; deduction for good behavior in state prison sentences, Murphy v. Com., 172 Mass. 264-277, 52 N.E. 505, 43 L.R.A. 154, 70 Am.St.Rep. 266; changing effect of notice as foundations for action at law, McNamara v. B. & M. R. R., 216 Mass. 506, 104 N.E. 285. The statutes considered in all the foregoing cases have been held to apply only to causes arising subsequent to their enactment. The same rule prevails generally elsewhere. Reynolds v. McArthur, 2 Pet. 417, 434, 7 L.Ed. 470; Murray v. Gibson, 15 How. 421, 14 L.Ed. 755; Chew Heong v. U.S., 112 U.S. 536, 559, 5 Sup.Ct. 255, 28 L.Ed. 770; Cook v. U.S., 138 U.S. 157, 181, 11 Sup.Ct. 268, 34 L.Ed. 906; Herrick v. Boquillas Land & Cattle Co., 200 U.S. 96, 26 Sup.Ct. 192, 50 L.Ed. 388; Union Pacific Ry. v. Lamarie, 231 U.S. 190, 199, 34 Sup.Ct. 101, 58 L.Ed. 179; Cameron v. U.S., 231 U.S. 710, 720, 34 Sup.Ct. 244, 58 L.Ed. 448; Dash v. VanKleeck, 7 Johns. (N.Y.) 477, 502, 5 Am.Dec. 291; Lambard, Appellant, 88 Me. 587, 34 A. 530; Gardner v. Lucas, 3 App. Cases, 582, 597; Queen v. Ipswitch Union, 2 Q. B. D. 269; Moon v. Durden, 2 Exchequer, 22; Knight v. Lee, [1893] 1 Q. B. 41.

It is impossible to distinguish St. 1913, c. 305, as to its effect upon pending or past matters from those under consideration in these numerous cases.

Another and more decisive reason leads to the same conclusion. If the statute were construed to govern such a case as that here presented, it would be unconstitutional. The conveyance of the real estate to Mr. Newell vested in him all the right, title and interest of the owner, subject only to the attachment. It was a conveyance upon a valid and sufficient consideration. It was one which the grantor had a right to make and one which did not involve any fraud or prohibited preference

The grantee was a purchaser for value. The contract manifested by the conveyance and the property rights thereby transferred were entitled to all the securities conferred by the Constitution. When this conveyance was made, the law respecting the title was that the attachment Clarke v. Fay,

apply to the case at bar, has taken away from the grantee of the...

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