Cantrell v. Com.
| Decision Date | 25 June 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 2007-SC-000218-MR.,2007-SC-000218-MR. |
| Parties | Brent CANTRELL, Appellant v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
On the morning of January 27, 2006, the Johnson County Sheriffs Department received a tip that a methamphetamine lab was in operation in a trailer located on property owned by Brent Cantrell's father. Three members of the Johnson County Sheriffs Department proceeded to the location in three separate cruisers.
When Deputy Tom Wyatt drove up to the trailer, he noticed Brent Cantrell and Shawna Dalton climbing out an open window and running away. Although it was late in January, Cantrell was wearing only a t-shirt, jeans, and shoes. Dalton was wearing a t-shirt and jeans, but no shoes. Deputy Barry Mayes also observed Cantrell and Dalton climbing out the window and running away. Officer Mayes ordered the pair to stop and they were apprehended. The officers detected the odor of ammonia on both Cantrell and Dalton.
Cantrell gave the officers permission to search the trailer. A strong caustic odor permeated the air around the residence. Upon entry, the officers encountered a foggy haze and more of the strong caustic odor which had been detected outside. In fact, one of the officers began coughing so much because of the fumes that he had to be treated at a local hospital. Inside the trailer, the officers discovered all the chemicals and equipment necessary for the manufacturing of methamphetamine. An individual by the name of Dale Wells was found passed out on a bunk in a back bedroom. A video surveillance system was also discovered inside the trailer, with the camera focused on the driveway leading up to the residence.
Deputy Boyce Williams collected and photographed evidence from the trailer. Among the evidence collected were cans of butane fuel, a butane torch, ph strips, tubing, kitty litter, a coffee pot, coffee filters, a funnel, a beaker, a mason jar, and hollowed-out light bulbs. Two hollowed-out light bulbs containing residue and three bottles were sent to the Kentucky State Police Laboratory for testing. Lab results showed that these items contained methamphetamine.
Cantrell was convicted in the Johnson Circuit Court of: complicity to manufacture methamphetamine;1 complicity to possession of a controlled substance in the first degree (methamphetamine);2 complicity to use/possession of drug paraphernalia;3 and being a second-degree persistent felony offender.4 As a result of his conviction for being a persistent felony offender, Cantrell's 20-year sentence for manufacturing methamphetamine was enhanced to 50 years, and his 5-year sentence for possession of a controlled substance was enhanced to 10 years. Cantrell received a 12-month sentence on the drug paraphernalia charge. In accordance with the jury's recommendation, Cantrell was sentenced to a total of fifty (50) years in prison.
Appealing to this Court as a matter of right,5 Cantrell raises numerous issues. His first three arguments deal with the sufficiency of evidence as to the counts of manufacturing methamphetamine, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Next, Cantrell claims the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict as to the persistent felony offender count. Cantrell also argues the trial court erred in allowing the Commonwealth to introduce evidence of his girlfriend's drug use. Further, Cantrell argues the court abused its discretion when it failed to grant a continuance on the second day of trial. Finally, he argues the court committed reversible error when it overruled his objection to a portion of the Commonwealth's closing argument during the penalty phase. Each argument will be addressed in turn.
Cantrell argues there was insufficient evidence to convict him of manufacturing methamphetamine, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia. At trial, Cantrell did not contest the existence of the methamphetamine lab in the trailer, methamphetamine on the scene, or the recovery of drug paraphernalia from the trailer, but rather claimed that his estranged wife, Mary, was the owner of everything in the trailer.
A person is guilty of manufacturing methamphetamine when he knowingly and unlawfully manufactures methamphetamine or with intent to manufacture methamphetamine possesses two (2) or more chemicals or two (2) or more items of equipment for the manufacture of methamphetamine. See KRS 218A. 1432(1).
A person is guilty of possession of a controlled substance in the first degree when he knowingly and unlawfully possesses a controlled substance that contains any quantity of methamphetamine. See KRS 218A.1415(1).
A person is guilty of possession of drug paraphernalia when he is found in possession of any
equipment, products and materials of any kind which are used, intended for use, or designed for use in planting, propagating, cultivating, growing, harvesting, manufacturing, compounding, converting, producing, processing, preparing, testing, analyzing, packaging, repackaging, storing, containing, concealing, injecting, ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing into the human body a controlled substance in violation of this chapter.
See KRS 218A.500(1).
The Commonwealth introduced evidence of numerous items recovered from the trailer. This included two hollowed-out light bulbs containing residue and three bottles containing sediment or residue. Lab tests conducted on the residue or sediment in each of these five items confirmed the presence of methamphetamine. Further, officers testified that, from their experience, light bulbs converted in this fashion are used for ingesting methamphetamine.
Unable to challenge the above evidence, Cantrell relies instead on his claim that the Commonwealth failed to connect him to the trailer. Therefore, the question before us is whether the Commonwealth introduced any evidence establishing Cantrell's connection to the trailer.
The Commonwealth introduced evidence that Cantrell was climbing out a window of the trailer and attempting to flee when officers arrived on the scene. See Rodriguez v. Commonwealth, wherein this Court recognized that "proof of flight to elude capture or to prevent discovery is admissible because `flight is always some evidence of a sense of guilt.'" 107 S.W.3d 215, 218-19 (Ky.2003) (citations omitted). Officers also noted how Cantrell and Dalton were unseasonably dressed when they were apprehended. In addition, officers testified that there was the presence of a strong odor of ammonia on the clothes of both Cantrell and Dalton. Cantrell led the officers to believe the trailer was his home. The written consent form Cantrell signed allowing officers to search the trailer clearly indicated Cantrell was giving them consent to search "the home of Brent Cantrell." Cantrell's black truck was parked in front of the residence. Finally, we note that after the charges were brought, Cantrell presented the trial court with a motion to suppress evidence seized from "his home" in violation of his constitutional rights. Before leaving this issue, we also note that Cantrell was indicted on each of these three offenses as having acted in complicity with Shawna Dalton and Dale Wells. As this Court has held: "Complicity liability requires (1) proof of commission of an offense by another person and (2) proof of the defendant's participation in commission of that offense." Parks v. Commonwealth, 192 S.W.3d 318, 327 (Ky. 2006) (citation omitted). When the evidence presented is taken as true and viewed in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we cannot say it was clearly unreasonable for the jury to find guilt. Thus, we conclude sufficient evidence existed to convict Cantrell on each of the three offenses, and we reject his claim that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict as to each of the three counts.
Cantrell argues the Commonwealth failed to establish all the elements of the count charging him with being a persistent felony offender in the second degree. In particular, Cantrell points out that the Commonwealth failed to introduce any evidence as to his age at the time the prior felony was committed. As with any count of an indictment, the Commonwealth has the burden of proving every element beyond a reasonable doubt. See Adams v. Commonwealth, 551 S.W.2d 561, 564 (Ky. 1977); KRS 500.070. In order to establish the count for being a persistent felony offender in the second degree, the Commonwealth must show Cantrell was over the age of eighteen (18) years at the time the first offense was committed, and that he was more than twenty-one (21) years of age when he was convicted of the current offenses. See KRS 532.080(2).
In this case, the Commonwealth relied on the testimony of Cantrell's father in order to establish his date of birth. During T.C. Cantrell's testimony, he indicated Brent Cantrell was born in 1976. Since Cantrell was convicted of the present charges in 2007, the evidence is clear that he was at least 29 years of age at the time of the conviction. Likewise, we find no error in the evidence relied on by the Commonwealth for allowing the jury to infer Cantrell was over eighteen (18) years of age when he committed the first offense. During the penalty phase,...
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