Cantrell v. Dekalb County
| Decision Date | 08 August 2001 |
| Citation | 78 S.W.3d 902 |
| Parties | William CANTRELL v. DeKALB COUNTY, Tennessee, et al. |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
Michael E. Evans, Nashville, TN, for appellants, DeKalb County, TN, Brent Russell, Trevor Young, and Kenneth Pack.
Richard M. Brooks, Carthage, TN, for appellee, William Cantrell.
WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which BEN H. CANTRELL, P.J., M.S., and PATRICIA J. COTTRELL, J., joined.
This appeal involves two deputy sheriffs' response to a church's complaint that one of its members was disrupting a church assembly. After the deputy sheriffs suggested that he leave the premises, the church member filed a civil rights action in the Circuit Court for DeKalb County alleging that the two deputies had unlawfully detained him and had interfered with his right to practice his religion. The law enforcement officers, asserting qualified immunity, moved for a summary judgment. The trial court denied their motion. We have determined that the trial court erred because the undisputed facts demonstrate that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity because they acted reasonably and did not violate any of the church members' clearly established statutory or constitutional rights. Accordingly, we vacate the order denying the summary judgment and remand the case with directions that it be dismissed.
William Cantrell is a member of the Phillipi Church of Christ in DeKalb County. During an informal church meeting on July 10, 1996, he resigned as an elected lay Sunday school teacher apparently over a doctrinal disagreement with the church's pastor. Mr. Cantrell had second thoughts about his resignation, and, during the regular Sunday school assembly on July 14, 1996, he commandeered the podium and announced that he retracted his resignation. Then, he proceeded to read several Bible verses intended to cast aspersions on the church's pastor and several other members of the congregation.1
While Mr. Cantrell was speaking, Mark Lance, the church's pastor, requested his wife to ask another church member to telephone the Sheriff of DeKalb County to report that Mr. Cantrell was disturbing their assembly. This call was dispatched to Deputy Trevor Young who immediately contacted Sheriff Kenneth Pack for advice. Sheriff Pack instructed Deputy Young to investigate the complaint because state law prohibited the disruption of a public meeting.2
Deputy Young and Deputy Brent Russell then responded to the complaint. The pastor and two members of the congregation met the deputies in the church parking lot. They complained that Mr. Cantrell was disrupting their assembly and requested the deputies to remove him from the church. Deputy Young informed them that he could only ask Mr. Cantrell to leave because the officers had not personally witnessed the disruption and because no warrant had been issued for Mr. Cantrell's arrest.
The two deputies then entered the church and found Mr. Cantrell sitting quietly in the rear of the church. They told him that they had received a complaint that he was disrupting the assembly and curtly suggested that he leave the building so that they could talk with him outside. Mr. Cantrell complied and left the church. Once outside in the parking lot, Mr. Cantrell asked the deputies if he was under arrest. The deputies responded that he was not under arrest and suggested that he leave the premises and return another day to resolve his difference with the pastor. Mr. Cantrell eventually left after the deputies declined to arrest him.
On July 11, 1997, Mr. Cantrell filed a civil rights action in the Circuit Court for DeKalb County against DeKalb County, Sheriff Pack, and Deputies Young and Russell. He sought $10,000 in compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive damages. The defendants filed a joint answer denying that they had violated any of Mr. Cantrell's rights under color of law. Later, following the depositions of Mr. Cantrell and the two deputies, the defendants moved for a summary judgment based on the law enforcement officers' qualified immunity for acts undertaken in good faith within the scope of their duty. The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment, and the county and the law enforcement officers appealed.3
The standards for reviewing summary judgments on appeal are well settled. Summary judgments are proper in virtually any civil case that can be resolved on the basis of legal issues alone. Fruge v. Doe, 952 S.W.2d 408, 410 (Tenn.1997); Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tenn. 1993); Church v. Perales, 39 S.W.3d 149, 156 (Tenn.Ct.App.2000). They are not, however, appropriate when genuine disputes regarding material facts exist. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. Thus, a summary judgment should be granted only when the undisputed facts, and the inferences reasonably drawn from the undisputed facts, support one conclusion — that the party seeking the summary judgment is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Webber v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 49 S.W.3d 265, 269 (Tenn.2001); Brown, v. Birman Managed Care, Inc., 42 S.W.3d 62, 66 (Tenn.2001); Goodloe v. State, 36 S.W.3d 62, 65 (Tenn.2001).
The party seeking a summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating that no genuine dispute of material fact exists and that it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Shadrick v. Coker, 963 S.W.2d 726, 731 (Tenn.1998); Belk v. Obion County, 7 S.W.3d 34, 36 (Tenn.Ct. App.1999). In order to be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, the moving party must either affirmatively negate an essential element of the non-moving party's claim or establish an affirmative defense that conclusively defeats the non-moving party's claim. Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d at 215 n. 5; Cherry v. Williams, 36 S.W.3d 78, 82-83 (Tenn.Ct.App.2000).
Once the moving party demonstrates that it has satisfied Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56's requirements, the non-moving party must demonstrate how these requirements have not been satisfied. Nelson v. Martin, 958 S.W.2d 643, 647 (Tenn.1997). Mere conclusory generalizations will not suffice. Cawood v. Davis, 680 S.W.2d 795, 796-97 (Tenn.Ct.App.1984). The non-moving party must convince the trial court that there are sufficient factual disputes to warrant a trial (1) by pointing to evidence either overlooked or ignored by the moving party that creates a factual dispute, (2) by rehabilitating evidence challenged by the moving party, (3) by producing additional evidence that creates a material factual dispute, or (4) by submitting an affidavit in accordance with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.07 requesting additional time for discovery. McCarley v. West Quality Food Serv., 960 S.W.2d 585, 588 (Tenn.1998); Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d at 215 n. 6. A non-moving party who fails to carry its burden faces summary dismissal of the challenged claim because, as our courts have repeatedly observed, the "failure of proof concerning an essential element of a cause of action necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Alexander v. Memphis Individual Practice Ass'n, 870 S.W.2d 278, 280 (Tenn.1993); Strauss v. Wyatt, Tarrant, Combs, Gilbert & Milom, 911 S.W.2d 727, 729 (Tenn.Ct.App.1995).
Summary judgments enjoy no presumption of correctness on appeal. Scott v. Ashland Healthcare Ctr., Inc., 49 S.W.3d 281, 285 (Tenn.2001); Penley v. Honda Motor Co., 31 S.W.3d 181, 183 (Tenn.2000). Accordingly, appellate courts must make a fresh determination that the requirements of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56 have been satisfied. Hunter v. Brown, 955 S.W.2d 49, 50-51 (Tenn.1997); Mason v. Seaton, 942 S.W.2d 470, 472 (Tenn.1997). We must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and we must resolve all inferences in the non-moving party's favor. Doe v. HCA Health Servs., Inc., 46 S.W.3d 191, 196 (Tenn.2001); Memphis Hors. Auth. v. Thompson, 38 S.W.3d 504, 507 (Tenn.2001). When reviewing the evidence, we must determine first whether factual disputes exist. If a factual dispute exists, we must then determine whether the fact is material to the claim or defense upon which the summary judgment is predicated and whether the disputed fact creates a genuine issue for trial. Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d at 214; Rutherford v Polar Tank Trailer, Inc., 978 S.W.2d 102, 104 (Tenn.Ct.App.1998).
The dispositive issue for this appeal is whether the law enforcement officials have presented undisputed facts demonstrating that they are entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law. The trial court concluded that they did not. We respectfully disagree.
The courts fashioned the defense of qualified immunity for governmental officials facing civil rights suits to strike a balance between society's interest in safeguarding citizens' constitutional rights and the ability of public officials to perform their duties. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987); Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 195, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 3019, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984). While civil actions for damages may be a citizen's only recourse to vindicate his or her constitutional rights when public officials abuse their power, Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2736, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), harassing litigation and the possible exposure to personal liability will unduly inhibit public officials in the good faith performance of their duties. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. at 638, 107 S.Ct. at 3038; Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 814, 102 S.Ct. at 2736.
The defense of qualified immunity is available to public officials whose conduct conforms to a standard of objective legal reasonableness. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. at 639, 107 S.Ct. at 3038; Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 819, 102 S.Ct. at 2739. Under this standard, governmental officials performing discretionary functions will be shielded from liability...
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