Jones v. Metzger

• Decision Date: 14 May 1923
• Docket Number: 23210
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: JONES et ux. v. METZGER

96 So. 161

132 Miss. 247

JONES et ux. v. METZGER

No. 23210

Supreme Court of Mississippi

May 14, 1923

1. VENDOR AND PURCHASER. Mutual mistake as to buildings being on land and mistake as to title held to justify rescission.

Where ignorant negroes purchasing sixteenth section school land by special warranty deed expected to obtain fee-simple title to knowledge of the vendor, who owned only a leasehold, and both parties mistakenly supposed certain valuable buildings were on the land, there was sufficient ground for rescission.

2. COVENANTS. The words "warrant specially" is warranty only against those claiming through grantor.

The words "warrant specially" in a conveyance is merely a covenant that the grantor and his heirs and representatives warrant the title against the claims of all persons claiming through or under the grantor.

3 DEEDS. Conveyance with special warranty may be grant of fee-simple title.

A conveyance with special warranty may be a grant of a fee-simple title.

HON. R W. CUTRER, Chancellor.

APPEAL from chancery court of Wilkinson county, HON. R. W. CUTRER Chancellor.

Suit by Willie Jones and wife against August Metzger. From a decree for defendant, complainants appeal. Reversed and remanded.

Decree reversed and case remanded.

David C. Bramlett, counsel for appellant.

The trouble with the court below, with the greatest respect, is that in addition to a misconception of the law applicable the issues were misconceived, as a glance at the final decree demonstrates to quote a phrase thereof on which the entire decree is based: ". . . And that the covenants in said deed, Exhibit A, have not been breached. . . ."

Regarding the breach of the special warranty vel non as one of the vital issues, it is not surprizing that the court below erred. "Experience shows that when a trial judge is wrong in his conception of the issues, or of the principles of law applicable to them, his errors are likely to be many and also to be prejudicial." Copper Process Co. v Chicago B. & I. Co., 8 A. L. R. 1477-1479, 262 F. 66.

In Jackson Naval Storks v. Tootle, 96 Miss. 486, this court held that it being unlawful for the lessee of a sixteenth section, public school land, to sell for commercial purposes the timber standing thereon, the warrant in a sale of such timber by the lessee is broken when made, and an action for the breach at once lies, without hostile assertion of the paramount title.

In this case the sale was not only of the timber but of the land including timber and everything else pertaining thereto, and as the court held in the Naval Stores case, supra, if a sixteenth section timber deed is a nullity, surely the deed in the case of the land under the facts and circumstances of this case is a nullity.

Again the court below held in the final decree that the sale of this land was "in good faith." It is elementary in Mississippi that it matters not how good might have been the faith or how honest the mistake, if a mutual material mistake is made and the purchaser does not get what he thought he was getting, the sale will be rescinded. Brown v. Coker, 129 Miss. 411.

The undisputed testimony in this case shows: First. Appellee Metzger, is a shrewd, successful merchant and trader in lands. Second. Appellants are uneducated ignorant, hard-working negroes who traded with appellee as their merchant and trusted him and left this entire matter to appellee who had the papers prepared by his attorney and appellants were not represented by an attorney. Third. Appellee, Metzger, executed to appellants a usual land deed, which in addition to being a nullity as hereinbefore shown, is in itself sufficient to mislead appellants, under the facts and circumstances of this case, into believing that they were receiving a fee-simple title to the land; and, further, appellants had no knowledge of the legal effect of "warrant specially" or any other information as to land titles. Fourth. Metzger knew when he conveyed appellants the land described in the deed that he did not own the same but that it was school land and the most he had was a lease. Fifth. There is not the slightest suggestion that appellants, prior to or at the time of the purchase, knew that Metzger did not own this land, or that it was school-section land. Sixth. Metzger, prior to or at the time of the purchase, did not tell appellants that he did not own this land, but concealed this fact from appellants and concealed the further fact that all he did own was a lease. Seventh. This entire transaction was to sell--not to lease--land, and in consummating such a transaction to transfer land and the execution of a deed purporting to convey land, under the facts, constitutes a fraudulent misrepresentation on the part of Metzger. Eighth. The residence and barn within the fence which appellee, Metzger, claimed was on the line, are not on the Metzger place but are on the Still place and are not on the land described in the deed executed by Metzger to Appellants; therefore, appellants not only did not acquire the residence and barn in fee as they thought they were buying, but appellants are without even a color of title thereto.

This court has ever jealously guarded the rights of the weak and ignorant as against the shrewd, designing and powerful, and, strange to say, in doing so, in nearly all instances it has been necessary to reverse the lower courts. In a case similar to this wherein an ignorant negro had been overreached, this court said: "When the true situation of the parties is thoroughly understood, the evidence of unfair, if not fraudulent dealing is made manifest upon an inspection of the deeds themselves, and this coupled with other proof in the case, abundantly warrants the court in setting aside the transaction." Carter v. Eastman Gardner Company, 95 Miss. 651-655.

Again at page 656: "Be this as it may, this whole transaction is so manifestly unfair and unjust, made between parties standing upon such an unequal footing; showing so clearly that appellants have been overreached, that it must be set aside. The true purpose of the court would be lost sight of if so palpable a wrong could be allowed to go uncorrected."

Suppression of the truth as well as suggestion of falsehood may render a party guilty of fraud, to quote 12 R. C. L. 305: "Fraud may be committed by the suppression of the truth as well as by the suggestion of falsehood and it is equally competent for the court to relieve against it whether it is committed in one way or the other. The one acts negatively, the other positively; both are calculated, in different ways, to produce the same result. The former as well as the latter is a violation of the principles of good faith. It proceeds from the same motives and is attended with the same consequences; and the deception and injury may be as great in the one case as in the other."

In Parham v. Randolph, 4 Howard (Miss.) 435-451, this court said: "Any intentional misrepresentation or concealment in relation to land, either as to quality or title, by which the purchaser is imposed on, is fraudulent and it is immaterial whether the false representations are intentional or not." Rimer v. Dugan, 39 Miss. 477; 2 Tucker's Lect., p. 421, 422, citing 1 Brown's Ch. C. (Ves.) 174, 183; 10 Id. 475; 1 Ves. & B. 355; 9 Ves. 21; and see 1 Story Eq., sec. 193; 3 Cranch, 270.

The same doctrine has long been settled in this court. See Parham v. Randolph et al., 4 How. 451; Davidson v. Moss, 5 Id. 684; Hall v. Thompson, 1 S. & M. 485; Clopton et al. v. Cozart et al., 13 Id. 363; Oswald v. McGehee, 28 Miss. 340; Lindsey v. Lindsey, 34 Id. 432."

And again at page 483: "That the complainant may resort to equity for relief against the fraud, instead of relying upon his covenant of warranty, is well settled in this court. Davidson v. Moss, 4 How. 673; Parham et al. v. Randolph et al., 4 Id. 451; English v. Benedict, 25 Miss. 167."

In Davis v. Heard, 44 Miss. 50, at page 57 this court said: "The rule of law is, that if a vendor misrepresents a material fact, in relation to title or quantity of an estate, though innocently and under a belief of its truth, or if he conceals any material circumstances which may be calculated to enhance the value of the property in the estimation of the purchaser, a court of equity will rescind the contract."

We also call the court's attention to the cases of Estell v. Myers, 54 Miss. 174; Vincent v. Corbett, 94 Miss. 46, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 85; McNeer & Dodd v. Norfleet, 113 Miss. 611.

There is not a jurisdiction or encyclopedia or law authority of any kind to which we could not go for further citations but we see no occasion for further going outside our own court which from its beginning down to and including the 129 Mississippi, supra, has passed on the points involved in this record as hereinbefore shown so many times.

Conclusion. This court has the entire record before it; consequently, we ask this court to reverse the decree and judgment of the court below and to grant the prayer of appellants' bill of complaint namely, that the deed and notes be rescinded and canceled, and judgment be entered against appellee in favor of appellants in the sum of one thousand one hundred dollars with interest; thus placing all the parties hereto in statu quo with loss to no one.

Tucker & Tucker, for appellee.

There is nothing in this record to show that the appellee had any influence over the appellants or they had any undue confidence in appellee, except the self-serving declaration of appellant Willie Jones; that he had confidence in appellee and that both of the appellants declare they are ignorant.

This cost of the land to appellee and the sale price to appellants fail to show any overreaching of the appellants in price. In...