Carey v. Broadway Motors, Inc.

• Citation: 253 Minn. 333,91 N.W.2d 753
• Decision Date: 01 August 1958
• Docket Number: No. 37439,37439
• Parties: Lloyd B. CAREY, Respondent, v. BROADWAY MOTORS, INC., et al., Defendants, Broadway Motors, Inc., Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 753

91 N.W.2d 753

253 Minn. 333

Lloyd B. CAREY, Respondent, v. BROADWAY MOTORS, INC., et al., Defendants, Broadway Motors, Inc., Appellant.

No. 37439.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Aug. 1, 1958.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Under M.S.A. § 168.15, party in whose name automobile is registered in office of registrar of motor vehicles is prima facie owner thereof, but evidence may be submitted to show that such ownership may be in person other than one designated in registration. Where evidence is submitted to establish ownership different than that indicated in registration, fact question for jury is presented if such evidence is doubtful or inconclusive, or if questions as to credibility of witnesses arise.

2. Under § 168.15, which requires that transfers of motor vehicles be registered in office of registrar of motor vehicles, where dealer permits motor vehicle to remain in its name after claimed sale to employee, conclusive evidence would be required before court could determine As matter of law that dealer was not owner of such vehicle. Held, where evidence would sustain finding that dealer had not signed or filed claimed conditional sales contract covering alleged sale of car to employee and that employee had never requested transfer of car to him and had not paid claimed sales price thereof, court was correct in submitting issue of ownership to jury.

3. Under § 170.54, proof of ownership of car establishes prima facie case that it was being operated upon public highway with express or implied consent of such owner at time of accident. In absence of evidence negativing such consent, jury might properly find that driver of car was operating it with express or implied consent of owner.

The order appealed from is affirmed.

Gordon C. Peterson, Minneapolis, for appellants.AT Peter F. Greiner, Minneapolis, for respondent.

THOMAS GALLAGHER, Justice.

Action against Broadway Motors, Inc., and Monroe H. Gage for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff in an automobile accident on May 7, 1955. Defendant Gage did not answer and judgment was entered against him by default. The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff against Broadway Motors, Inc.

At the close of the trial Broadway Motors, Inc., moved for a directed verdict on the ground that the evidence compelled a finding that it was not the owner of the 1937 Plymouth automobile involved in the accident, and that Monroe H. Gage, who was its driver at the time, was not then its agent or employee. The same ground was urged as a basis for its subsequent motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial, and on appeal from the order denying such motion is urged here as ground for reversal thereof.

The facts relative to the issues are as follows: On the day of the accident, and for sometime prior thereto, the 1937 Plymouth involved was registered in the name of Broadway Motors, Inc. Prior to the accident Gage had at times been employed by Broadway Motors, Inc., waxing cars on a piecework basis. Testimony was submitted by Emer Bloom, president of Broadway Motors, Inc., and by Gage that Broadway Motors, Inc., had sold the car to Gage for $85 on April 8, 1955; that a conditional sales contract evidencing this sale had been signed by Gage but had not been signed, delivered, or filed by Broadway Motors, Inc.; and that after the accident the car had been towed to a service station and thereafter not reclaimed by either defendant.

On April 8, 1955, title to a 1941 Chevrolet was transferred by Broadway Motors, Inc., to Gage by execution of the bill of sale on the back of the official registration card therefor, but this car had been retransferred by Gage to Broadway Motors, Inc., on April 26, 1955. Both Gage and Bloom testified that the transfer of the Chevrolet to Gage had been in error in that it had been intended to transfer the 1937 Plymouth instead. In April 1955 the time required for transfer of an automobile and issuance of a new registration card therefor by the registrar of motor vehicles was approximately 8 days. Bloom testified that in the ordinary course of business upon the sale of a car on a conditional sales contract the title and registration card was promptly placed in the name of the purchaser. He failed to explain why the 1937 Plymouth had not been thus transferred to Gage at any time after it had been sold to the latter. He testified that the purchase price of the Plymouth had been fully paid by Gage, but the ledger sheets of Broadway Motors, Inc., revealed that payments were still due on the contract of purchase covering the car.

Gage testified that he had not been employed by Broadway Motors, Inc., subsequent to April 22, 1955, but there was evidence that when he returned the title card of the 1941 Chevrolet on April 26, 1955, he had worked on that date. He testified that he had paid for the car in full but admitted that he never attempted to procure its transfer or to have the registrar of motor vehicles issue a new registration card evidencing such ownership.

1. In Flaugh v. Egan Chevrolet, Inc., 202 Minn. 615, 279 N.W. 582; Bolton-Swanby Co. v. Owens, 201 Minn. 162, 275 N.W. 855; and Holmes v. Lilygren Motor Co., Inc., 201 Minn. 44, 275 N.W. 416, this court established the rule that registration of an automobile under M.S.A. § 168.15 ¹ establishes prima facie that the registrant is the owner of the automobile described in such...