Campbell v. Hogs

• Decision Date: 20 May 2011
• Docket Number: No. 103,458.,103,458.
• Parties: Robert L. CAMPBELL, Appellant,v.HUSKY HOGS, L.L.C., Appellee.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

292 Kan. 225

255 P.3d 1

161 Lab.Cas. P 61,149

32 IER Cases 407

Robert L. CAMPBELL, Appellant,

v.HUSKY HOGS, L.L.C., Appellee.

No. 103,458.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

May 20, 2011.

[255 P.3d 2 , 292 Kan. 225]

Syllabus by the Court

1. Kansas law recognizes the tort of retaliatory discharge when an employee is terminated for filing a wage claim under the Kansas Wage Payment Act.

2. The alternative remedies doctrine is a substitution of law concept under which a federal or state statute can substitute for a state retaliatory discharge claim if the substituted statute provides an adequate remedy.

3. The statutory remedies for violating the Kansas Wage Payment Act are not an adequate substitute remedy for a state retaliatory discharge claim based upon a wage claim filing because the wage claim redresses a different harm, the statutory administrative process varies greatly from the judicial process applicable to wrongful termination, and the statutory damages are limited by the wages wrongly withheld. The judicial process will better serve the public interest in deterring this type of retaliatory misconduct.

Larry G. Michel, of Kennedy Berkley Yarnevich & Williamson, Chartered, of Salina, and Angela Chesney Herrington, of the same firm, were on the brief for appellant.Daniel C. Walter, of Ryan, Walter & McClymont, Chtd., of Norton, was on the brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by BILES, J.:

This court considers for the first time whether a common-law tort for retaliatory discharge may be brought against an employer when an employee claims he or she was fired for filing a wage claim under the Kansas Wage Payment Act (KWPA), K.S.A. 44–313 et seq. The district court dismissed the lawsuit because there was no previously recognized exception to the terminable-at-will doctrine for discharging an employee for filing a KWPA wage claim. The district court also found there was an adequate remedy available under that Act. We hold the pleadings state a valid claim for retaliatory discharge, and the statutory remedies provided by the KWPA are an insufficient substitute for common-law remedies. As such, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Factual and Procedural Background

Robert L. Campbell was an at-will employee with Husky Hogs, L.L.C., for about 1 year when he filed a complaint with the Kansas Department of Labor (KDOL) alleging Husky Hogs was not paying him as required by the KWPA. Campbell was fired 1 business day after KDOL acknowledged receiving his claim. Campbell filed this lawsuit in Phillips County District Court alleging Husky Hogs terminated him for pursuing his statutory rights under the KWPA. Husky Hogs denied the allegation.

The company also filed a K.S.A. 60–212(b)(6) motion for judgment on the pleadings. It argued Kansas had not previously recognized a retaliatory discharge claim for alleging KWPA violations and no public policy reasons existed for allowing such a claim now. Campbell conceded the legal issue was one of first impression, but he argued Kansas public policy strongly favors wage earners and compliance with the statutory mandates, so his claim should qualify as an exception sometimes permitted at common law.

The district court granted Husky Hogs' motion. It held Campbell's termination did not violate Kansas public policy, even though it was required to assume the discharge resulted from filing the disputed wage claim. And the district court sua sponte determined that even if Campbell had stated a valid common-law retaliatory discharge claim, it was supplanted by the KWPA because that Act provides Campbell an adequate substitute remedy. Campbell filed a timely notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals. This court transferred the case pursuant to K.S.A. 20–3018(c) (transfer on court's own motion).

Analysis

Standard of Review

Whether a district court erred by granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is a question of law subject to unlimited review. Ritchie Paving, Inc. v. City of Deerfield, 275 Kan. 631, 633, 67 P.3d 843 (2003). An appellate court is required to assume the facts alleged by the plaintiff are true, along with any inferences reasonably drawn from those facts. The appellate court then decides whether the facts and inferences state a claim based on the plaintiff's theory or any other possible theory. Bland v. Scott, 279 Kan. 962, 963, 112 P.3d 941 (2005) (quoting McCormick v. Board of Shawnee County Comm'rs, 272 Kan. 627, Syl. ¶ 1, 35 P.3d 815 [2001], cert. denied 537 U.S. 841, 123 S.Ct. 170, 154 L.Ed.2d 65 [2002] ).

Exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine

Kansas historically adheres to the employment-at-will doctrine, which holds that employees and employers may terminate an employment relationship at any time, for any reason, unless there is an express or implied contract governing the employment's duration. Morriss v. Coleman Co., 241 Kan. 501, 510, 738 P.2d 841 (1987). But there are specific statutory exceptions to this rule, such as terminations based on race, gender, or disability. See K.S.A. 44–1009 (It is unlawful for an employer to terminate or otherwise discriminate against a person because of race, religion, color, sex, disability, national origin, or ancestry or to commit other discriminatory employment practices listed in the statute.).

There are also exceptions recognized by Kansas courts through our case law. Over the past 30 years, exceptions to the at-will doctrine created a common-law tort for retaliatory discharge. These exceptions gradually eroded the general terminable-at-will rule when an employee is fired in contravention of a recognized state public policy. Ortega v. IBP, Inc., 255 Kan. 513, 518, 874 P.2d 1188 (1994) (“[I]t is clear that this state has recognized exceptions to the doctrine of employment-at-will when an employee is discharged in contravention of public policy.”); Anco Constr. Co. v. Freeman, 236 Kan. 626, Syl. ¶ 5, 693 P.2d 1183 (1985) (“When an employee is terminated in violation of federal public policy, however, no state cause of action is pled.”).

To date, this court has endorsed public policy exceptions in four circumstances: (1) filing a claim under the Kansas Workers Compensation Act, K.S.A. 44–501 et seq ; (2) whistleblowing; (3) filing a claim under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 51 (2006) et seq.; and (4) exercising a public employee's First Amendment right to free speech on an issue of public concern. Anco Constr. Co., 236 Kan. at 629, 693 P.2d 1183 (workers compensation); Palmer v. Brown, 242 Kan. 893, 900, 752 P.2d 685 (1988) (whistleblowing based on good-faith reporting of coworkers or employers infraction pertaining to public health and safety); Hysten v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Ry. Co., 277 Kan. 551, 561, 108 P.3d 437 (2004) (FELA); Larson v. Ruskowitz, 252 Kan. 963, 974–75, 850 P.2d 253 (1993) (retaliatory discharge claim when a public employee is terminated for exercising First Amendment rights to free speech on an issue of public concern); see also Flenker v. Willamette Industries, Inc., 266 Kan. 198, 204, 967 P.2d 295 (1998) (whistleblowing based on good-faith reporting of federal Occupational Safety and Health Act violations); Coleman v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 242 Kan. 804, 815, 752 P.2d 645 (1988) (employer prohibited from terminating employee because of absence caused by work-related injury and potential workers compensation claim), overruled on other grounds by Gonzalez–Centeno v. North Central Kansas Regional Juvenile Detention Facility, 278 Kan. 427, 101 P.3d 1170 (2004); Cox v. United Technologies, 240 Kan. 95, Syl., 727 P.2d 456 (1986) (recognizing tort of retaliatory discharge for filing a workers compensation claim but declining to apply it under specific facts of case), overruled on other grounds by Coleman, 242 Kan. at 813–15, 752 P.2d 645.

Murphy v. City of Topeka, 6 Kan.App.2d 488, 630 P.2d 186 (1981), was the first Kansas case recognizing a cause of action for retaliatory discharge. There, plaintiff alleged he was terminated for claiming workers compensation benefits against his employer. The Workers Compensation Act did not contain an express provision making it unlawful to terminate an employee for filing a claim. In fact, the Murphy court noted the legislature had considered amending the law to explicitly permit a retaliation claim on two occasions, but neither amendment passed. 6 Kan.App.2d at 496, 630 P.2d 186. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals held a strong public policy could be implied from the statutory scheme and that policy needed protection against job-related retaliation. It noted the Workers Compensation Act provided efficient remedies and protections for employees, was designed to promote the welfare of people in the state, and was the exclusive remedy available for injured workers. As such, “[t]o allow an employer to coerce employees in the free exercise of their rights under the act would substantially subvert the purposes of the act.” 6 Kan.App.2d at 496, 630 P.2d 186. Four years later, the Court of Appeals' analysis was affirmed by this court in Anco Constr. Co., 236 Kan. at 629, 693 P.2d 1183, and then reaffirmed in subsequent cases. See Rebarchek v. Farmers Co-op. Elevator & Mercantile Ass'n, 272 Kan. 546, 560–62, 35 P.3d 892 (2001); Brown v. United Methodist Homes for the Aged, 249 Kan. 124, 132, 815 P.2d 72 (1991); Coleman, 242 Kan. at 810, 752 P.2d 645; Cox, 240 Kan. at 96, 727 P.2d 456.

Almost 2 decades after Anco Constr. Co., this court applied the same analysis recited in Murphy to recognize that a retaliatory discharge claim under FELA was necessary to protect an employee's exercise of statutory FELA rights. Hysten, 277 Kan. at 561, 108 P.3d 437. In Hysten, a railroad employee filed a retaliatory discharge claim alleging the railroad retaliated against him for filing a tardy claim for work-related injuries. The railroad argued this was not a valid state law retaliatory discharge...