Lamb v. S. Cheney & Son

• Decision Date: 06 January 1920
• Citation: 227 N.Y. 418,125 N.E. 817
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: LAMB v. S. CHENEY & SON.

227 N.Y. 418

125 N.E. 817

LAMB

v.S. CHENEY & SON.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Jan. 6, 1920.

Action by Calvin A. Lamb against S. Cheney & Son. From an order overruling demurrer to the complaint, defendant appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed (181 App. Div. 960,168 N. Y. Supp. 1115), and from its order defendant appeals, a question being certified.

Order affirmed, and question certified answered.

See, also, 183 App. Div. 913,169 N. Y. Supp. 1100.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third department.

Louis L. Waters, of Syracuse, for appellant.

H. W. Coley, of Oneida, for respondent.

McLAUGHLIN, J.

This action was brought to recover damages alleged to have been sustained by reason of the defendant's inducing a third party to break his contract of employment with the plaintiff. A demurrer to the complaint was overruled, an appeal taken to the Appellate Division, Third Department, where the order was affirmed, two of the justices dissenting, leave then given to appeal to this court, and the following question certified:

‘Does the complaint state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action?’

The complaint alleges, in substance, that prior to October, 1915, the plaintiff entered into a contract with one Bullard, by the terms of which the latter, in consideration of the payment to him of certain wages and the occupancy of a dwelling, agreed to work for plaintiff for a period of one year from October 1, 1915; that Bullard moved into the dwelling on October 1, 1915, commenced work, and continued to perform his part of the contract until the latter part of June, 1916, when, without plaintiff's consent, he left and vacated the premises; that prior to the time when Bullard terminated his contract and vacated the premises, the plaintiff, ascertaining that defendant was endeavoring to induce him to break his contract and leave the employment of plaintiff, to enter the employment of defendant, notified it in writing that Bullard was in his employ under a contract which did not expire until October 1, 1916; that if defendant persisted in its efforts to and did induce Bullard to leave, plaintiff would hold defendant liable for all damages flowing therefrom; and that after the receipt of this notice defendant ‘maliciously enticed, induced, and procured’ Bullard to leave plaintiff's employ and enter that of defendant. Then follow allegations showing the damages alleged to have been sustained by plaintiff by reason of Bullard's breaking his contract, for which judgment was demanded.

[1][2] By demurring defendant admits every material allegation of the complaint, and also every fact which can fairly and legitimately be drawn therefrom. Construing the complaint in this way, I am of the opinion that it states a cause of action under the rules established by this court. Posner Co. v. Jackson, 223 N. Y. 325, 119 N. E. 573;Lawyer v. Fritcher, 130 N. Y. 239, 29 N. E. 267,14 L. R. A. 700, 27 Am. St. Rep. 521;Rice v. Manley, 66 N. Y. 82, 23 Am. Rep. 30;Caughey v. Smith, 47 N. Y. 244;Woodward v. Washburn, 3 Denio, 369;Benton v. Pratt, 2 Wend. 385, 20 Am. Dec. 623. It alleges a specific contract for a definite time; defendant's knowledge thereof; that it ‘maliciously’ induced Bullard to break his contract and enter the employment of defendant; and by reason thereof damages were sustained. This states a cause of action, not only under the authorities cited, but, so far as I have been able to discover, under the rule laid down in the federal courts, the other states, and in England. Such rule is that if one maliciously interferes with a contract between two parties, and induces one of them to break that contract, to the injury of the other, the party injured can maintain an action against the wrongdoer. Angle v. Chicago, St. Paul, M. & O. Ry. Co., 151 U. S. 1, 13, 14 Sup. Ct. 240, 38 L. Ed. 55;Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 38, 36 Sup. Ct. 7, 60 L. Ed. 131, L. R. A. 1916D, 545, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 283;Hitchman C. & C. Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229, 252, 38 Sup. Ct. 65, 62 L. Ed. 260, L. R. A. 1918C, 497, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 461;Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555, 567;Berry v. Donovan, 188 Mass. 353, 74 N. E. 603,5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 899, 108 Am. St. Rep. 499,3 Ann. Cas. 738;McGurk v. Cronenwett, 199 Mass. 457, 461, 85 N. E. 576,19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 561;Cornellier v. Haverhill, 221 Mass. 554, 559, 109 N. E. 643, L. R. A. 1916C, 218;Brennan v. United Hatters, 73 N. J. Law, 729, 65 Atl. 165,9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 254, 118 Am. St. Rep. 727,9 Ann. Cas. 698;Kock v. Burgess, 167 Iowa, 727, 733, 149 N. W. 858;Cumberland Glass Co. v. De Witt, 120 Md. 387, 392, 87 Atl. 927, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 702;Thacker Coal Co. v. Burke, 59 W. Va. 253, 255, 53 S. E. 161,5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1091,8 Ann. Cas. 885;Bixby v. Dunlap, 56 N. H. 456, 22 Am. Rep. 475;Employing Printers' Club v. Dr. Blosser Co., 122 Ga. 518, 50 S. E. 353,69 L. R. A. 90, 106 Am. St. Rep. 137,2 Ann. Cas. 694; Quinn v. Leathen, 1901 A. C. 495, 510; Lumley v. Gye, 2 E. & B. 216; Glanmorgan Coal Co. v. South Wales Miners' Fed., 1903 2 K. B. 545, 573; Read v. Friendly Soc., 1902 2 K. B. 732, 739. This is also the rule laid down by many of the text-writers. Pollock on Torts (10th Ed.) p. 343; Anson on Contracts, p. 276; Wood on Master and Servant, §§ 230, 231; Schouler on Domestic Relations, § 487; Hammon on Contracts, § 350.

What was said by Evans, J., in Employing Printers' Co. v. Dr. Blosser Co., supra, is quite applicable to the facts set out in the complaint under consideration. He said:

‘In this state it...