Carlis v. State, 15293.
| Decision Date | 22 June 1932 |
| Docket Number | No. 15293.,15293. |
| Citation | 51 S.W.2d 729 |
| Parties | CARLIS v. STATE. |
| Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Appeal from Criminal District Court, Nueces County; Geo. C. Westervelt, Judge.
V. Don Carlis was convicted of murder, and he appeals.
Reversed and remanded.
R. E. Haegelin and A. P. Snyder, both of Corpus Christi, for appellant.
Lloyd W. Davidson, State's Atty., of Austin, for the State.
The offense is murder; the punishment, confinement in the penitentiary for 99 years.
It was charged in the indictment, in substance, that appellant, with malice aforethought, killed Alfred Steinbach by striking him with a blunt instrument, the exact nature of which was to the grand jurors unknown.
The state relied upon circumstantial evidence. In view of our disposition of the case, it is unnecessary to set out the circumstances.
As shown by bill of exception prepared by the court, upon the voir dire examination of the first member of the special venire, appellant asked the juror whether he was acquainted with the district attorney, the extent of his friendship for that official, and whether his acquaintance would influence him in reaching a verdict if he should be chosen on the jury. The court permitted these questions to be asked and answered by the venireman. Thereafter, according to the bill of exception, the court, in the interest of time, addressed to all the veniremen in a body the following question: "Gentlemen of the venire, if the acquaintance of any of you with the district attorney is such as will influence you in rendering a verdict, stand up now."
The court allowed a reasonable time for any of the jurors to stand up, and, none having stood up, the court concluded that none of the veniremen was acquainted with the district attorney in such a way as would likely influence him in rendering a verdict in the case. The court then stated to counsel for appellant: "None of them stand up so I conclude that that will not influence them." The court then requested counsel to refrain from asking the same question or a similar question to any of the other veniremen; whereupon appellant's counsel asked the court if the court meant that he should not ask that question, and the court replied: "Yes, sir; cut that question out." Appellant then excepted to the ruling of the court. It is clear from the bill of exception that the question propounded by the court afforded appellant's counsel no information as to whether or not the veniremen were personally acquainted with the district attorney, and whether or not there was any friendship existing between them and the district attorney. The court merely asked the veniremen if their acquaintance with the district attorney, if any, would influence them in rendering a verdict. Appellant's counsel desired to know if they were acquainted with the district attorney, and the extent of their acquaintance or friendship for that official. He desired the information in order that he might intelligently exercise his peremptory challenges.
The opinion is expressed that the learned trial judge fell into error. The right to appear by counsel is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and carries with it the right of counsel, within reasonable limits, to examine each juror individually in order that he may prepare himself for the exercise of the peremptory challenges allowed the appellant by statute. Article 1, § 10, Constitution of Texas; article 3, C. C. P. 1925; Tubb v. State, 109 Tex. Cr. R. 455, 5 S.W.(2d) 152; Holland v. State, 107 Tex. Cr. R. 582, 298 S. W. 898; Plair v. State, 102 Tex. Cr. R. 628, 279 S. W. 267, 269; Reich v. State, 94 Tex. Cr. R. 449, 251 S. W. 1072. We quote from the opinion on ...
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Smith v. State
...of forming his own conclusion, Mathis v. State, supra; Olliff v. State, 161 Tex.Cr.R. 336, 276 S.W.2d 839 (1954); Carlis v. State, 121 Tex.Cr.R. 290, 51 S.W.2d 729 (1932); Pendergrass v. State, 121 Tex.Cr.R. 213, 48 S.W.2d 997 (1932), there is also no doubt that reasonable controls may be e......
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