Cappadona v. Riverside 400 Function Room, Inc.

• Decision Date: 14 March 1977
• Citation: 360 N.E.2d 1048,372 Mass. 167
• Parties: Thomas F. CAPPADONA v. RIVERSIDE 400 FUNCTION ROOM, INC. (and a companion case 1 ).
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 1048

360 N.E.2d 1048

372 Mass. 167

Thomas F. CAPPADONA v. RIVERSIDE 400 FUNCTION ROOM, INC. (and a companion case

¹

).

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued Jan. 6, 1977.

Decided March 14, 1977.

Roy F. Kipp, Boston, for plaintiffs.

Daniel B. Greenberg, Concord, for defendant.

Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and QUIRICO, KAPLAN and WILKINS, JJ.

HENNESSEY, Chief Justice.

The plaintiffs (the Cappadonas) appeal pursuant to G.L. c. 211, § 3, from the denial by a single justice of this court of petitions for relief from a Superior Court interlocutory order which stayed proceedings in two contract actions. There was no error. We hold, once again, that a litigant cannot obtain appellate review by the full court of an interlocutory order which was not reported to us by the judge who entered it, regardless of the procedural route pursued, Kargman v. Superior Court, --- Mass. ---, ---, ^a 357 N.E.2d 300 (1976), and that we exercise our extraordinary power to grant discretionary relief from such an order under G.L. c. 211, § 3, only to protect substantive rights. Rollins Environmental Servs. Inc. v. Superior Court, --- Mass. ---, ---, ^b 330 N.E.2d 814 (1975).

The litigation underlying these appeals concerns two promissory notes executed by Leisure Sports Investment Corporation (Leisure) to Riverside Enterprises, Inc. The defendant (Riverside), Leisure's wholly owned subsidiary, guaranteed the notes, and Riverside Enterprises, Inc., assigned them to the Cappadonas. Leisure filed a petition in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts under a 11 of the Bankruptcy Act in January, 1975. In April, 1976, the Cappadonas sued Riverside, as guarantor, for payment of the notes, then due.

A Superior Court judge ordered that all proceedings concerning the notes be stayed until Leisure's bankruptcy proceedings are completed. The Cappadonas brought petitions for relief from this interlocutory order to the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County under G.L. c. 231, § 118. They alleged that the order violates their rights to prompt adjudication and constitutional due process of law because Riverside, as a corporate entity distinct from Leisure, is not subject to the jurisdiction currently being exercised by the Federal Bankruptcy Court. After a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court denied the Cappadonas' petitions, they sought further review from the full bench of this court.

The Cappadonas argue that Riverside has claimed in Federal Bankruptcy Court that it is an entity separate from Leisure while maintaining in the Superior Court that it is a part of Leisure and that this inconsistency constitutes an exceptional circumstance requiring that we exercise our powers under G.L. c. 211, § 3. The Cappadonas mistake the nature of the circumstance which invokes these extraordinary powers. Therefore, we decline to review the denial of their petitions for relief or the underlying Superior Court order.

Interlocutory orders cannot be presented for appellate review, absent special authorization, until the entire case is ripe for review. Kargman v. Superior Court, supra. Rollins Environmental Servs., Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, --- Mass. at --- - ---, ^c 330 N.E.2d 814; Giacobbe v. First Doolidge Corp., --- Mass. ---, --- - ---, ^d 325 N.E.2d 922 (1975). This rule stems from the burdensome nature of piecemeal appellate review. Giacobbe, supra. For the same reasons, we have held that, although G.L. c. 231, § 118, authorizes appellate relief from interlocutory orders of the Superior Court, this statute does not entitle a litigant as a matter of right to review of an appellate order denying relief under G.L. c. 231, § 118, from such a Superior Court order. Foreign Auto Import, Inc. v. Renault Northeast, Inc., --- Mass. ---, --- - ---, ^e 326 N.E.2d 888 (1975).

Consequently, the Cappadonas request review of the single justice's order on the basis of this court's discretionary power to grant relief 'to correct and prevent errors and abuses . . . (in courts of inferior jurisdiction) if no other remedy is expressly provided . . .,' G.L. c. 211, § 3, as amended by St.1973, c. 1114, § 44. However, this power 'should be exercised only in exceptional circumstances, when necessary to protect substantive rights.' HEALY V. FIRST DIST. COURT OF BRISTOL, --- MASS. --- , 327 N.E.2D 894 (1975)^F, cited in Rollins, supra, --- Mass. at --- ^g, 330 N.E.2d at 818. Such exceptional circumstances do not exist when the appellant will have an opportunity to prove its allegations at trial. Ibid. The Cappadonas will have an opportunity to prove that Riverside is in fact an independent entity responsible as guarantor for payment of its bankrupt parent's notes when Leisure's bankruptcy proceedings are finished and the Superior Court action resumes. ² The Cappadonas have not argued or demonstrated that the offending delay in trial will...