Campbell v. State, 8 Div. 907

• Decision Date: 10 January 1984
• Docket Number: 8 Div. 907
• Parties: Ted Wayne CAMPBELL v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 913

444 So.2d 913

Ted Wayne CAMPBELL v. STATE.

8 Div. 907.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

Jan. 10, 1984.

E. Steven Croomes, Athens, for appellant.

Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and J. Anthony McLain and James F. Hampton, Sp. Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee.

HARRIS, Judge.

On February 9, 1983, the Limestone County Grand Jury indicted appellant, Ted Wayne Campbell, on a charge of burglary third degree. At trial, he was found guilty as charged in the indictment, and on April 29, 1983, the trial court adjudged appellant guilty in accordance with the jury verdict. Based upon three previous felony convictions, he was found to be an habitual felony offender and was sentenced to a minimum of fifteen years in the state penitentiary.

Testimony at trial revealed that appellant was arrested by Police Officer Thomas Townsend, of the Athens Police Department, at approximately 10:00 a.m. on October 11, 1982, on a charge of public intoxication. Officer Townsend had been informed that a local shoe store had been burglarized the night before, and that appellant was reported to have been in a pool hall trying to sell a pair of brown boots. Acting on this information, Officer Townsend read appellant's Miranda rights to him immediately after making the arrest.

Appellant was placed in a patrol car, and on the way to the police station, he spontaneously confessed that he had broken into a shoe store the previous night. On reaching the police station he was again given Miranda warnings, and he again confessed to breaking into the shoe store. Two police officers took appellant to a patrol car and he directed them to the store and identified it as the one he had broken into. He then directed the police officers to a spot where some shoes were hidden.

A second interrogation took place some four hours later and appellant again admitted committing the burglary.

There was extensive testimony concerning appellant's physical condition at the time of his arrest and statements. The police officers who arrested and questioned the appellant stated that he was intoxicated at the time and that his speech was somewhat slurred, that he staggered and was unsteady on his feet. They also testified that he recognized two of them and called them by name, that he was able to sit up, cross his legs, was coherent and responsive to questions, and that he never lost consciousness, or requested medical attention of any kind during the arrest or questioning.

Appellant testified that he was a heavy drinker and had been drinking steadily for two weeks prior to his arrest. He disclaimed any memory of his arrest or statements, but did remember hallucinating during an episode of delirium tremens while he was in jail subsequent to the arrest.

The first issue raised on appeal is whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence, in the form of certified copies of minute entries, used to enhance appellant's punishment under the Habitual Felony Offender Statute. Alabama law is clear that such records of conviction and representation by counsel are sufficient proof of prior felonies in an habitual offender context. Gilbert v. State, 410 So.2d 473 (Ala.Cr.App.1982); Ray v. State, 398 So.2d 774, cert. denied, 398 So.2d 777 (Ala.1981); Thomas v. State, 395 So.2d 1105 (Ala.Cr.App.1981). Appellant argues that these documents failed to demonstrate that he waived his constitutional rights under the Fifth Amendment when he made the prior guilty pleas. Appellant himself, however, asserts that when a guilty plea is entered in a state criminal trial that these federal constitutional rights are thereby waived. He cites Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968); and Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1964), for this proposition. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), involved a guilty plea entered by a defendant who was not represented by counsel, and is thus distinguishable from the case before us. Appellant's contention is, therefore, without merit.

The second issue raised by appellant is whether the fifteen-year sentence he received for his conviction of burglary third degree was excessive and constituted cruel and unusual punishment under Solem v. Helm 463 U.S. 277, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983).

In Solem, supra, the defendant was convicted of uttering a worthless check, and, because of prior non-violent felony convictions, was sentenced to life without parole under a state recidivist statute.

In this case, appellant was convicted of third degree burglary and his three prior convictions were two for burglary second degree and one for assault with intent to murder. Appellant was sentenced to the minimum allowable term. Clearly, Alabama's Habitual Felony Offender Statute is constitutional...