Cantley v. Drainage District
Decision Date | 04 February 1928 |
Docket Number | No. 28185.,28185. |
Citation | 2 S.W.2d 607 |
Parties | S.L. CANTLEY, Commissioner of Finance, Appellant, v. LITTLE RIVER DRAINAGE DISTRICT. |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Cape Girardeau Court of Common Pleas. — Hon. Oscar A. Knehans, Judge.
AFFIRMED.
Bailey & Bailey and Gallivan & Finch for appellant.
(1) A bank has no statutory power to prefer one class of depositors by pledging its bills receivable to secure same. Chap. 90, art. 1, R.S. 1919, particularly Sec. 9749. (2) Only such powers and rights can be exercised under corporation franchises as are clearly comprehended under the words of the grants or derived therefrom by necessary implications, regard being had for the object of the grant. Wright v. Board of Education, 246 S.W. 45; Watson's Seminary v. Pike County Court, 149 Mo. 57; State ex rel. v. Murphy, 130 Mo. 10; State ex rel. v. O'Rear, 144 Mo. 157. (3) To permit a bank to favor some of its depositors by securing such deposits with its bills receivable would be to sanction a fraud upon other depositors. Commercial Bank v. Trust & Guaranty Co., 156 S.W. 160. (4) The Commissioner of Finance is a statutory receiver who represents primarily the creditors. Secs. 11700, 11701, 11702, 11723, R.S. 1919; Alexander v. Relfe, 74 Mo. 495; Weldon v. Farm Loan Co., 213 S.W. 57. (5) A receiver of an insolvent corporation may repudiate the void contracts made by the corporation, and to the general rule that a receiver takes only the title of the corporation whose receiver he is there is a recognized exception which permits a receiver of an insolvent corporation, in the interest of creditors, to disaffirm dealings of the debtor in violation of the law and in fraud of the rights of creditors, where the receiver represents the creditors, or where the receiver by statute represents the creditors and stockholders. Commercial Bank v. Trust & Guaranty Co., 156 S.W. 160; Fisher v. Adams, 63 Fed. 674; In re Wilcox Co., 70 Conn. 220; Green v. Mfg. Co., 52 Conn. 33; Franklin Nat. Bank v. Whitehead, 149 Ind. 560; State v. Sullivan, 120 Ind. 197. (6) A receiver who represents creditors and stockholders is not required to restore what was received as a condition to maintaining a suit against a third party who had possession of corporate assets. Guild v. Parker, 43 N.J.L. 430.
Oliver & Oliver for respondent.
(1) A certificate of deposit is the same in its legal effect as a promissory note or bills payable. 7 Cyc. 646, secs. 334, 336; Howey Co. v. Cole, 269 S.W. 956; Dickey v. Adler, 143 Mo. App. 332; First Natl. Bank v. Lanier, 11 Wall. 369; Elmore Co. Bank v. Avant, 189 Ala. 418; Kavanaugh v. Bank, 239 Ill. 404; Pryor v. Bank, 240 Ill. 100; Kushner v. Abbott, 156 Iowa, 598; Bank v. Bank, 72 W. Va. 534; Kirkwood v. Bank, 40 Neb. 484; Tiedeman on Com. Paper, par. 485; Daniels on Neg. Instruments (6 Ed.) par. 1698. (2) A certificate of deposit being the same in its legal effect as a promissory note, the bank has the same power to secure a certificate of deposit as it has to secure a bill payable, and no one will question the right of a bank to secure the lender of money to it. The chief difference between a certificate of deposit and a bill payable is the phraseology used in expressing the obligation of the bank to repay the money obtained. The relation of debtor and creditor exists in both cases. (3) The money having been obtained from the district upon condition that it be satisfactorily secured, the transaction became a closed one, and the Finance Commissioner cannot now set aside the transaction. The bank having obtained the benefit of the loan (deposit) and pledged the collateral, it must live up to its contract, even though it may have been an ultra vires act on the part of the bank in pledging the collateral. There is no statute prohibiting the doing of what was done, and one party receiving a benefit will not be permitted to plead ultra vires when the contract has been executed. McCormick v. Bank, 304 Mo. 289; Schlitz v. Poultry Co., 287 Mo. 400; Winscott v. Inv. Co., 63 Mo. App. 369. (4) It has always been the policy of the State to throw every safeguard around the public funds of not only the State itself, but all of its political subdivisions. Both the State and its political subdivisions are required to take security for the deposit of public funds. The statutes are mandatory. Mo. Const., art. 10, sec. 15; Secs. 9582, 11269, 11245, 10806, 13379, 4401, 4497, R.S. 1919. To hold that a bank could not secure funds of these political subdivisions placed on deposit with it would be in the face of these mandatory sections. (5) It is interesting to note that at one time it was doubted in Missouri as to whether banks could borrow money since the power was not expressly granted in the statute. The courts unequivocally held, when the question was first presented to them, that the banks possessed such an implied power, even though not expressly stated in the statute. Ringling v. Kohn, 6 Mo. App. 333; Donnell v. Lewis Co. Bank, 80 Mo. 165. Subsequently it was not only held that the implied power to borrow existed but that the power to pledge collateral to secure the loan also existed. Powers v. Woolfolk, 132 Mo. App. 358; Sloan v. Bank, 158 Mo. 439. (6) The banks of this State have the implied power to pledge collateral to secure a certificate of deposit. The courts of many states as well as the National courts, including the Supreme Court of the United States, have uniformly held, with the exception of one state court (Ky.) that banks have implied power to pledge assets to secure certificates of deposit. The great weight of authority supports this view. Sec. 11737, R.S. 1919; Cameron v. Christy, 133 Atl. 551; City of Williston v. Ludowese, 208 N.W. 82; Richards v. Osceola Bank, 70 Iowa, 707; Ward v. Johnson, 95 Ill. 215; Ahl v. Rhodes, 84 Pac. 319; McPherson Bank Co. v. Nat. Surety Co., 212 Pac. 489; Interstate National Bank v. Ferguson, 48 Kan. 732; Merrill v. Bank, 173 U.S. 131; 7 C.J. 592; Morse, Banks & Banking (5 Ed.) 142; Zane, Banks & Banking, sec. 125; 1 Patton's Digest Banking, 1926, sec. 641, p. 101, Vol. 2, sec. 519A; Page Trust Co. v. Rose, 135 S.E. 795; Williams v. Hall, 249 Pac. 758.
This is an action by the Commissioner of Finance for the State of Missouri against the Little River Drainage District. The present Commissioner of Finance, S.L. Cantley, was substituted for the Commissioner originally bringing the suit. The action is in two counts. The first count is an ordinary action in replevin, wherein the plaintiff seeks to recover some thirty-eight specifically described notes, and $500 damages for the detention thereof. The second count is one for money had and received. The material portion of this count is as follows:
The answer is quite long, but counsel for the defendant say this as to the defense urged:
The learned trial judge filed a written opinion in the case, which has been of much value to us. As to the pleadings he says:
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Cantley v. Little River Drainage Dist.
... 2 S.W.2d 607 318 Mo. 1120 S. L. Cantley, Commissioner of Finance, Appellant, v. Little River Drainage District No. 28185 Supreme Court of Missouri February 4, 1928 ... Appeal ... from Cape Girardeau Court of Common Pleas; Hon. Oscar A ... Knehans , Judge ... ... Affirmed ... Bailey & Bailey and Gallivan & Finch for appellant ... ...