Carlson v. Bloomington Hous. Partners II
| Decision Date | 11 July 2011 |
| Docket Number | A10-1926,A10-2021 |
| Parties | Brian T. Carlson, et al., Appellants, v. Bloomington Housing Partners II, et al., Respondents, David B. Eide, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2010).
Affirmed; motion denied
Hennepin County District Court
Brian T. Carlson, Crosslake, Minnesota (for appellants)
Daniel R. Kelly, Richard R. Voelbel, Felhaber, Larson, Fenlon & Vogt, P.A.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondents Bloomington Housing Partners II, et al.)
William L. Davidson, Paul C. Peterson, Teresa E. Knoedler, Lind, Jensen, Sullivan &
Peterson, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondents David B. Eide, et al.)
Considered and decided by Johnson, Chief Judge; Minge, Judge; and Harten, Judge.*
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
In 2005, Brian Carlson and his wife sued Bloomington Housing Partners II, a real-estate developer. The lawsuit was unsuccessful. In 2009, Carlson brought another lawsuit against Bloomington Housing Partners II, its general partner, an affiliated company, and the attorneys who represented it in the first lawsuit. The district court dismissed the second lawsuit on the grounds of collateral estoppel and res judicata and imposed sanctions on Carlson. We affirm.
In April 2004, Carlson and his wife entered into an agreement to purchase a condominium unit from Bloomington Housing Partners I (BHP I). The Carlsons later decided that they wanted to purchase a less expensive condominium unit from Bloomington Housing Partners II (BHP II), which is affiliated with BHP I. In October 2004, the Carlsons canceled the April purchase agreement with BHP I and entered into a second purchase agreement with BHP II for a different condominium, with a closing date of March 25, 2005. The second agreement provided that BHP I would return $9,750 of the earnest money from the first purchase agreement and credit the remaining $16,000 in earnest money toward the second purchase agreement. Thereafter, the Carlsons lost interest in the second condominium. They sought to cancel the second purchase agreement and recover the $16,000 in earnest money, but BHP II refused to return the funds.
In April 2005, the Carlsons commenced an action against BHP II in the Hennepin County District Court. The Carlsons alleged claims of breach of contract and a violation of a statute governing real-estate disclosure statements. Carlson, who is an attorney, represented himself and his wife; BHP II was represented by attorneys at the law firm of Felhaber, Larson, Fenlon & Vogt, P.A. The district court granted BHP II's motion for summary judgment in March 2007 and awarded attorney fees to BHP II in April 2007. This court affirmed. Carlson v. Bloomington Housing Partners II, No. A07-1105, 2008 WL 3835176, at *8 (Minn. App. Aug. 19, 2008), review granted (Minn. Oct. 29, 2008), review dismissed, 763 N.W.2d 303 (Minn. 2009).
In December 2009, Carlson commenced this action, also in the Hennepin County District Court. He again sued BHP II and also named as defendants BHP I, an individual who is the general partner of BHP I and BHP II, the Felhaber law firm, five individuals who are attorneys of the Felhaber law firm, and the chair of Felhaber's board of directors. For purposes of this opinion, we will refer to these defendants in two groups: the BHP respondents and the Felhaber respondents. Carlson's complaint alleges claims of malice and intentional tort; unjust enrichment; a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006); theft and conversion; treble damages pursuant to Minn. Stat. §§ 481.07, .071 (2008); abuse of process; vacatur of the judgment in the prior action under Minn. Stat. § 548.14 (2008); legal malpractice by Felhaber and its attorneys; negligent misrepresentation; piercing the corporate veil, in order to find BHP I and the general partner jointly liable with BHP II; punitive damages; a declaratory judgment that the April 2004 disclosure statement was inadequate; "undue taking advantage"; inducement and conspiracy to breach the October2004 purchase agreement; "intentional effort to harm plaintiffs"; and a request for attorney fees and costs under Minn. Stat. § 549.211 (2008).
The district court consolidated the second lawsuit with post-judgment proceedings in the first lawsuit. In January and April 2010, the respondents moved to dismiss the complaint, based on evidentiary materials relating to the prior action, and moved for sanctions against Carlson pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.03 and Minn. Stat. § 549.211 (2008). Carlson opposed all of the motions and attached affidavits to his memoranda in support of his position.
In June 2010, the district court granted respondents' motions to dismiss and motions for sanctions. The district court reasoned that the second lawsuit is barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. The district court imposed sanctions on Carlson pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 11. In September 2010, the district court determined the amount of the sanctions, awarding the BHP respondents more than $25,000 in attorney fees and costs and the Felhaber respondents approximately $58,500 in attorney fees and costs. Carlson appeals.
In the district court, respondents filed motions to dismiss pursuant to rule 12.02(e) of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure. A motion to dismiss under rule 12.02(e) is converted to a motion for summary judgment under rule 56 if "matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the district court." Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02. Here, all parties attached affidavits and other evidence to their submissions to the district court, which the district court considered. Thus, the district court's decision should betreated as a grant of summary judgment. Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01; Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota Metro. Council, 684 N.W.2d 485, 490-91 (Minn. 2004).
A district court must grant a motion for summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that either party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.03. "On an appeal from summary judgment, we ask two questions: (1) whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and (2) whether the [district] court[] erred in [its] application of the law." State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4 (Minn. 1990). A genuine issue of material fact exists if a rational trier of fact, considering the record as a whole, could find for the nonmoving party. Frieler v. Carlson Mktg. Grp., Inc., 751 N.W.2d 558, 564 (Minn. 2008). We apply a de novo standard of review to a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Valspar Refmish, Inc. v. Gaylord's, Inc., 764 N.W.2d 359, 364 (Minn. 2009).
We begin our analysis by considering an issue raised by the Felhaber respondents. They argue that the district court's dismissal on the basis of collateral estoppel may be affirmed without analysis because Carlson failed to challenge the district court's decision on that ground.
"Where a party fails to urge an assignment of error or contest a trial court order in his brief on appeal, the point is deemed waived by him, and the trial court's rulings will stand." Lener v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 263 N.W.2d 389, 390 (Minn. 1978)."It is axiomatic that issues not 'argued' in the briefs are deemed waived on appeal." In re Application of Olson for Payment of Services, 648 N.W.2d 226, 228 (Minn. 2002).
Carlson's initial brief does not mention collateral estoppel. Carlson argues in his reply brief that, in his initial brief, he used the term res judicata to apply to both res judicata and collateral estoppel. It is true that res judicata and collateral estoppel are "related doctrines." Hauschildt v. Beckingham, 686 N.W.2d 829, 837 (Minn. 2004). Nonetheless, each doctrine has its own set of requirements, and some of the requirements of collateral estoppel are unique to that doctrine. See Heine v. Simon, 702 N.W.2d 752, 761 (Minn. 2005) (). Our careful review of Carlson's initial brief makes clear that he challenged only the district court's application of the doctrine of res judicata, not the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Carlson did not properly raise the issue of collateral estoppel in his reply brief because an appellant may not raise new issues in a reply brief. McIntire v. State, 458 N.W.2d 714, 717 n.2 (Minn. App. 1990), review denied (Minn. Sept. 28, 1990).
Thus, with respect to the Felhaber respondents, Carlson has forfeited the argument that the district court erred by dismissing Carlson's action on the basis of collateral estoppel. The doctrine of collateral estoppel is a sufficient, independent basis for the district court's judgment in favor of the Felhaber respondents.
Carlson argues that the district court erred by dismissing his action on the basis of the doctrine of res judicata. Having concluded in part I that Carlson cannot prevail onappeal with respect to the Felhaber respondents, it is necessary to analyze the res judicata issue only with respect to the BHP respondents.
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