Campbell v. Motion Picture Mach. Operators' Union of Minneapolis

• Decision Date: 27 January 1922
• Docket Number: No. 22200.,22200.
• Citation: 186 N.W. 781,151 Minn. 220
• Parties: CAMPBELL v. MOTION PICTURE MACH. OPERATORS' UNION OF MINNEAPOLIS, LOCAL 219, INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE OF THEATRICAL STAGE EMPLOYEES OF UNITED STATES AND CANADA, et al.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

151 Minn. 220

186 N.W. 781

CAMPBELL

v.MOTION PICTURE MACH. OPERATORS' UNION OF MINNEAPOLIS, LOCAL 219, INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE OF THEATRICAL STAGE EMPLOYEES OF UNITED STATES AND CANADA, et al.

No. 22200.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Jan. 27, 1922.

Appeal from District Court, Hennepin County; W. W. Bardwell, Judge.

Action by John J. Campbell against the Motion Picture Machine Operators' Union of Minneapolis, Local 219, International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees of the United States and Canada, and others. Judgment for plaintiff, and the defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

A private party may maintain a suit for injunction to restrain a violation of section 8973, Gen. St. 1913, if necessary to prevent irreparable injury to property for which there is no adequate remedy at law.

The fact that a threatened invasion of a person's rights may constitute a criminal offense is no bar to relief by an injunction to which such person would otherwise be entitled.

The business of conducting a motion picture theater falls within the purview of section 8973, Gen. St. 1913, and a combination to boycott such a theater is one in restraint of trade and forbidden by the terms of the statute.

The word ‘trade’ is used in the statute in its broad sense, and is not restricted to trade involving useful commodities.

The publication of the statement that plaintiff was unfair to organized labor portended injury to plaintiff's business under the facts found, and the judgment enjoining the continued publication of the statement was not too broad and did not deprive defendants of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution. Hallam and Dibell, JJ., dissenting.

The term ‘unfair’ as set forth in a resolution of a trade and labor assembly that a certain theater be declared ‘unfair’ and on a banner carried by pickets of the theater, was intended to signify that patronage of the theater was to be withheld because of action taken with reference thereto by a labor or trade union. Geo. B. Leonard, Thomas E. Latimer, Robert M. Works, and Fred Berglund, all of Minneapolis, for appellants.

Nathan H. Chase, of Minneapolis, for respondent.

LEES, C.

Plaintiff, who owns and operates a motion picture theater in the city of Minneapolis, brought this action to enjoin the defendants from continuing in a course of conduct which interfered with his business. The trial resulted in findings in his favor. Judgment was entered thereon, and defendants appealed.

The findings are lengthy, but we set them out practically in full in order that there may be a better understanding of the questions presented by the appeal.

The Motion Picture Operators' Union of Minneapolis, Local 219, is an unincorporated association having a large membership composed of operators, by trade, of motion picture projecting machines. None of its officers or members is sole or part owner, or manager, or proprietor of any theater or place of amusement.

The Trades and Labor Assembly is an unincorporated association composed of delegates from the local trade and labor unions in the city of Minneapolis, including Local 219. The Assembly edited and published a weekly newspaper called the Minneapolis Labor Review. It was and is the official organ of the Assembly.

Until February 24, 1917, plaintiff employed none but members of Local 219 to operate the projecting machines in his theater. On February 10, 1917, having decided to reduce his expenses, he gave to his operators the notice called for by his contract with them for termination of employment, and gave similar notice to the Local. He informed them that, to reduce expenses, he was going to operate his machine himself for the whole or a greater portion of the time, but was willing to employ a member of the Local, at the wage scale fixed by it, to relieve him a portion of the time each day. The officers of the Local refused to enter into the proposed arrangement. Plaintiff then offered to join the Local, but was not taken in because the rules did not allow an owner or proprietor of a theater to become a member. On February 24, 1917, the employment of plaintiff's machine operators was terminated in accordance with the notice, and from and after that date and until June 18, 1917, plaintiff operated his machines himself, with part time aid from one Dillon, who was not a member of Local 219.

Subsequent to February 10, 1917, the officers and certain members of Local 219 and the grievance committee of the Assembly requested plaintiff to continue the Local operators in his employ, but plaintiff refused so to do except upon the terms heretofore stated. Thereupon such officers and members entered into a combination to restrain and injure the trade and business of plaintiff's theater by causing decrease and loss of patronage thereof, to the end and with the sole intent and purpose of forcing him to accede to such request. Pursuant to such combination, they secured the adoption, at one of the regular meetings of the Assembly, of a resolution declaring plaintiff and his theater to be unfair to organized labor.

The constitution of the Assembly provides among other things, as follows: That the Assembly shall maintain a list of names of individuals who are known to be unfair to organized labor, called the ‘We Do Not Patronize List.’ This list is absolutely under the control of the Assembly, which has power to place names thereon or remove them therefrom.

The editor manager of the Labor Review is elected by the Assembly and is required to edit the paper in conformity with the principles of the Trades and Labor Assembly.

Following the adoption of the ‘unfair’ resolution, and pursuant to and in furtherance of the combination above mentioned, the Assembly caused to be published from time to time in the Labor Review articles in which it was stated, among other things, that plaintiff's theater was unfair to organized labor, that the union had the right to withhold patronage from the theater, and that organized labor and the public thoroughly understood the issue and were giving the Operators Union loyal support. The paper has a general and extensive circulation among the members of the various labor and trade unions represented in and by the Assembly.

In furtherance of such combination and to further injure plaintiff's business, the officers and members of the Local, shortly subsequent to February 24, 1917, employed a ‘picket’ to walk back and forth on the street directly in front of plaintiff's theater, displaying a banner upon which was printed in large letters the words: ‘This Theater Unfair to Organized Labor.’ The picket commenced displaying the banner each morning at the time plaintiff opened his theater for business and continued the picketing and display until the close of the theater each evening, with the exception of two weeks, up to and including the time of the trial of this action on September 23, 1919.

Immediately following the institution of the picketing and bannering, and as the direct result thereof, crowds collected from time to time on the sidewalk in front of the theater and engaged in loud and boisterous talk relative to the trouble between plaintiff and organized labor, with the result that the police were frequently called to clear such crowds away and quell the disturbance thus created. At intervals pickets talked to people passing by and endeavored to attract attention and to get passers-by to talk to them. On one occasion at least the picket then on duty swore at the people passing in front of the theater and called them vile names. While the disturbances were more frequent during the first six months of the picketing and bannering, there were sporadic instances of this character, necessitating calling the police, down to the time of the trial.

After the institution of the picketing and bannering, a number of people came up to the ticket office, put down their money, and then, on noticing the picket and banner, withdrew their money and walked away. Others walked toward the ticket office and then, their attention being called or directed to the picket and banner, similarly walked away. As the direct result of the picketing and bannering and of the articles published in the Labor Review, large numbers of people have been influenced to withdraw and withhold their patronage of plaintiff's theater, and he has been and is annoyed and obstructed in its conduct and operation and has suffered and is suffering irreparable injury for which there is no adequate remedy at law.

[6] The term ‘unfair,’ as contained and used in the resolution adopted by the Assembly and set forth on the banner, meant and signified, to all members of labor unions and to the public generally, and was, by the officers and members of Local 219 and the officers and delegates of the Assembly, intended to signify, that patronage of plaintiff's theater was to be withheld because of action taken with reference thereto by some labor or trade union, and was not to be bestowed until rescission of such action was evidenced by the withdrawal of the picket and banner.

In substance, the conclusions of law were that plaintiff was entitled to an injunction restraining defendants from combining or continuing a combination to interfere with the patronage of his theater by picketing or bannering it or by publishing statements in the Labor Review that plaintiff was unfair to organized labor, or by publishing in any other manner statements naturally tending to injure or restrain his business. The record presents two principal questions: The first, whether section 8973, G. S. 1913, commonly known as the anti-trust statute, applies to this case, and the second, whether defendants' acts amounted to an unlawful boycott of plaintiff's theater. Our conclusion respecting the first question renders consideration of the second unnecessary.

Section 8973, G. S. 1913, omitting the penalty clause, reads as follows:

‘No person or association of persons shall...