Capitol Hill Methodist Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle

• Decision Date: 09 May 1958
• Docket Number: No. 34462,34462
• Citation: 324 P.2d 1113,52 Wn.2d 359
• Parties: CAPITOL HILL METHODIST CHURCH OF SEATTLE, a corporation; Matthew J. Cline; Adeline M. Spear; and Max Grieff, Appellants, v. The CITY OF SEATTLE, a municipal corporation; and Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound, Inc., a corporation, Respondents.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 359

52 Wn.2d 359

324 P.2d 1113

CAPITOL HILL METHODIST CHURCH OF SEATTLE, a corporation Matthew J. Cline; Adeline M. Spear; and Max Grieff, Appellants, v. The CITY OF SEATTLE, a municipal corporation; and Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound, Inc., a corporation, Respondents.

No. 34462.

Supreme Court of Washington, Department 2.

May 9, 1958.

Rehearing Denied July 2, 1958.

Allen, DeGarmo & Leedy, Seattle, for appellants.

A. C. Van Soelen, Arthur T. Lane and Houghton, Cluck, Coughlin & Henry, Seattle, for respondents.

HUNTER, Justice.

This is an action to enjoin the closing, obstruction, or vacation of east John street, between Fifteenth and Sixteenth avenues north, in the city of Seattle. To avoid the necessity of complicated written descriptions of the streets and lots involved in this controversy, and in an attempt to simplify our discussion of the underlying legal principles, the area in question, with the parties' properties identified, has been reproduced in the following map:

NOTE: OPINION CONTAINS TABLE OR OTHER DATA THAT IS NOT VIEWABLE

The defendant Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound, Inc., is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the state of Washington. It owns all the property abutting east John street from Fifteenth to Sixteenth avenue north on a part of which it operates a hospital. In November, 1956, it filed a petition with the city council of Seattle to vacate the portion of east John street extending from the alleyway between Fifteenth and Sixtennth avenues to Sixteenth avenue north.

The plaintiffs, Capitol Hill Methodist Church of Seattle, a corporation, Matthew J. Cline, Adeline M. Spear, and Max Grieff, are the owners of property in the immediate vicinity (see map), and they protested the granting of the petition before the streets and sewers committee of the city council. After a hearing on this matter, the city council adopted an ordinance granting the petition, which was approved by the mayor. The vacation was to take effect June 7, 1957.

Thereafter the plaintiffs commenced this action against the city of Seattle, and the Group Health Cooperative, for an injunction to prevent the closing of the public street.

The defendants filed a motion for a summary judgment in their favor and affidavits in support thereof. The plaintiffs filed counter-affidavits, but the court, after a hearing, determined that there were no genuine material issues of fact to be tried, and that the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. From the order granting the motion, the plaintiffs have appealed.

The appellants have assigned as error the granting of the motion for summary judgment by the trial court.

The respondents' motion was based on Rule of Pleading, Practice, and Procedure 19, 34A Wash.2d 81, as amended, effective November 1, 1955, which provides in part as follows:

'1. Summary Judgment:

* * *

* * *

'(b) For Defendant Party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought may, at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof.

'(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The motion shall be served at least ten days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party, prior to the day of hearing, may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. * * *' (Italics ours.)

This is the first opportunity we have had to interpret our rule providing for a summary judgment. In view of the fact that the rule was adopted almost verbatim from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, 28 U.S.C.A., we deem it advisable to review some of the Federal court decisions where the purpose of the reul has been discussed.

In Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 1944, 321 U.S. 620, 64 S.Ct. 724, 729, 88 L.Ed. 967, the supreme court stated:

'* * * Rule 56 authorizes summary judgment only where the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, where it is quite clear what the truth is, that no genuine issue remains for trial, and that the purpose of the rule is not to cut litigants off from their right of trial by jury if they really have issues to try. * * *' Cited in Stevens v. Howard D. Johnson Co., 4 Cir., 1950, 181 F.2d 390; Chappell v. Goltsman, 5 Cir., 1950, 186 F.2d 215.

In Brodrick v. Gore, 10 Cir., 1955, 224 F.2d 892, 897, the court said:

'* * * The purpose of Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), 28 U.S.C.A., authorizing entry of summary judgment in specified circumstances is to permit the expeditious disposition of cases in which there are no genuine issues of material fact upon which the outcome of the litigation depends. But the procedure is not to be used as a substitute for a regular trial of cases in which there are disputed issues of material fact upon which the ultimate outcome hinges, and it should be invoked with due caution to the end that litigants may be afforded a trial where there exists between them a bona fide dispute of material facts. Where it appears however that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact upon which the outcome of the litigation depends, the case is appropriate for disposition by summary judgment and it becomes the duty of the court to enter such judgment. SMS Manufacturing Co. v. U. S.-Mengel Plywoods, 10 Cir., 219 F.2d 606. And in determining whether a motion for summary judgment is well founded, the court may pierce formal allegations of fact in the pleadings and determine from the entire case whether there are genuine issues of fact for resolution upon a formal trial. Avrick v. Rockmont Envelope Co., 10 Cir., 155 F.2d 568.' (Italics ours.)

See, also, Silva v. Sandia Corp., 10 Cir., 1957, 246 F.2d 758; Cox v. English-American Underwriters, 9 Cir., 1957, 245 F.2d 330; New & Used Auto Sales, Inc., v. Hansen, 9 Cir., 1957, 245 F.2d 951; Sequoia Union High School Dist. v. United States, 9 Cir., 1957, 245 F.2d 227; Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, 28 U.S.C.A.; 6 Moore's Federal Practice, 2d Ed., 2028, § 56.04(1).

From a review of these authorities, it is clear that the sole question presented for our determination is: Whether the pleadings and affidavits considered by the trial court raise any genuine issues of material fact upon which the outcome of the litigation depends. If such issues are found to exist, the appellants are entitled to a trial and must prevail on this appeal. However, if there exists no genuine issues of material fact and the respondents are entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the disposition made by the trial court must be upheld.

The appellants vigorously contend that the record reveals 'genuine issues of material fact' entitling them to a trial on the merits. In substance, the alleged genuine issues of material facts raised in the pleadings and affidavits are as follows:

(1) The appellants acquired their properties in reliance upon the recorded plat description in which east John street appeared as a dedicated public street and provided access from Fifteenth to Sxiteenth avenue north.

(2) East John street is the appellants' principal means of access, and the closing thereof will deprive them of the most direct and convenient access to their respective properties.

(3) The closing of the street will expose the appellants' properties to an extreme fire hazard.

(4) Closure of said street would halt all access from the west of persons seeking to attend the services of public worship conducted by the appellant church, and would substantially reduce the number of persons attending church.

(5) The property of each appellant would be permanently damaged by the closing, and each would be specially damaged in a substantial degree.

(6) The ordinance authorizes the vacation of a portion of a public street for a private use.

At the outset, before considering the alleged issues of fact above, we must determine whether the appellants are in a position to question the vacation of the street by city council of Seattle.

We said in Olsen v. Jacobs, 1938, 193 Wash. 506, 76 P.2d 607, 609:

'The general rule supported by this court is that only abutting property owners, or those whose reasonable means of access has been obstructed, can question the vacation by the proper authorities. To warrant such interference with proceedings relative to street or road vacations, it must appear that the complaining parties suffered a special damage different in kind and not merely in degree from that sustained by the general public.' (Italics ours.)

In Taft v. Washington Mutual Sav. Bank, 1923, 127 Wash. 503, 221 P. 604, 606, this court stated:

'* * * we conclude that the correct rule is that only those directly abutting on the portion of the street or alley vacated, or alleged to be obstructed, or those whose rights of access are substantially affected, have such a special interest as to enable them to maintain an action. The further rule deducible from our own cases and the authorities generally is that owners of property abutting on a street or alley have no vested right in such street or alley, except to the extent that their access may not be unreasonably restricted or substantially affected. Owners who do not abut, such as respondents here, and whose access is not destroyed or substantially affected, have no vested rights which are substantially affected. * * *' (Italics ours.)

We find, in 11 McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, 3d Ed., 146, § 30.194, the following statement:

'On the other hand, if the street directly in front of one's property is not vacated but the portion vacated is in another block, so that he may use an intersecting cross street, although perhaps it is not quite so short a way nor as...