City of St. Louis v. Carpenter

• Decision Date: 09 January 1961
• Docket Number: No. 2,No. 48225,48225,2
• Citation: 341 S.W.2d 786,87 A.L.R.2d 1219
• Parties: CITY OF ST. LOUIS, a Municipal Corporation, the Board of Police Commissioners of the City of St. Louis and Harry A. Underberg, Appellants, v. Milton CARPENTER, Director of Revenue of the State of Missouri, Respondent
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 786

341 S.W.2d 786

87 A.L.R.2d 1219

CITY OF ST. LOUIS, a Municipal Corporation, the Board of Police Commissioners of the City of St. Louis and Harry A. Underberg, Appellants, v. Milton CARPENTER, Director of Revenue of the State of Missouri, Respondent.

No. 48225.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2.

Jan. 9, 1961.

Thomas J. Neenan, City Counselor, John J. Shanahan, Associate City Counselor, St. Louis, for appellants.

John M. Dalton, Atty. Gen., James E. Conway, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

STORCKMAN, Judge.

This is a declaratory judgment action in which the plaintiffs seek an adjudication that The Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law, Chapter 303, RSMo Supp 1957, V.A.M.S., does not apply to employees of the City of St. Louis, a municipal corporation, or to employees of the Board of Police Commissioners of the City of St. Louis, when such employees, in the discharge of their official duties, are operating motor vehicles owned by the City or the Police Department which are involved in accidents. More specifically, the plaintiffs contend that Sec. 303.350 exempts the employees as well as the municipality and, therefore, the defendant director of revenue is without lawful authority to suspend the operators' licenses of such employees for non-compliance with the security provisions of the Chapter. The case was submitted on the pleadings to the court without a jury. From a finding by the trial court that plaintiffs' employees were subject to all of the provisions of Chapter 303, the plaintiffs have appealed.

Under the Responsibility Law the operator of a motor vehicle involved in an accident in which a person is killed or injured, or property is damaged in excess of $100, is required to report the matter to the director of revenue; if the operator is physically incapable of making such report, then the owner of the vehicle involved must make the report within ten days after learning of the accident. Section 303.040. If, after the report is made, proof of ability to respond in damages is not furnished in the time and the manner provided, the defendant, as director of revenue of the State of Missouri, is required to 'suspend the license of each operator, and all registrations of each owner of a motor vehicle, in any manner involved in such accident'. Section 303.030. Proof of financial responsibility may be required 'with respect to a motor vehicle or with respect to a person who is not the owner of a motor vehicle'. Section 303.160.

The section upon which the plaintiffs depend for exemption and which we are called on to construe is Sec. 303.350 which reads as follows:

'Notwithstanding anything else herein contained, this chapter shall not apply with respect to any motor vehicle owned by the United States, the state of Missouri, or any political subdivision of this state, or any municipality therein, * * *.' Italics added.

In support of their contention that it is the intent of Sec. 303.350 to make the Responsibility Law inapplicable to municipal officials and employees, the plaintiffs cite City of St. Paul v. Hoffmann, 223 Minn. 76, 25 N.W.2d 661, and City of Phoenix v. Lane, 76 Ariz. 240, 263 P.2d 302. These cases hold that the employee drivers of municipally owned motor vehicles, as well as the municipality, are exempted from compliance with the financial responsibility laws of Minnesota and Arizona. The cases are not particularly helpful because of differences in the statutes under consideration. For example, the Minnesota law does not provide for a suspension of the registration of the motor vehicle involved, but only the license of the operator or driver of the motor vehicle, Secs. 170.21 and 170.25, Minnesota Statutes Annotated. Also Sec. 170.51, the exclusion provision, specifies 'any motor vehicle owned and operated' by the municipality. Italics added. Section 303.350 of the Missouri Law does not in express terms mention the operation or operator of the motor vehicle. Moreover, under Sec. 170.54 of the Minnesota Act, the driver is deemed to be the agent of the owner; and this provision has been held to establish a prima facie case that the motor vehicle was being operated with the express or implied consent of the owner thus broadening the operative field of the doctrine of respondeat superior. Carey v. Broadway Motors, Inc., 253 Minn. 333, 91 N.W.2d 753; Aasen v. Aasen, 228 Minn. 1, 36 N.W.2d 27; Clemens v. United States, D.C., 88 F.Supp. 971. The Missouri Law does not purport to enlarge the liability of the owner or the operator of the motor vehicle.

While the Arizona law operates both upon the operator's license and the registration of the motor vehicle, it contains a provision that the law does not apply to a driver operating a motor vehicle owned by his employer; in such case the owner of the motor vehicle is subject to the provisions of the law, but the driver is not. Section 28-1143, subd. A, par. 5, Arizona Revised Statutes Annotated. The Lane decision is based at least partially on this ground; and the provision, which is not in the Missouri Law, also appears to have influenced the court's construction of the exemption section. The Hoffmann and the Lane cases are not persuasive that we should adopt a similar construction of the exemption provision of the Missouri Law.

Statutes enacted for the protection of life and property, or which introduce some new regulation conducive to the public good, are considered remedial in nature and are generally given a liberal construction. 82 C.J.S. Statutes Sec. 388, p. 918; 50 Am.Jur., Statutes, Sec. 395, p. 420; Barbieri v. Morris, Mo., 315 S.W.2d 711, 714; State ex rel. Whatley v. Mueller, Mo.App., 288 S.W.2d 405, 409[2, 3].

The purpose of The Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law is to protect the public from injury or damage by the operation of motor vehicles upon the public highways and to that extent it is remedial. New York Casualty Company v. Lewellen, 8 Cir., 184 F.2d 891, 894. The Law necessarily provides for sanctions as a means of its enforcement.

Where a statute is both remedial and penal, remedial in one part while penal in another, it should be considered a remedial statute when enforcement of the remedy is sought and penal when enforcement of the penalty is sought. State ex rel. Terminal R. R. Ass'n of St. Louis v. Hughes, 350 Mo. 869, 169 S.W.2d 328, 330[4, 5]. The part of Chapter 303 with which we are concerned deals with the coverage of the Law and exemptions therefrom; in that respect it is remedial and should be liberally construed in order to accomplish the greatest public good. New York Casualty Co. v. Lewellen, supra.

Statutes relating to the same or similar subject matter, even though enacted acted at different times and found in different chapters, are in pari materia and must be considered together when such statutes shed light on the statute being construed. State ex rel. Smithco Transport Co. v. Public Service Commission, Mo., 316 S.W.2d 6, 12; State ex rel. Wright v. Carter, Mo., 319 S.W.2d 596, 600; State ex rel. Spink v. Kemp, 365 Mo. 368, 283 S.W.2d 502, 526. In this case The Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law should be construed in the light of other statutes relating to motor vehicles such as the provisions for the registration and licensing of motor vehicles, Chapter...