Carealliance Health Servs. v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue
Decision Date | 20 April 2016 |
Docket Number | Appellate Case No. 2014–001457.,No. 27627.,27627. |
Citation | 416 S.C. 484,787 S.E.2d 475 |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Parties | CAREALLIANCE HEALTH SERVICES d/b/a Roper St. Francis Healthcare, Respondent, v. SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Appellant. |
Milton G. Kimpson and Lauren Acquaviva, both of the South Carolina Department of Revenue, of Columbia, for appellant.
John C. Von Lehe, Jr. and Bryson M. Geer, both of Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP, of Charleston, and Raymond P. Carpenter, of Roswell, Georgia, for respondent.
The South Carolina Department of Revenue (DOR) appeals the Administrative Law Court's (ALC) grant of summary judgment in favor of Care Alliance Health Services (the Hospital) finding (1) orthopaedic prosthetic devices purchased for specific patients are exempt from sales tax and (2) other bone, muscle, and tissue implants replaced a missing part of the body. We reverse.
The Hospital is a health corporation comprised of Roper Hospital and St. Francis Hospital in Charleston, which render customary surgical and emergency services to patients. The Hospital provides orthopaedic prosthetic devices1 and other implants to patients through either a planned surgical procedure or in response to trauma.
Generally during a scheduled surgery, a prosthetic device vendor is present in the operating room with a portfolio of prosthetic devices from which a surgeon can select the appropriate implant. Upon determining the appropriate device, the surgeon communicates his selection to the vendor. The vendor then provides the chosen device to a circulating nurse for implantation by the surgeon. Subsequently, the vendor fills out a requisition sheet, in which a record of the device is memorialized. The requisition sheet is initialed by the circulating nurse as an acknowledgement the items were consumed. The form is then provided to the Hospital's purchasing department, and a purchase order is generated and submitted to the vendor based on prearranged pricing agreements with the Hospital.
Believing the purchase of orthopaedic prosthetic devices and other implants were eligible for a sales tax exemption, the Hospital sought a refund from DOR.2 Specifically, the Hospital asserted under Home Medical Systems, Inc. v. South Carolina Department of Revenue, 382 S.C. 556, 564, 677 S.E.2d 582, 587 (2009), the prosthetic devices were “sold by prescription” as required for the tax exemption under section 12–36–2120(28) of the South Carolina Code (2014). Pursuant to Home Medical, a device is sold by prescription if (1) the sale requires a prescription; (2) the device is actually sold by prescription; and (3) the device replaces a missing part of the body. 382 S.C. at 564, 677 S.E.2d at 587.
Following an audit, DOR denied the request as to orthopaedic prosthetic devices on the grounds they do not require a prescription to be sold and a prescription was not used in the purchase of the devices.3 DOR also held other bone, muscle, and tissue implants were not exempt because they did not replace a missing part of the body, as required for the exemption.
The Hospital filed for a contested case hearing. After discovery, both parties filed motions for summary judgment. Following a hearing on the motions, the ALC granted summary judgment in favor of the Hospital, finding orthopaedic prosthetic devices qualified for the exemption and other bone, muscle, and tissue implants replaced a missing part of the body.
DOR filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied, and thereafter filed a notice of appeal. This Court certified the case for review pursuant to Rule 204(b), SCACR.
In an appeal from an ALC decision, the Administrative Procedures Act provides the appropriate standard of review. S.C.Code Ann. § 1–23–610(B) (Supp.2015); Kiawah Dev. Partners, II v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 411 S.C. 16, 28, 766 S.E.2d 707, 715 (2014). While an appellate court will not substitute its judgment for that of the ALC as to findings of fact, we may reverse or modify decisions that are controlled by an error of law or are clearly erroneous in view of the substantial evidence on the record as a whole. S.C. Dep't of Corr. v. Mitchell, 377 S.C. 256, 259, 659 S.E.2d 233, 235 (Ct.App.2008). Substantial evidence is evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion that the administrative agency reached or must have reached in order to justify its action. Lark v. Bi–Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 135, 276 S.E.2d 304, 306 (1981). Ordinarily, tax exemption statutes are strictly construed against the claimed exemption. TNS Mills, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue, 331 S.C. 611, 620, 503 S.E.2d 471, 476 (1998).
DOR challenges the ALC's holding the Hospital is entitled to the sales tax exemption for orthopaedic prosthetic devices. Specifically, DOR contends the ALC erred in finding a prescription is required for the sale of an orthopaedic device between the Hospital and vendor because of federal regulations. We agree.
Generally, the retail sale of a prosthetic device to a hospital or doctor is a taxable sale if the prosthetic device is furnished to a patient as part of a service being rendered by a hospital. S.C.Code Ann. § 12–36–110(1)(i) (2014). As noted above, the sales tax exemption enumerated in section 12–36–2120(28) is for prosthetic devices sold by prescription.
S.C.Code Ann. § 12–36–2120(28) ; see also 10 S.C. Reg. 117–308 (2012) ( ); S.C. Rev. Ruling # 98–9 (. that once it is established that a sale to a hospital is a retail sale, then one must determine whether the item in question comes within an exemption) Although the tax code does not define the term sold by prescription, this Court in Home Medical enunciated a three-part test to determine whether an item is sold by prescription. 382 S.C. at 564, 677 S.E.2d at 587. A device is sold by prescription if (1) the sale requires a prescription; (2) the device is actually sold by prescription; and (3) the device replaces a missing part of the body. Id.
DOR applied Home Medical and found the exemption inapplicable for orthopaedic prosthetic devices because a prescription is not required for the transaction between the Hospital and vendor. Relying on Regulation 117–308.3 and Regulation 117–308.8, DOR argues the purchase of an orthopaedic prosthetic device is equivalent to the purchase of traditional medical supplies like bandages. Under 117–308.3, 10 S.C. Reg. 117–308.3 (2011)(emphasis added). Similarly, hospitals are considered the consumers “[w]here drugs, prosthetic devices and other supplies are furnished to their patients as a part of the medical service rendered.” 10 S.C. Reg. 117–308.8 (2011). DOR accordingly asserted the Hospital was not required to have a prescription to acquire supplies, be they prosthetic devices or bandages. Moreover, DOR suggested the exemption was intended for individual patients who purchase a prosthetic device with a prescription from a brace and boot shop, not for a hospital or doctor rendering services by implanting prosthetic devices.
However, the Hospital argued that because the devices are Class II and Class III federal prescription prosthetics, inquiry into the nature of the transaction was unnecessary—the implants are prescription devices by federal mandate. See 21 C.F.R. § 801.109(a) (2011) ( ).4 Consequently, the Hospital suggested these prosthetics will always satisfy Home Medical, and the Hospital was therefore entitled to the exemption. DOR argued the federal regulation relied on by the Hospital merely dictates labeling requirements for when the device is allowed in the stream of commerce and therefore provided no insight into the state's taxation of the devices. See 21 C.F.R. § 801.109(a). It therefore gave no weight to the devices' classification as Class II or Class III in formulating its position.
The ALC rejected DOR's construction of federal regulations, finding Home Medical was satisfied because FDA regulation requires a prescription for orthopaedic prosthetic devices. See 21 C.F.R § 801.109(a) ; see also 21 U.S.C. § 360j(e)(1)(A) (2006) ( ). While the ALC acknowledged a prescription is not necessary for all sales under section 801.109, it found DOR interpreted the regulation too strictly and as a result defeated the statutory purpose to allow for an exemption as applied by Home Medical. The ALC concluded ...
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