Carhart v. Aldridge
| Decision Date | 27 September 1926 |
| Docket Number | 25704 |
| Citation | 144 Miss. 178,109 So. 700 |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
| Parties | CARHART v. ALDRIDGE, et al. [*] |
1. REFORMATION, OF INSTRUMENTS. Bill to set aside judgment and settlement between parties thereto on ground of mistake must show mutual mistake, and due diligence in ascertaining facts at or prior to time of settlement, and that ignorance of facts was not result of, or want of, reasonable care and diligence.
An original bill, filed to set aside a judgment of a chancery court and a settlement between the parties thereto on the ground of mistake, must not only show that there was a mutual mistake, which induced the decree and settlement, but there must also be shown thereby due diligence in ascertaining the facts at or prior to the time of the settlement, and that ignorance of the facts was not the result of, or want of reasonable care and diligence upon the part of such party.
2. COMPROMISE AND SETTLEMENT.
Family settlements are highly favored by the courts, and they will not be lightly set aside at the instance of a party, or parties, thereto.
HON. E N. THOMAS, Chancellor.
APPEAL from chancery court of Washington county, HON. E. N. THOMAS Chancellor.
Suit by Mrs. Kate Feltus Carhart against Katherine Feltus Aldridge and others to set aside an instrument of conveyance, an instrument creating a trust in her behalf, and a decree in a former suit. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed and remanded.
Judgment affirmed and remanded.
Boddie & Farish and Lamar F. Easterling, for appellant.
The only ground of demurrer that aims at the whole bill is whether or not the bill as a whole has equity on its face and shows that appellant here, complainant below, was entitled to equitable relief. The averments of the bill and the exhibits in connection therewith bring into review and make it sufficiently plain that the compromise agreement and the decrees and instruments entered in furtherance thereof were caused by duress, imposition, misrepresentation and by mutual mistake of fact. If the allegations of this bill are true, which is admitted on this demurrer, for the purpose of the demurrer, the grossest outrage has been perpetrated under the guise of a compromise against the appellant.
We content ourselves with some of the leading decisions touching the jurisdiction of a court of equity to set aside any agreement, deed, decree, contract or settlement where there was a mutual mistake in a material fact, but for which such contract, agreement, or decree would not have been made or entered into. 27 Cyc. 807 and note; 8 Cyc. 523; Nabors v. Cocke, 24 Miss. 44. The last-named case is peculiarly applicable here and, in our judgment, is conclusive on this demurrer. See also Harrison v. Stowers, 1 Walker, 165 (Miss.); A. & V. Ry. Co. v. Jones, 73 Miss. 110, 19 So. 105; Pomeroy on Equity, secs. 841-850; Powell v. Plant, 23 So. 399, which is nearly on all fours with this case; Brown v. Wesson, 114 Miss. 216, 74 So. 831.
All the authorities may be summed up in the simple statement that if Mrs. Carhart was induced to make the settlement and agree to the decree as she did under this mutual mistake of a most material fact in the case, then on this ground alone equity has power to take jurisdiction of the bill and to grant full and complete relief. There is no trouble in this case about restoring the status quo. In fact, nobody can be hurt at all if all the transactions of sale are set aside. We submit that the bill is sufficient on demurrer and that it imperatively calls for an answer. Merchants and Farmers Bank v. Dent, 102 Miss. 455, 59 So. 805; Norwich Fire Ins. Co. v. Standard Drug Co., 117 Miss. 429, 78 So. 353.
Regarding a mistake as to material matter, see: Allen et al. v. Luckett, 94 Miss. 872; 2 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, secs. 852, 853, Bigham v. Madison, 103 Tenn. 358, 52 S.W. 1074, 47 L. R. A. 267; Webb v. Webb, 54 So. 840; Hoy v. Hoy, 93 Miss. 732, 48 So. 903, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 182 note. See also Clark v. Lopez, 75 Miss. 932, 23 So. 648; Norfleet v. Beall, 82 Miss. 538, 34 So. 328; Johnson v. Hall, 87 Miss. 667, 47 So. 1; Leech v. Hirshman, 90 Miss. 723, 44 So. 33; Leflore County v. Alley, 80 Miss. 298, 31 So. 815.
Ordinarily a compromise settlement where fairly and understandingly entered into is valid, but can be set aside on the clearest evidence of fraud or mistake. In fact, fraud or mistake are very common grounds of equity in the cancellation of instruments. For a case where the contract of sale was set aside, see Caulk v. Burke, 73 So. 618, 75 So. 369, 114 Miss. . The above case was first affirmed and afterwards on a suggestion of error reversed. See also Lowenstein v. Goodbar, 69 Miss. 808, where it was held that the mutual mistake upon which a sale will be avoided must be as to an essential fact which forms an inducement of sale such as would justify the inference that if the truth had been known, the sale would not have occurred. See Railroad v. Jones, 73 Miss. 110; Pratt v. Cotton Co., 51 Miss. 470; Spark v. Pittman, 51 Miss. 511; Norton v. Coaley, 45 Miss. 125; Cumming v. Steele, 54 Miss. 647; Bunch v. Shannon, 46 Miss. 523; Allen v. Bratton, 47 Miss. 119; Clark v. Equitable Society, 76 Miss. 22; Hoy v. Hoy, 49 So. 903; Virginia Trust Co. v. Cato, 134 Miss. , 99 So. 261; Alexander v. Meek, 96 So. 101; Jones v. Metzger, 96 So. 161; Burton v. Hayden, 108 Va. 51, 60 S.E. 736, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1038.
The very purpose of a demurrer is to give appellant a better bill and to call attention to any defects of form that could be cured by amendment. Its office is to point out the way to a better bill. See Fearne v. Shirley, 31 Miss. 301, 66 Am. Dec. 575; Watson v. Byrd, 53 Miss. 480; McNair v. Stanley, 57 Miss. 298.
Taking the four corners of the bill and all the allegations and averments together, we submit that a clear case of mistake as to a material fact, coercion by circumstances and misrepresentations, is presented by this record which clearly entitles appellant to the relief prayed for.
A settlement should not be allowed to stand on the averments of this bill, especially between mother and daughters under the facts and circumstances as averred in the bill. The case should be reversed, the demurrer overruled, and the cause remanded for a trial upon the facts as averred in the bill; and if appellant substantiates these facts, the instruments assailed should be canceled and appellant granted the relief therein prayed for.
Boiled down to the last analysis, appellant was induced to surrender and sign away her entire interest in said estate, to forego any claim for services rendered in the managing of said estate, and to forego any claim due her in the administration of said estate, all for a mere pension of two hundred dollars per month during her life.
On the authority of Webb v. Webb, 84 So. 640, a transaction between parent and child is to be even more carefully scrutinized than if it had taken place between strangers. Therefore, on the facts of this record, we submit that the chancellor erred in sustaining this demurrer and that the cause should be reversed and remanded and that the appellant should be required to answer said bill and that the cause should be tried upon its merits.
Watson & Jayne, for appellees.
The theory of appellant is that this is a case of mistake. The position of appellees on the subject of mistake is: (1) That the bill and exhibits show that there was no mistake; (2) if there was a mistake, it was a mistake of law, from the nature of which equity will not relieve; and (3) that the consideration for the deed and trust instrument were not based on any mistake of law or fact, but that the same were set up, executed, and delivered for valuable consideration, as therein expressed, moving, toward the appellant, and saving her from want because of the wastages for which she was accountable to appellees.
For masterly statement of the origin, growth, and present status of mistake in equity, see 2 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (4 Ed.), secs. 838-871, inclusive. The instant case falls under that classification in Pomeroy relating to compromises and voluntary settlements, as explained in section 850.
Holding to the viewpoint of appellees already brought forward in this brief on the subject of mistake and to the particular classification of the cases controlling the transaction complained of in the instant case, as being one of compromise, appellees do not differ with the textbooks and cases extensively cited in appellant's brief on the general subject of mistake. Nor do appellees differ with the line of authorities cited in appellant's brief on the subject of mutual mistake--this for the reason that the allegations of the bill of complaint taken with the exhibits thereto do not make the instant case one of mutual mistake as appellees have already endeavored to show.
Law on Demurrer. Appellees do not differ with the authorities cited by appellants on the subject of demurrer, but contend that they are in their application of general import, and not controlling in the instant case; and this for the reason that the allegations of the bill endeavor to make a case of mutual mistake wholly based on an alleged ignorance on the part of all parties of the attempted resignation of James B. Fraley as executor and trustee. But this allegation must be taken with the proceedings in the two equity causes, to-wit: Nos 3941 [144 Miss. 183] and 7379. In the first of the above cases, which was the administration case, the papers were filed and constituted a part of the record therein, and in the second the removal of trustee case, an issue was made with regard to both the filing and effect of this paper. Therefore, as appellees see it, there was...
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