Capital Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., Inc., 72757
Decision Date | 02 September 1986 |
Docket Number | No. 72757,72757 |
Citation | 349 S.E.2d 201,180 Ga.App. 413 |
Parties | CAPITAL FORD TRUCK SALES, INC. v. UNITED STATES FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
J. Arthur Mozley, Eric T. Johnson, Atlanta, for appellant.
W. Wray Eckl, Georgia L. Schley, Atlanta, for appellee.
An employee of appellant Capital Ford Truck Sales, Inc. (Capital), collided with an automobile while he was driving a company-owned wrecker on company business. A passenger in the other vehicle brought an action for personal injuries against appellant and the driver of the car in which she was riding. Capital called upon its primary insurer, Aspen Indemnity Corp. (Aspen), to defend the action, and Aspen undertook to do so, hiring attorneys to handle the case. Aspen subsequently became insolvent and went into receivership, however, and the law firm it had retained withdrew from the case. Capital thereupon called upon its secondary insurer, appellee U.S. Fire Insurance Co. (U.S. Fire), to provide a defense. Appellee denied coverage on the grounds that (1) whatever obligation it might have toward Capital as an insured extended only to amounts exceeding the $1,000,000 limit of Aspen's policy, and that (2) the obligation was not activated at all unless and until the liability exceeded $1,000,000. Capital then undertook its own defense in the personal injury action.
By leave of court, defendant/appellant Capital filed a third-party complaint against U.S. Fire, alleging breach of contract, tortious and bad-faith refusal to defend, and tortious and bad-faith denial of coverage, and seeking reimbursement for all defense costs and the amount of any adverse judgment that might be rendered, plus attorney fees and damages for bad faith. U.S. Fire moved for summary judgment on the third-party complaint, and the trial court granted the motion. On appeal, Capital enumerates several errors pertaining to the trial court's alleged misreading of the language of the policy issued to Capital by appellee U.S. Fire Insurance Co., so as to award summary judgment to appellee and absolve it of any duty to defend in the fact situation of the instant case. Held:
1. This appeal is from an award of summary judgment on the issue of whether, as excess insurer, appellee U.S. Fire had a duty to defend plaintiff/appellant Capital in a personal injury action, when the primary insurer, Aspen, after initially undertaking the defense pursuant to its insurance contract with Capital, became insolvent and abandoned the defense. At the time of the collision, appellant maintained in full force and effect a liability insurance policy with Aspen, as primary insurer, in the amount of $1,000,000. Also in full force and effect at the time was a commercial comprehensive catastrophe liability policy issued by appellee, providing additional (or "excess": the parties to this appeal are sharply divided on this point) liability coverage up to $5,000,000 per occurrence. Both policies undisputedly applied to the accident which gave rise to the underlying action. Also undisputed is the fact that appellant gave both insurers timely notice of the accident and the claims, and complied with the duties of cooperation, etc., imposed by both policies.
With respect to this appeal, the rights and duties of the parties are set forth in, and governed by, the liability insurance policy issued to Capital by U.S. Fire. See Richmond v. Ga. Farm, etc., Ins. Co., 140 Ga.App. 215, 221, 231 S.E.2d 245 (1976). The policy consists (in addition to declarations, schedules, and endorsements) of three sections: "Insuring Agreements," "Exclusions," and "Conditions." Pertinent portions of these sections are as follows:
Georgia law, like that of a number of other jurisdictions, holds that an insurer's duty to pay and his duty to defend are separate and independent obligations. Richmond v. Ga. Farm, etc., Ins. Co., supra; Home Indem. Co. v. Godley, 122 Ga.App. 356, 177 S.E.2d 105 (1970); Loftin v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 106 Ga.App. 287, 127 S.E.2d 53 (1962); National Surety Corp. v. Dunaway, 100 Ga.App. 842, 112 S.E.2d 331 (1959). See also Palmer v. Pacific Indem. Co., 74 Mich.App. 259, 254 N.W.2d 52 (1977); Ladner & Co. v. Southern Guar. Ins. Co., 347 So.2d 100 (Ala.1977); Sloan Constr. Co. v. Central Nat. Ins. Co., 269 S.C. 183, 236 S.E.2d 818 (1977).
Although most of the cases dealing with the respective duties of the primary and the excess insurer 1 concern either disputes between insurers of two different vehicles or two different drivers (or between the driver's insurer and the insurer of the owner of the vehicle) or disputes as to whether a certain item of property is covered, the principle is the same: if the facts bring the occurrence wholly, partially, or...
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