Carino v. Watson

• Decision Date: 03 August 1976
• Citation: 171 Conn. 366,370 A.2d 950
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Charles CARINO v. John WATSON.

Page 950

370 A.2d 950

171 Conn. 366

Charles CARINO v. John WATSON.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Aug. 3, 1976.

Robert E. Beach, Jr., Asst. Chief State's Atty., in support of the motion.

Hubert J. Santos, Hartford, in opposition.

Before HOUSE, C.J., and LOISELLE, BOGDANSKI, LONGO and BARBER, JJ.

HOUSE, Chief Justice.

This matter came to this court on a motion to review and reverse an order of the Superior Court in Hartford County granting bail in the amount of $10,000 to the plaintiff, Charles Carino. The named defendant, John Watson, is the commanding officer of the detective division of the Connecticut state police and at the commencement of the proceedings held the plaintiff in his custody. Carino is wanted by the state of New Jersey on a variety of criminal charges. He was arrested on unrelated charges in East Hartford on June 6, 1975. He was then charged with being a fugitive from justice, but, before the governor could sign the extradition arrest warrant, he challenged in the federal district court for Connecticut the validity of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (General Statutes §§ 54-157 through 54-185). That court temporarily enjoined the signing of the warrant, and a three-judge panel was convened. That panel upheld the validity of the act and dissolved the injunction. DeGenna and Carino v. Grasso, D.Conn.1976, 413 F.Supp. 427. The plaintiff appealed the decision to the United States Supreme Court which summarily ruled against his claims on June 7, 1976. Carino v. Grasso, 426 U.S. 913, 96 S.Ct. 2617, 49 L.Ed.2d 368 (44 U.S.L.W. 3698).

Following dissolution of the injunction, the governor signed the extradition arrest warrant. The plaintiff surrendered himself on April 8, 1976, and, as permitted by § 54-166, immediately petitioned the Superior Court for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging the legality of his arrest under that arrest warrant. That same day, the Superior Court set bond and gave the state permission to seek review of its order in the event that such permission should be deemed to be necessary-a question which, under the circumstances, need not be decided in the present proceedings.

The motion for review of the order fixing bail is properly before this court. Practice Book § 694. The defendant does not question the reasonableness of the amount of the bail bond set but claims that, after the governor has signed an extradition warrant and even though the fugitive has petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, the court is powerless to admit him to bail.

The Uniform Criminal Extradition Act expressly provides (§ 54-172) that a judge may admit to bail a person arrested as a fugitive from another state pending issuance of the governor's warrant in an extradition proceeding, unless the offense charged is punishable by death or life imprisonment under the law of the demanding state. ¹ It is significantly silent, however, concerning the authority of a court or judge to admit a fugitive to bail after the governor's warrant has been signed. See Allen v. Wild, 249 Iowa 255, 259, 86 N.W.2d 839.

The plaintiff, citing Winnick v. Reilly, 100 Conn. 291, 123 A. 440, contends that the Superior Court in the exercise of its common-law powers may, in a habeas corpus proceeding arising from a prisoner's arrest on a governor's extradition warrant, admit that prisoner to bail. The Winnick case concerned a defendant's right to bail pending a decision on his appeal from the dismissal of a writ of habeas corpus issued on his challenge to an extradition warrant signed by the governor. This court held that the trial court did have the power to admit the defendant to bail. Speaking through Wheeler, C.J., this court quoted with approval (p. 297, 123 A. p. 442) from the opinion of Hamersley, J., in State v. Vaughan, 71 Conn. 457, 460-61, 42 A. 640: 'The power to admit to bail after conviction is not a statutory but a common-law power; the constitutional provision does not apply; bail is then a matter of absolute discretion, to be exercised by the court, however, with great caution, and rarely to be allowed when the crime is serious. But the power to admit to bail is inherent in the court so long as the prisoner is in its custody; that is, until he is taken in execution. . . . But it necessarily follows, . . . that where, as in this state, a review of the judgment by a court of errors is a matter of right, there must be power in the courts to stay execution, and, if the special circumstances of the case justify it, to admit to bail.' Noting that the Connecticut statutes then in effect provided for the release on bail of a fugitive from justice apprehended in this state, pending the institution and consummation of requisition proceedings, and also provided that the demand by the governor of another state shall not be complied with by the delivery of the fugitive from this state's justice until he has had an opportunity to apply for a writ of habeas corpus, the court in Winnick continued (p. 298, 123 A. p. 442): 'Such a provision is an express recognition under our law of the right of the fugitive to have his cause finally determined by this court. And such right exists in the constitution of the court apart from this statute. If the right to bail after the determination of the habeas corpus proceeding in the trial court did not exist, the right of appeal would be destroyed or seriously hampered, for the period of the pendency and determination of the appeal by this court might be considerable, and, in the event of the taking out of a writ of error to the United States Supreme Court, it would be still longer.' It is pertinent to note that as recently as our decision in Liistro v. Robinson, 170 Conn. 116, 123, 365 A.2d 109 this court again cited the holding in State v. Vaughan, supra, 71 Conn. 461, 42 A. 640, to the effect that 'the Superior Court possesses the common-law powers formerly exercised by the Court of King's Bench to 'admit to bail in all cases, on consideration of the...