Cardin v. Morrison-Knudsen
Decision Date | 30 November 1979 |
Docket Number | No. 5064,MORRISON-KNUDSE,A,5064 |
Citation | 603 P.2d 862 |
Parties | Frank CARDIN, Appellant (Plaintiff-employee), v.ppellee (Defendant-employer). |
Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Frank L. Thomas, Jr., Kemmerer, for appellant.
V. Anthony Vehar, Kemmerer, for appellee.
Before RAPER, C. J., and McCLINTOCK, THOMAS, ROSE and ROONEY, JJ.
This appeal arises under the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act, §§ 27-12-101 to 27-12-804, W.S.1977, which finds worker Frank Cardin making a disputed claim for injury against his employer, Morrison-Knudsen. At the hearing, the court found a compensable injury had occurred and, by order dated October 5, 1978, determined Mr. Cardin to have suffered "less than 5% Permanent total disability" and awarded him $1,499.00. We remanded because a doctor's report was not of record and, after settlement of the record, the judge adopted and affirmed the order of October 5, 1978. The worker appealed.
He did not assign a percentage of permanent total disability to the injury of the worker. This letter was made a part of the record through the defendant's deposition.
A Dr. Morrow, whose letter was also admitted for the record, examined the worker and wrote:
"At the present time, I feel that he does have a ten percent (10%) permanent partial disability of each knee. . . . "
In response to a remand order of this court for purposes of settling the record, the employer's doctor, H. William Mott, answered interrogatories in which he relates finding no permanent partial disability to the worker, Cardin. When asked "Has Mr. Cardin suffered a permanent loss of function or use of either or both knees?"
The state of the record with respect to permanent partial disability, as it finally comes to us, is that one doctor testified that the worker had suffered a 10% Permanent partial disability of each knee and the other doctor represented that he had zero disability of the knees. There is no other evidence in the record which recites a percentage of permanent partial disability.
There is other testimony with respect to the worker's ability to perform his "duties as a warehouseman," which is relevant to one of the issues raised by this appeal. The record indicates that Mr. Cardin is capable of doing only manual labor. Dr. Carson testified that the appellant is "permanently disabled from working as a warehouseman which requires climbing and lifting," and recommended that Mr. Cardin engage only in sedentary or clerical work which would not aggravate his condition. The worker contends that he is unqualified to perform clerical or sedentary work and, in any case, Morrison-Knudsen had not offered him such employment.
There are two issues for our consideration presented by this appeal:
First. Has the worker been rendered permanently totally disabled?
Second. If not, does the evidence support the court's award of less than 5% Permanent total disability, in the sum of $1,499.00?
It is the theory of the appellant, under § 27-12-405(a), W.S.1977, that his injury resulted in permanent total disability. The subsection of the statute provides:
"(a) Permanent total disability means the loss of both legs or both arms, total loss of eyesight, paralysis Or other conditions permanently incapacitating the employee from performing any work at any gainful occupation for which he is reasonably suited by experience or training." (Emphasis supplied)
It is the theory of the worker that the italicized language means in his case under the condition of this record that he is entitled to be declared permanently totally disabled. He comes by this theory, in large part, by reason of his understanding of our holding in In re Iles, 56 Wyo. 443, 110 P.2d 826 (1941).
We said in In re Iles that, except for the disabilities enumerated in the statute (§ 27-12-405(a)), an award for permanent total disability should not be made unless it
" ' " " (Emphasis supplied) 110 P.2d at 829.
See, also, Standard Oil Company v. Sullivan, 33 Wyo. 223, 237 P. 253 (1925).
The question is: According to the testimony available to the court, was there sufficient evidence to decide that the affliction will yield to treatment And the workman will be able to work at a gainful occupation? The appellate rule which guides us is that we must consider the evidence most favorable to the prevailing party and every inference which we can give to it, and, if this evidence with its attendant inference is sufficient to sustain the judgment, we will not disturb the decision of the trier-of-fact. Berry Refining Company v. Pinsky, Wyo., 443 P.2d 521, 523 (1968). See, also, Johnson v. State, Wyo., 562 P.2d 1294, 1297 (1977), quoting from Blakely v. State, Wyo., 542 P.2d 857, 863 (1975), and Harris v. State, Wyo., 487 P.2d 800, 801 (1971), and citing, in further support, Bentley v. State, Wyo., 502 P.2d 203, 208 (1972).
In adopting this concept in In re Iles, supra, we said:
" . . . '(W)here it is found that the employee is permanently and totally disabled so far as hard or manual work is concerned, but that he might do light work of a special nature not generally available, the burden is on the employer to show that such special work is available to the employee.' . . ." 110 P.2d at 829.
Before the burden of which In re Iles,, supra, speaks shifts to the employer, the employee must prove that he or she is so disabled that he or she will not be capable of employment in any well-known branch of the labor market. Since the evidence in this case is that Cardin is capable of light or sedentary work, we think the court below was justified in holding that the facts do not serve to make the "odd-lot doctrine" available to this worker and the court was, therefore, justified in finding the worker to not be permanently totally disabled.
Dr. Carson's letter said:
This is not to say that the appellant is permanently totally disabled for doing all hard manual work.
Dr. Carson said in his deposition:
"By no stretch of my imagination could I conclude this man permanently totally disabled."
At another place he said:
"There are thousands and thousands of occupations he could perform."
The safety engineer for Morrison-Knudsen testified with respect to the jobs suitable for the worker, given the restriction on activity and movement enunciated by Dr. Carson:
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