Cannon v. Minneapolis Police Dep't

• Decision Date: 01 June 2010
• Docket Number: No. A09-1154.,A09-1154.
• Citation: 783 N.W.2d 182
• Parties: James F. CANNON, Respondent,v.MINNEAPOLIS POLICE DEPARTMENT, Relator,City of Minneapolis, Commission on Civil Rights, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

783 N.W.2d 182

James F. CANNON, Respondent,v. MINNEAPOLIS POLICE DEPARTMENT, Relator,City of Minneapolis, Commission on Civil Rights, Respondent.

No. A09-1154.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

June 1, 2010.

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Syllabus by the Court

1. Minneapolis, Minn., Code of Ordinances § 141.50(m) (2010), which permits a panel of the Minneapolis Commission on Civil Rights to award mental-anguish damages to an individual who successfully demonstrates injury due to discrimination, does not authorize the panel to apply the compensatory-damages multiplier to a mental-anguish damages award.

2. The $8,500 cap on damages imposed by Minneapolis, Minn., Code of Ordinances § 141.50(m), applies only to punitive damages and does not apply to mental-anguish damages or attorney fees. David L. Shulman, Law Office of David L. Shulman PLLC, Minneapolis, MN, for respondent James F. Cannon.

Susan L. Segal, Minneapolis City Attorney, Timothy S. Skarda, Assistant City Attorney, Minneapolis, MN, for relator.

Considered and decided by LANSING, Presiding Judge; HALBROOKS, Judge; and CONNOLLY, Judge.

OPINION

HALBROOKS, Judge.

Relator Minneapolis Police Department (the department) brings this certiorari appeal from a determination by respondent Minnesota Commission on Civil Rights (the commission) that the department engaged in reprisal discrimination. The department challenges the final determination on five grounds: (1) the record does not contain substantial evidence to support the commission's decision on the issue of reprisal; (2) the commission exceeded its authority by doubling the award for mental-anguish damages; (3) relator is not a proper party to a charge of discrimination; (4) the commission should have recused; and (5) the commission evidenced bias. Because we conclude that the commission improperly doubled the award for mental-anguish damages, we modify the judgment to the original award of $15,000. But because we conclude that the judgment is proper in all other respects, we affirm as modified.

FACTS

Respondent James Cannon brought a charge of discrimination to the commission, alleging racial discrimination and reprisal discrimination by employees of the department. Cannon's charge was based on an incident that occurred on September 5, 2006, when Cannon, his wife Lois Cannon (Lois), and his son James Cannon Jr. (James), went to Wrecker Services, Inc., a towing facility in Minneapolis, to retrieve a towed vehicle. The family arrived at Wrecker's at approximately 9:45 p.m.; but after paying the towing fee, respondent was informed that the vehicle was unavailable and that they would have to wait. Over the next 45 minutes, four other people arrived at Wrecker's to pick up their towed vehicles. They were similarly informed, after they had paid the fees, that they would need to wait. The individuals, all of whom were African or African American, waited in Wrecker's small lobby.

At some point while the individuals were waiting, a male (not Cannon) struck the plexiglass window that separated the lobby from the area where the Wrecker's employee was working and demanded his car. In response, the Wrecker's employee called 911, and relator dispatched Officers Julie Hagen and Michael Meath. Dispatch provided the officers with the following information: “Cust in lobby yelling at clr and banging on glass. Mad because they want their car immediately but tow driver isn't there.” When the officers arrived at Wrecker's, they bypassed the individuals in the waiting room and spoke directly to the employee who had called 911.

The commission found that other than the incident involving the plexiglass window, “no other loud or disruptive conduct occurred while the Cannon family was waiting for their vehicle to be released. The Cannon family and other persons waiting were quiet or talking in a conversational tone....” Likewise, “[n]one of the customers waiting for their vehicles were acting unruly or speaking loudly when the [o]fficers arrived.” Officer Hagen testified at the hearing that the individuals in the waiting room were speaking loudly when the officers arrived, but the commission credited the testimony of the Cannons regarding the tenor of the waiting room.

When addressing the crowd in the waiting room, Officer Hagen yelled loudly that the next person to touch the plexiglass window would go to jail for disorderly conduct. Officer Hagen also stated, “I want you to shut up and behave yourselves! You need to act like adults!” Officer Hagen testified that she spoke in a loud, authoritative tone. But the Cannons testified that she screamed at the top of her lungs when addressing the waiting room. There is no dispute that Officer Hagen did not address anyone individually or ask who had hit the window, but instead spoke to the group in the waiting room as a whole. In response, Lois told Officer Hagen that she did not “need to use that tone,” to which Officer Hagen replied that she would “use any tone I damn well please.” Cannon attempted to explain the situation to Officer Hagen, including the fact that everyone had been waiting for approximately 45 minutes, and Officer Hagen replied, “I don't care if you've been waiting four days.” Officer Hagen testified that Lois called her a racist, which she felt was extremely inappropriate; Officer Meath also testified that Lois called them racist. Lois denied making this statement to Officer Hagen, and the commission concluded that her testimony was more credible.

Following this exchange, Cannon and his family decided to leave Wrecker's without their vehicle. Before leaving, Cannon stated in front of Officer Hagen, “I think this is discrimination. I'm going to file a complaint.” Officer Hagen replied that Cannon could not do anything to her. At the hearing, Cannon introduced the statements of two individuals who had also been at Wrecker's to pick up vehicles that evening; those statements corroborated much of the Cannons' testimony, including the fact that Officer Hagen told Cannon that he could not do anything to her.

After the Cannons left Wrecker's office, Lois realized that she needed Officer Hagen's badge number in order to file a complaint. She reentered Wrecker's and attempted to write down the badge number. When Officer Hagen noticed Lois, she “yelled in a mocking manner, pointing to her badge, ‘Yeah, you got my badge number! My badge number is 1019, got that?’ ” Officer Hagen repeated her badge number twice in a slow, mocking manner. Lois then left the office. She testified at the hearing that Officer Hagen's conduct made her feel intimidated and dehumanized.

Cannon and his family attempted to drive out of Wrecker's parking lot. Officer Meath, who up to that point had not been involved in the altercations, left Wrecker's lobby and walked into the parking lot. Officer Meath stood in front of the Cannons' car, writing the license-plate number on his hand. Cannon testified that he felt intimidated by this act and thought that Officer Meath's actions had to do with his statement regarding a complaint. Officer Meath agreed that he wrote down Cannon's license-plate information but testified that he did so because he “wanted to make sure there was a valid driver, there [were] no warrants on the vehicle, [and that] the vehicle wasn't stolen.” Both Officer Meath and Officer Hagen testified that Officer Meath routinely ran license-plate checks, sometimes up to 30 per day, because at that time he was new to the force. According to Officer Meath, he did not hear Cannon say that he would be filing a complaint.

Cannon filed a charge of discrimination, alleging both racial and reprisal discrimination by the department's officers. The Minneapolis Department of Civil Rights made an initial determination that there was probable cause to believe Cannon's allegations of discrimination. The matter was then referred to the commission for a contested hearing as required by ordinance. See Minneapolis, Minn., Code of Ordinances § 141.50(i) (2010). The department moved for recusal of the commission on the ground that Cannon had served on the commission from 1988 to 1998. The commission denied the department's motion for recusal, reasoning that Cannon's service on the commission more than ten years earlier did not create a reasonable appearance of impropriety. The commission also noted that none of the commission members assigned to Cannon's charge had been on the commission before 2002.

Following a contested hearing, two of the three panel members found that Cannon had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the department engaged in reprisal discrimination. The commission concluded that Cannon did not meet his burden of proving racial discrimination.¹ The commission awarded Cannon $10,000 for past mental anguish and $5,000 for future mental anguish and then doubled the mental-anguish damages, for a total of $30,000. In addition, the commission imposed a civil penalty of $7,500 on the department to be paid into the fund for the City of Minneapolis. Cannon subsequently petitioned for reimbursement of attorney fees and costs in the amount of $22,283.09. The commission granted Cannon's petition and amended the judgment to include the amount of attorney fees. This certiorari appeal follows.

ISSUES

I. Does the record contain substantial evidence to support the commission's determination that the department's employees engaged in reprisal discrimination?

II. Did the commission err by doubling the amount of Cannon's mental-anguish damages?

III. Is the department a proper party to a charge of discrimination brought before the commission?

IV. Did the commission err by not recusing itself from Cannon's case?

V. Did the commission evidence bias in its determination?

ANALYSIS

On review of a contested-case hearing, this court may affirm the decision of the commission or remand it for further proceedings, or reverse or modify it

if the substantial rights of the petitioners may have been

...