Campbell v. Gates

• Decision Date: 20 November 1923
• Parties: CAMPBELL v. GATES.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

236 N.Y. 457

141 N.E. 914

CAMPBELL

v.GATES.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Nov. 20, 1923.

Action by Charles M. Campbell against Moody B. Gates. From an order of the Appellate Division (206 App. Div. 684,199 N. Y. Supp. 914), affirming an order denying his motion to dismiss the complaint, defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Torts 12

Interference with contract actionable. If A. has a legal contract with B., either for rendition of services or any other purpose, and C., knowing it, intentionally, knowingly, and without reasonable justification or excuse, induces B. to break the contract, causing damage to A., A. has an action against C. for such damage, since C.'s malicious motive is to be inferred from his intentional doing of a wrongful act without legal or social justification.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First department.

Theodore F. Humphrey and Charles C. Hoge, both of New York City, for appellant.

Arthur Garfield Hays and John Schulman, both of New York City, for respondent.

McLAUGHLIN, J.

This action was brought to recover damages alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff by reason of the defendant's inducing a third party to break a contract with plaintiff. The complaint alleges that the plaintiff and one McClure entered into a written agreement, for a good and valuable consideration, to co-operate in establishing, organizing, and publishing a magazine; that McClure, whose services were unique by reason of his experience and skill in administrative and editorial capacities, was to devote his time to the work of organizing and subsequently to the publishing of the magazine; that plaintiff, on his part, was to interest capital in support of the project, which originally was $200,000, but which by subsequent agreement was reduced to $50,000. It then alleges that defendant had due notice and knowledge of the contract between plaintiff and McClure, but, notwithstanding that fact, he ‘wrongfully, knowingly, intentionally, and maliciously induced, persuaded, and procured said McClure to violate, repudiate, and break his said agreement with the plaintiff and refuse to proceed further thereunder,’ and by reason of that fact plaintiff had sustained a specified amount of damage, for which judgment was demanded. Defendant moved for judgment dismissing complaint, on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The motion was denied, and an appeal taken to the Appellate Division from the order denying such motion, where the same was affirmed (one of the justices dissenting), on the authority of Lamb v. S. Cheney & Son, 227 N. Y. 418, 125 N. E. 817. Leave was given to appeal to this court and the following question certified:

‘Does the complaint herein state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action?’

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