Richardson v. Cvs Corp.

• Decision Date: 17 October 2001
• Docket Number: No. 1:00-CV-361.,1:00-CV-361.
• Citation: 207 F.Supp.2d 733
• Parties: Linda Lynette RICHARDSON, Plaintiff, v. CVS CORPORATION d/b/a CVS Pharmacy, Inc., and Michael Seesholtz, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee

207 F.Supp.2d 733

Linda Lynette RICHARDSON, Plaintiff, v. CVS CORPORATION d/b/a CVS Pharmacy, Inc., and Michael Seesholtz, Defendants.

No. 1:00-CV-361.

United States District Court, E.D. Tennessee at Chattanooga.

October 17, 2001.

Kenneth O. Fritz, Nelson, McMahan, PArker & Noblett, Chattanooga, TN, Joe E. Manuel, Chattanooga, TN, for Plaintiff.

Larry W. Bridgesmith, Susan G. Lindsey, Waller, Lansden, Dortch & Davis, Nashville, TN, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

EDGAR, Chief Judge.

Plaintiff Linda Lynette Richardson brings the present action against defendants CVS Corporation, d/b/a CVS Pharmacy, Inc. ("CVS"), and Michael Seesholtz. Richardson alleges that defendants violated her rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2615, and terminated her employment in retaliation for her assertion of FMLA rights. She also claims that CVS is liable for discrimination on the basis of plaintiff's race, sex, and age in violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act ("THRA") TENN.CODE ANN. §§ 4-21-101 - 903. Finally, plaintiff brings a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Tennessee common law.¹

Presently before the Court is defendants' motion for summary judgment. (Court File No. 29). For the following reasons, the motion shall be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The motion shall be DENIED with respect to plaintiff's FMLA claims. The motion shall be GRANTED with respect to plaintiff's THRA claims of discrimination and retaliation, and her claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.

I. Standard of Review

FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c) provides that summary judgment will be rendered if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The burden is on the moving party to conclusively show that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the Court must view the facts and all inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Morris v. Crete Carrier Corp., 105 F.3d 279, 280-81 (6th Cir.1997); White v. Turfway Park Racing Ass'n, Inc., 909 F.2d 941, 943 (6th Cir.1990); 60 Ivy Street Corp. v. Alexander, 822 F.2d 1432, 1435 (6th Cir.1987).

Once the moving party presents evidence sufficient to support a motion under Rule 56, the nonmoving party is not entitled to a trial merely on the basis of allegations. The nonmoving party is required to come forward with some significant probative evidence which makes it necessary to resolve the factual dispute at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); White, 909 F.2d at 943-44; 60 Ivy Street, 822 F.2d at 1435. The moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of the nonmoving party's case with respect to which the nonmoving party has the burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Collyer v. Darling, 98 F.3d 211, 220 (6th Cir.1996).

The judge's function at the point of summary judgment is limited to determining whether sufficient evidence has been presented to make the issue of fact a proper jury question, and not to weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, and determine the truth of the matter. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); 60 Ivy Street, 822 F.2d at 1435-36. The standard for summary judgment mirrors the standard for directed verdict. The Court must determine "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see also Lapeer County, Mich. v. Montgomery County, Ohio, 108 F.3d 74, 78 (6th Cir.1997). There must be some probative evidence from which the jury could reasonably find for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Bailey v. Floyd County Bd. of Educ., 106 F.3d 135, 140 (6th Cir.1997). If the Court concludes that a fair-minded jury could not return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party based on the evidence presented, it may enter a summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505; University of Cincinnati v. Arkwright Mut. Ins. Co., 51 F.3d 1277 1280 (6th Cir.1995); LaPointe v. UAW, Local 600, 8 F.3d 376, 378 (6th Cir.1993).

II. Facts

Plaintiff, who is an African American female, was hired by CVS as a cashier for the company's Brainerd store on March 31, 1994. At that time she was forty-seven (47) years old. Soon after Richardson commenced employment, the Brainerd store closed. Plaintiff, the store manager, and another coworker were transferred to the Signal Mountain store. Soon after that transfer, Richardson was promoted to the position of shift supervisor.

Richardson progressed through various job positions at CVS. Sometime in 1995, she was promoted into the company's management training program. In accordance with standard procedure, Richardson was transferred to the East Brainerd store, a "training store," to complete that program. She completed management training in April 1996. At that point, she was working as an assistant manager, and she had responsibility for administering the company's equal employment opportunity policies and procedures.

Within seven months of completing management training, Richardson was promoted to the position of store manager. Her first assignment in that capacity was at CVS's East Ridge store. She began working in that position in December 1996.

Sometime during the fall of 1997, Richardson's supervisor, CVS District Manager Richard Kennedy, promoted plaintiff to the position of store manager of the Wilcox store. With the promotion, Richardson received a raise in pay. She was assigned the responsibility of "tak[ing] control of the store and get it functioning properly." (Court File No. 29, Richardson depo p. 53). When she took over the store, it had many problems including suffering from shrinkage (stolen property), lack of record-keeping, a disorganized stockroom, and issues with some employees. (Court File No. 33, Richardson aff. ¶ 3). The Wilcox store was a "target store," which means it was known to have "historically bad inventory, shrinkages." (Richardson aff. ¶ 8). Notably, in becoming the store manager for the Wilcox store, Richardson replaced a male employee.

Initially, Kennedy told Richardson that he would appoint two assistant store managers to the Wilcox store. However, he later informed her that the Wilcox store's budget would not support two assistant managers. Richardson knew that each store's sales volume controlled the number and type of management-level employees assigned to that store. However, she complained to Kennedy that she required two assistant managers. In response, Kennedy assigned one assistant manager to the store. That position remained filled during Richardson's tenure at the Wilcox store.

At some point after taking over the Wilcox store, Richardson contacted Kennedy and told him she had received a telephone call from someone who alleged that pharmacy technicians were stealing and selling drugs. Richardson requested that Kennedy install video surveillance cameras "all over" the store to catch any employee engaging in that behavior. Kennedy did not install video cameras. However, he told Richardson that he would ask the loss prevention department to investigate the situation. Richardson admits that she never worked in a CVS store that was equipped with video surveillance cameras.

In May 1998, a Wilcox store hourly employee, Vivian Harris, complained to Kennedy that Richardson was requiring her to work through her lunch hour. Richardson admitted this had occurred on several occasions, although it violated CVS policy and wage and hour laws. (Richardson depo. pp. 76, 80). As a result, Kennedy met with Richardson on May 13, 1998, and gave her a written warning for her violation of CVS policy and wage and hour laws.

Following Richardson's violation of this policy, Lori Bennett, CVS' Field Employee Relations Manager at the time, visited the Wilcox store. Bennett met with the store's employees and conducted a morale survey. The survey indicated extremely low employee morale in the Wilcox store. Employees felt that Richardson lacked leadership and management skills, and that she was not properly training and developing her employees. On July 10, 1998, subsequent to the morale survey, Kennedy met with Richardson and counseled her about her poor management skills.

On or around that date, Kennedy transferred Richardson to the Rossville store. Richardson testified in her deposition that this store was "in fair shape ... but not really up to par." (Richardson depo. p. 104). Neither Richardson's title nor salary changed. However, the Rossville store did not have an assistant manager. When Richardson requested extra management help in the store, Kennedy assigned a shift supervisor to the store. Additionally, Richardson trained another employee to be a shift supervisor. Later, Kennedy assigned an assistant manager, Joe Barnes, to the Rossville store. In response to Richardson's requests, he sent another management-level employee to the Wilcox store to assist on several occasions. On more than one occasion, Kennedy sent crews of management-level employees to help Richardson get the store cleaned up and ready for inventory. (Richardson depo. p. 108).

On September 17, 1998, Kennedy rated Richardson poorly on her performance evaluation. Due to her performance, Kennedy did not give Richardson a raise. On the same day, Kennedy counseled Richardson for leaving five bank deposits in the store in violation of the CVS policy requiring deposits to be made daily.

On November 10, 1998, Kennedy counseled Richardson because price cut signs had not been put...