Cardona v. Cmty. Access, Inc.
| Decision Date | 25 January 2013 |
| Docket Number | 11-CV-4129 (MKB) |
| Parties | RUFINO CARDONA and NILDA CARDONA, Plaintiffs, v. COMMUNITY ACCESS, INC. and CARL JOHNSON, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
Plaintiffs Rufino Cardona and Nilda Cardona bring the above-captioned action against Defendants Community Access, Inc. ("Community Access") and Carl Johnson. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants engaged in discriminatory practices in violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (the "FHA"), the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (the "ADA"), and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq. (the "Rehabilitation Act"). Plaintiffs also assert claims for invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraudulent concealment, discrimination, negligence, assault and battery, and conspiracy, all under New York law. In addition, Plaintiffs purport to bring a claim for violation of the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a. Defendants moved for summary judgment. Plaintiffs seek sanctions based on the theory that Defendants' summary judgment motion is frivolous. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment and denies Plaintiffs' motion for sanctions.
Plaintiffs are a couple currently residing in a building owned and operated by Defendant Community Access. (Am. Compl. ¶ 4.) Defendant Community Access is a not-for-profit organization "concentrating in the field of supportive housing and peer employment training programs for New Yorkers who live with a psychiatric disability." (Def. 56.1 ¶ 2.) Defendant Carl Johnson is an employee of Community Access.1 (Id.)
As a factual basis for all of their claims, Plaintiffs allege that (1) they have been denied "their right to have guest [sic] visit without signing a log book at the receptionist desk, yet permitting non-Hispanic, non-disabled and gay guest [sic] of other tenants to forego sign-in and freely enter;" (2) "Plaintiffs are not permitted to have the receptionist's electric door buzzed open for Hispanics tenants;" (3) Plaintiff Rufino Cardona was assaulted by Defendant Johnson and "non-Hispanic tenants are not physically abused;" (4) (Am. Compl. ¶ 8.) Plaintiffs claim that all of the events (Id.)
This is Plaintiffs' second suit alleging similar facts. On July 13, 2009, Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendant Community Access and another entity (the "2009 Litigation"). (Def. 56.1 ¶ 3.) In the 2009 Litigation, Plaintiffs alleged that they were not allowed to live together as husband and wife and that Defendants "(1) forced plaintiffs, both tenants, to sign logbooks [sic] entering their building, (2) made plaintiffs [sic] guests to leave the building without rational reasons; (3) neglected, failed or refused to alert plaintiffs of the presence of guests attempt at visiting; [and] (4) made direct indirect threats against the plaintiffs." ().)
After two settlement conferences, on October 29, 2009, the parties filed a Stipulation of Settlement with a Confidential Release (collectively the "Settlement Agreement"). The Confidential Release was incorporated by reference into the Stipulation of Settlement and released the named defendants and various individuals associated with the named defendants including their employees from "any and all existing or possible" claims arising from their tenancies at buildings run by Defendant Community Access. (No. 09-CV-3148 Docket Entry No. 24; Weissman Decl. Ex. E (Stipulation of Settlement and Confidential Release).) The Settlement Agreement dismissed the 2009 Litigation with prejudice. (Weissman Decl. Ex. F.) On October 30, 2009, United States District Judge Carol Bagley Amon entered an order dismissing the case in light of the settlement. (No. 09-CV-3148 Docket Entry No. 25.)
Summary judgment is proper only when, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Redd v. N. Y. Div. ofParole, 678 F.3d 166, 174 (2d Cir. 2012); Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 344 (2d Cir. 2011). The role of the court is not "to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Cioffi v. Averill Park Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ, 444 F.3d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). A genuine issue of fact exists when there is sufficient "evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. The "mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" is not sufficient to defeat summary judgment; "there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Id. The court's function is to decide "whether, after resolving all ambiguities and drawing all inferences in favor of the non-moving party, a rational juror could find in favor of that party." Pinto v. Allstate Ins. Co., 221 F.3d 394, 398 (2d Cir. 2000).
"It is well established that the submissions of a pro se litigant must be construed liberally and interpreted 'to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest'" Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (alteration in original) (quoting Pabon v. Wright, 459 F.3d 241, 248 (2d Cir. 2006)); see also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) ; Thompson v. Tom Vazquez Janitorial, No. 05-CV-808, 2006 WL 3422664, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2006) () "This is particularly so when the pro se plaintiff alleges that her civil rights have been violated." Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008).
Plaintiffs bring a FHA claim against the Defendants.2 Plaintiffs argue that they were treated differently than non-Hispanic, non-disabled, homosexual individuals. (Am. Compl ¶ 8.) For example, their guests had to sign the guest book and Plaintiffs' guests were not buzzed into the building. (Id.) Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' FHA claims are precluded by the Settlement Agreement from the 2009 Litigation. Defendants are correct. Under New York law, res judicata bars a plaintiff from bringing "a later claim arising out of the same factual grouping as an earlier litigated claim even if the later claim is based on different legal theories or seeks dissimilar or additional relief.'" Reyes v. Fairfield Props., 661 F. Supp. 2d 249, 277 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting Burka v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth, 32 F.3d 654, 657 (2d Cir. 1994)). Because the Plaintiffs' FHA claims arise from facts that pre-dated the Settlement Agreement, Plaintiffs are precluded from bringing this claim.
"A dismissal with prejudice is res judicata not only as to the matters actually litigated in the previous action, 'but as to all relevant issues which could have been but were not raised and litigated in the suit.'" Samuels v. N. Telecom, Inc., 942 F.2d 834, 836 (2d Cir. 1991) (citations omitted); see also Reyes, 661 F. Supp. 2d at 277 (); Res. N.E. of Long Island, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 28 F. Supp. 2d 786, 792 (E.D.N. Y. 1998) ().
Settlement agreements entered as stipulations of dismissals with prejudice preclude all claims that could have been brought at the time of the settlement. See Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280, 286-87 (2d Cir. 2002) (); Muhammad v. City of Peekskill, No. 06-CV-1899, 2008 WL 4452355, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2008) ('"The stipulation dismissing plaintiff's 'action' with prejudice must be read to have dismissed all claims,' which precludes Plaintiff later raising 'those claims that would have been decided had the first action been fully litigated.'" (quoting Nemaizer v. Baker, 793 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1986)); Waldmanv. Vill. of Kiryas Joel, 39 F. Supp. 2d 370, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ().
The settlement would preclude not only claims against the named defendants in the prior action, but also those in privity with the named defend...
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