Cannon v. State, 36825
| Decision Date | 25 November 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 36825,36825 |
| Citation | 246 Ga. 754,272 S.E.2d 709 |
| Parties | CANNON v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Claude W. Hicks, Jr., Macon, for appellant.
W. Donald Thompson, Dist. Atty., Willis B. Sparks, III, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.
Melvin Cannon challenges the imposition of restitution as a condition of probation under Code Ann. Ch. 27-30 as unconstitutional. The trial court denied the challenge and he appeals. We affirm.
On May 15, 1980, Cannon was indicted for driving while his license was revoked under the habitual violator statute, driving under the influence and hit and run on March 28, 1980. On July 9, 1980, Cannon pleaded guilty to the habitual violator count and nolo contendere on the other two counts. At the guilty plea hearing, his appointed attorney challenged the restitution part of the sentence of four years with six months to serve, a $250 fine, and payment of his attorney fees and $1710 restitution, on the ground that "the statute having to do with restitution or any other provision for granting restitution in a case like this is in violation of the other laws of the State of Georgia and the Constitution of the State of Georgia primarily because of the fact that the victim in this case has a right to bring a civil action against Mr. Cannon and have the question of both fault and damages ascertained and determined by a jury."
1. On appeal, Cannon first contends that the application of Code Ann. Ch. 27-30 is an unconstitutional retrospective application of the law, (Code Ann. § 2-107; § 102-104;), since he committed the violation on March 28, 1980, and the effective date of the statute is April 1, 1980, Ga.L.1980, p. 1382. In so arguing, Cannon recognizes that the prohibition of ex post facto laws applies only to substantive, but not procedural, rights. Eades v. State, 232 Ga. 735, 208 S.E.2d 791 (1974); Winston v. State, 186 Ga. 573, 198 S.E.2d 667 (1938). Since under Code Ann. § 27-2711, 1 Ga.L.1956, pp. 27, 32; 1958 p. 15; 1965 p. 413, restitution was an authorized condition of probation, the enactment of Code Ann. Ch. 27-30 did not affect his substantive rights, but instead is merely a more detailed enactment regarding restitution. His rights have not changed. 2 Compare Akins v. State, 231 Ga. 411, 202 S.E.2d 62 (1973) () and Todd v. State, 228 Ga. 746, 187 S.E.2d 831 (1972) (); Eades v. State, supra, (abolishment of unsworn statement, procedural, applicable retroactively).
2. Cannon next urges that the chapter on restitution is unconstitutional because it deprives him of a jury trial on the question of damages contrary to the Georgia Constitution, Code Ann. § 2-3307. 3 This constitutional guarantee applies only to civil damage cases and does not apply to a penalty to be determined by the court in a criminal case. 4 Thus this argument has no merit.
3. Lastly, Cannon contends that Code Ann. Ch. 27-30 is constitutionally defective in denying him a hearing on the damage issue and, therefore, due process of a law. We find that Code Ann. §§ 27-3008 through -3010 contemplate a hearing and specific written findings by the court in determining whether it will order restitution and, if so, the amount thereof. Morgan v. Wofford, 472 F.2d 822 (5th Cir. 1973) (). 5 It is clear from the transcript that the trial court after denying Cannon's constitutional challenge, conducted a hearing which covered the points set out in § 27-3010. Cannon presented no other defense than the constitutional grounds and did not contest the evidence of damages presented by the State.
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur.
1 "The court shall determine the terms and conditions of probation and may provide that the probationer shall ... (7) make reparation or restitution to any aggrieved person for the damage or loss caused by his offense in an amount to be determined by the court, ..."
2 "The legislation of North Carolina in question in this case, did not make that a...
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Harris v. Murray
...of rights, duties, and obligations." Accord Barner v. State, 263 Ga. 365, 367(4), 434 S.E.2d 484 (1993); Cannon v. State, 246 Ga. 754, 755(1), 272 S.E.2d 709 (1980); Turman v. Mabry, 221 Ga. 153, 154, 143 S.E.2d 645 (1965);; Logan v. State, 212 Ga.App. 734, 736-737(b), 442 S.E.2d 883 (1994)......
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Cheeks v. State, A95A0478
...are required: a restitution hearing, consideration of the factors enumerated in OCGA § 17-14-10, and findings of fact. Cannon v. State, 246 Ga. 754, 272 S.E.2d 709 (1980); Slater v. State, 209 Ga.App. 723, 434 S.E.2d 547 (1993); Williams v. State, 180 Ga.App. 854, 350 S.E.2d 837 (1986). Her......
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Sloan v. United States
...action but as a sentencing device, no right to a jury trial on the calculation of the award was envisioned.20 See Cannon v. State, 246 Ga. 754, 755, 272 S.E.2d 709, 710 (1980); People v. Pettit, 88 Mich.App. 203, 206-207, 276 N.W.2d 878, 880 (1979); State v. Harris, supra, 70 N.J. at 597, 3......
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Williams v. State, 72737
...the court to make a written record of its consideration of the factors enumerated in OCGA § 17-14-10 but cited Cannon v. State, 246 Ga. 754(3), 272 S.E.2d 709 (1980), for the proposition that a hearing and specific written findings are contemplated by that section. The court found that the ......