Caraballo-Cepeda v. De Corrección
| Decision Date | 19 July 2013 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL NO.: 13-1135 (MEL) |
| Parties | WANAGET CARABALLO-CEPEDA, Plaintiff, v. ADMINISTRACIÓN DE CORRECCIÓN, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Pending before the court is a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), filed by defendants Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico ("Commonwealth of Puerto Rico") and Administración de Corrección (“Administration of Correction”). ECF No. 10. Wanaget Caraballo-Cepeda ("plaintiff") has yet to file a response in opposition to the pending motion. For the reasons set forth below, defendant's unopposed motion is granted.
Defendants argue under Rule 12(b)(6) that the allegations against them are insufficient to support a claim of violation of constitutional rights which would entitle plaintiff to relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983. When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must limit its focus to the allegations of the complaint. Litton Indus., Inc. v. Colón, 587 F.2d 70, 74 (1st Cir. 1978). The inquiry is whether the allegations, accepted as true, show "a plausible entitlement" to the relief requested. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007). To avoid dismissal, a plaintiff must "set forth factual allegations, either direct or inferential, regarding each material element necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable legal theory." Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 515 (1st Cir. 1988).
Plaintiff essentially claims that for at least the past fifteen years during which he has been imprisoned in various facilities under the Administration of Correction of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, he has been deprived of educational services. ECF No. 2. Plaintiff's prayer for relief, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 includes access to education and damages due to previous denial of education. (D.E. 2 at 6).
Plaintiff's claims for monetary damages against the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Administration of Correction, and the Secretary of Correction in his official capacity are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution provides that "[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." 1 U.S.C. Const. Amend. XI. The Supreme Court of the United States repeatedly has held that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against a state by its own citizens. See e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). The Supreme Court has held that "in the absence of consent a suit in which the State or one of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment." Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984).
The Eleventh Amendment immunity, however, is not absolute and may be waived by the state or "stripped away" by Congress. Metcalf & Eddie, Inc. v. P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth., 991 F.2d 935, 938 (1st Cir. 1993). There are four circumstances in which states lose Eleventh Amendment protection: (1) when a state consents to be sued in a federal forum; (2) when a state waives "its own immunity by statute or the like;" (3) when Congress abrogates state immunity; and (4) when "other constitutional imperatives...take precedence over the Eleventh Amendment federal-court bar." Id. at 938 (citations omitted); see also Toledo v. Sánchez, 454 F.3d 24, 31 (1st Cir.2006). An entity entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity can waive that immunity in three ways: "(1) by a clear declaration that it intends to submit itself to the jurisdiction of a federal court...; (2) by consent to or participation in a federal program for which waiver of immunity is an express condition; or (3) by affirmative conduct in litigation." Díaz-Fonseca v. Puerto Rico, 451 F.3d 13, 33 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing New Hampshire v. Ramsey, 366 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2004)).
A limited exception also exists to bring suit for prospective injunctive relief against state officers in their official capacity. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 160 (1908); Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 102-03. Any other claims for monetary relief or retrospective injunctive relief are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. This exception allows a state official to be sued only to enjoin a continuing violation of federal law. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 277-78 (1986); Whalen v. Mass. Trial Court, 397 F.3d 19, 29-30 (1st Cir. 2005). Furthermore, "[r]elief that in essence serves to compensate a party injured in the past by an action of a state official in his official capacity that was illegal under federal law is barred even when the state official is the named defendant." Papasan, 478 U.S. at 278. This limited exception does not apply to suits brought pursuant to state laws. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 117-18; Diaz Fonseca v. Puerto Rico, 451 F.3d 13, 43 (1st Cir. 2006); Cuesnongle v. Ramos, 835 F.2d 1486, 1496-97 (1st Cir. 1987).
It is well-settled that "Puerto Rico, despite the lack of formal statehood, enjoys the shelter of the Eleventh Amendment in all respects." Ramírez v. P.R. Fire Serv., 715 F.2d 694, 697 (1st Cir. 1983). Furthermore, "a prison system is an essential arm of the state" and hence, the claims for damages against the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the Administration of Correction are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Camacho v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 2006 WL 1704692, at 1 (D.P.R. 2006) (unpublished). Moreover, damages claims against the Secretary of Correction in his official capacity are also precluded by the Eleventh Amendment.
In addition to state agencies and institutions, Eleventh Amendment immunity may also attach to suits against state officials "when the state is the real, substantial party in interest." Although, state officials are literally persons, a suit against a state official in his official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office. As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself, therefore, immunity attaches to state officials, in their official capacity.
Bernier-Aponte v. Izquierdo, 196 F.Supp.2d 93, 98-99 (D.P.R. 2002) (citations omitted).
Turning now our attention to plaintiff's claim for prospective equitable relief, that is, that he be granted educational services, we must start the analysis by asserting at the outset that the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly nor implicitly guarantee a right to education. See San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35-37 (1973) ( ); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (). Furthermore, "education is [not] a 'fundamental' right that triggers strict scrutiny when government interferes with an individual's access to it." Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 487 U.S. 450, 458 (1988); see also Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 284 (1986) (); Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 328 (1983).
Moreover, there is no per se right to education in prisons; "[p]risoners have no constitutional right to educational or vocational opportunities during incarceration...." Wishon v. Gammon, 978 F.2d 446, 450 (8th Cir. 1992). It is well established that "lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system." (Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 125 (1977) (citing Price v. Johnson, 333 U.A. 266, 285). One of the privileges limited by adult incarceration is education. "[P]risoners do not have a due process right toparticipate in vocational and educational programs, let alone one of their choosing." Boulware v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 518 F. Supp. 2d 186, 189 (D.D.C. 2007). Additionally, "the unavailability of a program at a particular prison is not an atypical deprivation but rather 'merely leaves the prisoner with the normal attributes of confinement.''' Id. (citing Tanner v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 433 F. Supp. 2d 117, 123 (D.D.C. 2006)).
Imprisonment without access to educational programs does not constitute a cruel and unusual punishment as prohibited by the Eight Amendment. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 (1981) (); Johannes v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, CV 02-03197-SVW VBK (C.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2011) (); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1254-55 (9th Cir.1982) ), abrogated on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995).
Although "[t]he absence of rehabilitative programs is not, per se, a violation of the Eighth Amendment," there are circumstances in which denial of access to educational services can play a role in the violation of a prisoner's constitutional rights. Morales Feliciano v. Romero Barcelo, 672 F. Supp. 591 (D.P.R. 1986). First, denial of access to education can be one of the components which, when combined with other significant deleterious prison conditions, amount to a cruel and unusual punishment. "[T]he...
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