Carlisle v. Carlisle
| Decision Date | 10 October 1945 |
| Docket Number | 161 |
| Parties | CARLISLE v. CARLISLE. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
This is a civil action brought by the plaintiff against his wife for the purpose of having her declared a trustee for his benefit in certain property and for an accounting of partnership funds.
Plaintiff and defendant are now living separate and apart. For some nine years, while plaintiff and defendant were living together as man and wife in the State of Georgia, they were ebgaged in growing and marketing vegetables. The plaintiff supervised and directed the planting, harvesting and marketing of the crops. The defendant kept the books and looked after the office. Having accumulated several thousand dollars, the plaintiff and defendant came to Hendersonville North Carolina, for the purpose of purchasing land and constructing and operating a camp for girls. Accordingly, in the year 1931, they selected a site, containing 32 acres of land, on the Chimney Rock Highway. The plaintiff purchased and paid for the land and for convenience placed the title to said property in the name of defendant's aunt, Jennie Gaines.
Plaintiff alleges that in order to make necessary improvements on the property for its successful operation as a camp, it became necessary for him to borrow additional funds, and having agreed with his wife that she should operate the camp, on a basis of an equal division of the profits therefrom, it was further agreed verbally between them that they should request Jennie Gaines to execute a deed to the defendant, who would hold title to the camp site for the joint benefit of herself and the plaintiff until a corporation could be formed and the property conveyed thereto, whereupon the capital stock of the corporation would be equally divided between them, except for a nominal interest of one share to be held by a third party.
On December 2, 1931, Jennie Gaines executed a deed for the property to the defendant, which instrument has been duly recorded in the office of the Register of Deeds for Henderson County.
It is further alleged that the joint investment in the camp is now approximately $40,000, and that the plaintiff has furnished approximately $25,000 of said amount.
The defendant has declined to join in the formation of a corporation and claims the property as her sole and separate estate.
Plaintiff prays that he be adjudged the owner of a one-half undivided interest in the real property described in the complaint, and that the defendant be declared a holder of same in trust for his benefit, and that the defendant be required to give an accounting for all funds received in connection with the operation of said camp.
Upon motion of defendant for judgment on the pleadings, the motion was allowed and judgment entered to the effect that defendant is the sole owner of the property described herein and that the plaintiff has no interest in the camp operated thereon nor in the profits arising therefrom.
Plaintiff appeals, assigning error.
Monroe M. Redden, of Hendersonville, for plaintiff.
O. B Crowell and J. E. Shipman, both of Hendersonville, for defendant.
This appeal presents two questions for our determination: (1) Can a husband and wife enter into an enforceable parol agreement for the wife to hold real property for their joint benefit where the real property is conveyed to the wife pursuant to the agreement, by a third party, at the request of the husband? (2) Can the wife be required to account to the husband for profits realized under a partnership agreement covering a period in excess of three years, when the partnership was under the management and control of the wife and her personal services inured to its benefit, and the agreement was not executed in accordance with the requirements of G.S. s 52-12?
It is settled law with us that a parol trust in favor of a grantor cannot be engrafted upon a written deed conveying a fee-simple title to land, where nothing appears in the instrument to indicate otherwise than that the absolute title was to pass to the grantee. Gaylord v. Gaylord, 150 N.C. 222, 63 S.E. 1028; Chilton v. Smith, 180 N.C. 472, 105 S.E. 1; Perry v. Southern Surety Co., 190 N.C. 284, 129 S.E. 721; Penland v. Wells, 201 N.C. 173, 159 S.E. 423. However, since the seventh section of the English Statute of Frauds, which forbids the creation of a parol trust in land, has never been enacted in this jurisdiction, parol trusts may be enforced where the grantee takes title to property under an express agreement to hold the property for the benefit of another, other than the grantor. Owens v. Williams, 130 N.C. 165, 41 S.E. 93; Sykes v. Boone, 132 N.C. 199, 43 S.E. 645, 95 Am.St.Rep. 619; Avery v. Stewart, 136 N.C. 426, 48 S.E. 775, 68 L.R.A. 776; Taylor v. Wahab, 154 N.C. 219, 70 S.E. 173; Ricks v. Wilson, 154 N.C. 282, 70 S.E. 476; Lutz v. Hoyle, 167 N.C. 632, 83 S.E. 749; Boone v. Lee, 175 N.C. 383, 95 S.E. 659; Rush v. McPherson, 176 N.C. 562, 97 S.E. 613; Reynolds v. Morton, 205 N.C. 491, 171 S.E. 781; Taylor v. Addington, 222 N.C. 393, 23 S.E.2d 318.
In the instant case the plaintiff paid the purchase price for the land and took title in the name of another, towit, Jennie Gaines. Having paid the purchase price, a resulting trust in plaintiff's favor was created, and Jennie Gaines held the property as a trustee for him. Harris v. Harris, 178 N.C. 7, 100 S.E. 125; Kelly Springfield Tire Co. v. Lester, 190 N.C. 411, 130 S.E. 45. The complaint alleges, however, that the defendant took title from Jennie Gaines, pursuant to an agreement between the plaintiff and defendant, that she would hold the property for their joint benefit until a corporation could be formed under the laws of North Carolina, at which time she would convey the property to said corporation. It is further alleged that their respective interests in the partnership were to be preserved by an equal division of the capital stock of the corporation.
The plaintiff and defendant being man and wife, the fact that the plaintiff paid the purchase price and caused title to be taken in his wife's name does not create a resulting trust in his favor for a one-half undivided interest in the land which he now claims; but, on the contrary, where a husband pays the purchase money for land and has the deed made to his wife, the law presumes he intended it to be a gift to the wife. Thurber v. La Roque, 105 N.C. 301 11 S.E. 460; Arrington v. Arrington, 114 N.C. 116, 19 S.E. 278; Id., 114 N.C. 151, 19 S.E. 351; Ricks v. Wilson, supra; Singleton v. Cherry, 168 N.C. 402, 84 S.E. 698; Nelson v. Nelson, 176 N.C. 191, 96 S.E. 986; Kelly Springfield Tire Co. v. Lester, supra; Carter v. Oxendine, 193 N.C. 478, 137 S.E. 424. This presumption, however, is one of fact and is rebuttable. Faggart v. Bost, 122 N.C. 517, 29 S.E. 833; Flanner v. Butler, 131 N.C. 155, 42 S.E. 547; ...
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