Campbell v. Gould
| Decision Date | 24 July 1984 |
| Citation | 478 A.2d 596,194 Conn. 35 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | James CAMPBELL et al. v. Michael GOULD. |
Zbigniew S. Rozbicki, Torrington, for appellants (plaintiffs).
Randy L. Cohen, Trumbull, with whom was Raymond B. Rubens, Bridgeport, for appellee (defendant).
Before PETERS, HEALEY, SHEA, GRILLO and MENT, JJ.
At the conclusion of a trial arising out of a vehicular collision involving the plaintiffs, James Campbell and Debra Dominic, and the defendant, Michael Gould, the jury returned a verdict in the plaintiffs' favor and awarded Campbell $7885 in damages 1 and Dominic $39,700. Thereafter, the trial court denied the defendant's motion to set aside the verdict, but ordered a remittitur of $2885 for Campbell 2 and $9700 for Dominic. The plaintiffs have appealed, maintaining that the verdict was adequately supported by the evidence and not excessive, and that the trial court's order invaded the province of the jury.
In reaching its verdict the jury could have reasonably found the following facts: On May 19, 1979, at approximately 7:15 p.m., Campbell was operating a motorcycle, on which Dominic was also riding, in an easterly direction on Highland Avenue in Torrington. The defendant, who was operating his automobile, was proceeding in a westerly direction on Highland Avenue and, as he approached the intersection at Highland and Mt. Pleasant Terrace, turned left onto Mt. Pleasant Terrace. The defendant's car collided with the motorcycle, throwing Dominic head first to the pavement. Campbell remained with his motorcycle, sliding along the pavement until the motorcycle came to rest.
As a result of the collision, Dominic, who had a life expectancy of fifty-five years at the time of trial, suffered a concussion as well as severe abrasions on her forehead, nose, cheek, chin, and right shoulder. Gravel was imbedded in her chin and forehead as a result of the collision, and was still present at the time of trial more than three years later. Her face remained scabbed for two months after the collision and retained a pinkish tint for approximately six months. For approximately two weeks following the accident she could not see, and she was restricted to a liquid diet because she could not chew.
The jury could have found credible expert testimony that Dominic had suffered scarring of the forehead, upper lip, chin, right side of her face and right shoulder which would be permanent with only slight improvement even if corrective surgery were performed. The expert further testified that the dirt particles still imbedded in her face and causing hypopigmentation, a tatooing effect, could be removed by reconstructive surgery that would improve her appearance. Finally, the expert described the surgery, including the risks and benefits, preoperative and postoperative pain, the length of time of recovery, 3 and opined that Dominic should undergo the operation. The expert estimated the cost of the surgery at $1200.
The jury could have accepted Dominic's testimony that she had left her former employer in New York, where she worked as a secretary-receptionist for an insurance company, to search for work in Connecticut. She further testified that although she remained unemployed during her recuperative period, she was too embarrassed by her appearance to search actively for work. She eventually obtained a job as a secretary-receptionist twenty-nine weeks after the accident, at a wage of four dollars per hour--the same rate of pay she had previously earned. She further testified that she suffered extreme physical pain and anguish from her injuries and continued to suffer some discomfort, both physical and mental, as a result of the particles imbedded in her face. Finally, Dominic testified that she had incurred medical bills amounting to $94.25 resulting from the accident.
The jury was entitled to believe Campbell when he testified that he suffered three broken toes, had two fingernails ripped off, tore a hole in his left thumb, and hurt his knee as a result of the accident. He stated that he had been on crutches for one and one-half weeks following the collision, and was out of work totally for four weeks 4 and part time for three weeks. He further testified that he was employed as a logger earning approximately $250-$275 per week, and held a second job as a motorcycle mechanic, averaging $180 per week. He lost his second job, however, because his employer needed an immediate replacement.
Campbell also testified that his motorcycle was worth $2700 prior to the accident but only fifty dollars after the accident. He spent $1400 for parts to repair the motorcycle and repaired it himself.
Finally, Campbell testified that he had not regained full use of his thumb because it was imbedded with gravel, and that he still experienced some pain at the left thumb joint. He introduced into evidence his medical bills, which totalled $130, and an expert, testifying on his behalf, asserted that corrective surgery would cost $675. The expert also testified that a scar present at the left thumb joint would be permanent.
In ruling on the motion to set aside the verdict the trial judge stated that he "was shocked at the size of the verdict both because a figure had been put on [sic] by another judge which was substantially lower than mine, and this verdict was far, far in excess of what I thought the value of the case was." He stated further: The trial court concluded that
Slabinski v. Dix, 138 Conn. 625, 628, 88 A.2d 115 (1952), quoted in Wochek v. Foley, 193 Conn. 582, 585, 477 A.2d 1015 (1984). Slabinski v. Dix, supra, 138 Conn. 629, 88 A.2d 115. Unlike the trial court, we do not believe this "verdict so shocks the sense of justice as to compel the conclusion that the jury were influenced by ... mistake." (Emphasis added.) Id.
In reaching an opposite conclusion, the trial court emphasized that "the specials were very low in this case." We have in the past, however, discountenanced using the special damages as a yardstick by which to measure the general damages: Manning v. Michael, 188 Conn. 607, 616, 452 A.2d 1157 (1982); see Wochek v. Foley, supra; Herb v. Kerr, 190 Conn. 136, 139, 459 A.2d 521 (1983).
The trial court also claimed no permanent scarring...
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