Platt v. Kan. State Univ.

• Decision Date: 16 September 2016
• Docket Number: No. 110,179,110,179
• Citation: 379 P.3d 362
• Parties: Rachel K. Platt, Appellant, v. Kansas State University, Appellee.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

379 P.3d 362

Rachel K. Platt, Appellant,

v.Kansas State University, Appellee.

No. 110,179

Supreme Court of Kansas.

September 16, 2016

Mark Beam–Ward, of Beam–Ward, Kruse, Wilson & Fletes, LLC, of Overland Park, argued the cause, and Richard S. Fisk, of the same firm, was with him on the briefs for appellant.

Maureen A. Redeker, assistant general counsel and special assistant attorney general, of Kansas State University, of Manhattan, argued the cause, and was on the briefs for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by Nuss

, C.J.:

Rachel Platt, whose probationary employment was terminated by Kansas State University (University), sued the institution for retaliatory discharge. She alleged the University fired her as a result of her potential workers compensation claims for work related injuries.

The district court dismissed Platt's lawsuit essentially for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. It held that Platt was required under the Kansas Judicial Review Act, K.S.A. 77–601 et seq .

(KJRA), to first present her retaliatory discharge claim to the University for determination. A panel of the Court of Appeals reversed that dismissal and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. We affirm the panel and hold Platt's tort claim is not governed by the KJRA.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

At the outset, we acknowledge that when a district court has granted a motion to dismiss, “an appellate court must accept the facts alleged by the plaintiff as true, along with any inferences that can reasonably be drawn therefrom.” Cohen v. Battaglia , 296 Kan. 542, 546, 293 P.3d 752 (2013)

. Accordingly, the following facts are those asserted by Platt in her district court petition.

Platt was hired by the University as an accounting specialist in September 2011, and placed on an initial 6–month probationary period customary for new hires. Platt soon began to experience health problems that she associated with poor air quality in her workspace on campus in Rathbone Hall. After complaining to her supervisor, she learned that her predecessor also had experienced similar health issues and also complained about the environment of the office.

Problems were indeed later determined to exist with the ventilation system in Platt's office. She requested that the University fix the problem, and it arranged a meeting between Platt and an industrial hygienist to further evaluate the issue. Platt's employment was terminated the same day as that meeting. The University claimed the termination was for excessive absences—which Platt alleged were mainly a result of her work-caused health issues. Her firing on March 7, 2012, came 2 weeks before the end of her probationary period.

Platt sued the University and argued her employment termination was wrongful and in retaliation for her potential claims under the Kansas Workers Compensation Act (KWCA). K.S.A. 44–501 et seq .

She asserted she performed her job satisfactorily and that her firing was causally related to the University's discovery that she had an occupational disease connected with the air quality of her office. She sought damages exceeding $75,000 for loss of income, emotional distress, and costs.

The University filed a motion to dismiss. It argued the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over Platt's suit because her claims were governed by the KJRA, which required her to exhaust all administrative remedies made available by the University before judicial review could begin. See K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 77–612

.

The court granted the University's motion to dismiss. It held the “administrative process could have accommodated [her] claim and granted to her the fundamental relief sought, reinstated employment.”

A panel of the Court of Appeals reversed the district court. In Part A of its opinion, the panel held that, contrary to the University's assertion, Platt was “not seeking a review by the court of the process by which the University—as an agency—performs, or fails to perform, its statutory duties, function, or activities.” Platt v. Kansas State University , No. 110,179, 2014 WL 6090403, at *4 (Kan. App. 2014)

(unpublished opinion). Instead, the panel continued, “[she] seeks redress from the [district] court for a tortious act committed by the University unrelated to the agency's administrative function....” 2014 WL 6090403, at *4.

Consequently, the panel determined that the district court incorrectly defined Platt's action as one of wrongful discharge seeking reinstatement of her employment. According to the panel, Platt actually claimed that the University committed the tort of retaliatory discharge and she sought monetary damages that the University was incapable of awarding. So the panel held that Platt's claims were not governed by the KJRA and jurisdiction was proper in the district court.

In Part B of the panel's decision, it evaluated the case in the alternative, i.e ., as if the KJRA had applied to Platt's claims. Platt , 2014 WL 6090403, at *5–8

. It responded to the University's apparent argument that Platt should have sought relief for her termination from the University's Support Staff Peer Review Committee, which provides terminated employees an opportunity to seek redress before an impartial University committee. After considering the terms of Platt's employment during her probationary period and interpreting relevant statutes governing employment in state agencies, the panel held that the University's procedure was unavailable to Platt as a probationary employee. As a result, the panel held she was not required to show exhaustion of those remedies in order to pursue her tort claims in the district court. 2014 WL 6090403, at *8.

After the panel reversed the district court's dismissal, it remanded the case to that court for further proceedings.

We granted the University review of the panel's decision under K.S.A. 20–3018

. Our jurisdiction is under K.S.A. 60–2101(b).

More facts will be added as necessary to the analysis.

ANALYSIS

Issue: Platt's tort claim of retaliatory discharge is not governed by the KJRA.

The University argues that the panel erred by holding the University's decision in terminating Platt's employment was not an “agency action” as defined in K.S.A. 77–602(b)(3)

and therefore not governed by the procedural requirements of the KJRA. It contends Platt's claim is equivalent to wrongful termination complaints that are normally handled through internal agency administrative procedures. As a result, the University urges us to reverse the panel and uphold the district court's determination that Platt had an appropriate remedy through the KJRA and should have sought reinstatement of her employment there before bringing an action in court.

Platt responds that her claims sound in tort and therefore are not governed by the KJRA. She asks us to reject the University's assertion that all employment decisions by administrative agencies are “agency actions” governed by the KJRA. Consequently, she requests we uphold the panel's determination that her complaint amounted to a suit for retaliatory discharge—which the University was incapable of adjudicating—and affirm its reversal and remand to the district court.

Standard of review

This is an appeal from a district court's grant of a motion to dismiss. We review such a legal decision under a de novo standard. Cohen , 296 Kan. at 545, 293 P.3d 752

; Hale v. Brown , 287 Kan. 320, 322, 197 P.3d 438 (2008). “Additionally, when a district court has granted a motion to dismiss ... an appellate court must accept the facts alleged by the plaintiff as true, along with any inferences that can reasonably be drawn therefrom.” 296 Kan. at 546, 293 P.3d 752. If those facts and inferences state a claim based on plaintiff's theory or any other possible theory, the dismissal by the district court must be reversed. 296 Kan. at 546, 293 P.3d 752. To the extent that resolution of this issue requires this court to interpret the KJRA, review is unlimited. See Neighbor v. Westar Energy, Inc. , 301 Kan. 916, 918, 349 P.3d 469 (2015).

Discussion

At the heart of our analysis is our conclusion that the district court misinterpreted the nature of Platt's claims and the relief she sought. The order of dismissal clearly showed the court considered Platt's claim to be one of wrongful termination which simply could be remedied through the University's reinstatement of her employment:

“Plaintiff's foundational premises are: (a) Defendant employed her; (b) Defendant terminated her employment; and, (c) Defendant should not have terminated her employment. For that sequence, the remedial course must focus on the administrative procedure, since the entity that terminated the employment had an administrative procedure for Plaintiff to make the case for reversing the termination decision.... [T ]he remedy, restoration of employment, was well within Defendant's authority and experience. ” (Emphasis added.)

Turning first to the remedy Platt seeks, her petition shows she did not seek “restoration of employment.” Rather, she requested costs and monetary damages for loss of income and emotional distress “and such other and further relief as the Court may deem just, fair and equitable.” Moreover, the court's dismissal cut off any opportunity for Platt to later ask the court for permission to amend her petition to add a claim for punitive damages—a procedural delay required by Kansas law. See K.S.A. 60–3703

(“No tort claim or reference to a tort claim for punitive damages shall be included in a petition ... unless the court enters an order allowing an amended pleading that includes a claim for punitive damages” after “plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.”).

Turning next to the nature of Platt's claims, she asserts the University's actions constituted retaliatory discharge—an actionable tort recognized in the common law of this state that...