Carlson v. Smogard, 44186
| Citation | 298 Minn. 362,215 N.W.2d 615 |
| Decision Date | 22 February 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 44186,44186 |
| Parties | David N. CARLSON, Respondent, v. Merrill J. SMOGARD, Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff, Appellant, v. QUALITY MERCURY, INC., Third-Party Defendant, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
The Minnesota Workmen's Compensation Act is intended to control only the rights between employer and employee. Therefore, Minn.St. 176.061, subd. 10, of that act is unconstitutional in that it extinguishes a third-party tort-feasor's commonlaw right of indemnity without providing a reasonable substitute. It violates the due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and violates Article 1, § 8, of the Minnesota Constitution.
Robb Van Eps & Gilmore and John R. deLambert, Minneapolis, for appellant.
Luther M. Stalland, Minneapolis, for David N. Carlson.
Lasley Gaughan Reid & Stich and Douglas Dale Reid, Jr., Minneapolis, for Quality Mercury.
Heard before KNUTSON, C.J., and KELLY, TODD, and SCOTT, JJ., and reconsidered and decided by the court en banc.
Defendant and third-party plaintiff, Merrill J. Smogard, appeals from a judgment entered pursuant to a district court order dismissing his third-party complaint against Quality Mercury, Inc., employer of the plaintiff. We grant discretionary review, 1 and reverse.
Plaintiff, David N. Carlson, brought this action against Smogard, alleging negligence in the installation of a hood latch extension device in his (defendant's) automobile. Smogard denied any negligent conduct and alleged, through a third-party complaint against plaintiff's employer, Quality Mercury, Inc., that the sole cause of plaintiff's injuries was Quality's negligent conduct and that Smogard is entitled to contribution or indemnity from Quality. The trial court, on motion of the third-party defendant, granted it summary judgment on the basis of Minn.St. 176.061, subd. 10, which provides:
'If an action as provided in this chapter prosecuted by the employee, the employer, or both jointly against the third person, results in judgment against such third person, or settlement by such third person, the employer shall have no liability to reimburse or hold such third person harmless on such judgments or settlements in absence of a written agreement to do so executed prior to the injury.'
There was no such agreement between Smogard and Quality.
Since this matter was decided upon the motion for summary judgment, the facts available to this court are found in the parties' pleadings and briefs and in the deposition of the defendant and third-party plaintiff.
Defendant and third-party plaintiff, Smogard, purchased a 1969 used automobile from the third-party defendant, Quality Mercury, Inc., on April 10, 1971. A purchase invoice executed at that time obligated Quality to make certain repairs before delivery to Smogard. Included in these repairs were: (1) Fix the front end; (2) fix hood latch; (3) check battery; (4) change oil and new filter. Upon receiving delivery of the automobile, Smogard was assured that these items had been repaired as agreed. It seems that on several occasions prior to the injury Smogard returned the automobile to Quality for various reasons, among them the failure of the hood latch to operate property. A subsequent problem with the radiator necessitated frequent opening of the hood, so apparently Smogard then attached an extension wire to hold the opening rod in place. This was the only addition he made to the hood latch device and he allegedly changed nothing in the actual latch operation.
In June 1971 the transmission failed, and the car was again returned to Quality for repair at no cost to Smogard. The repair took one week, and Smogard was assured at that time by plaintiff, David N. Carlson, that the car was in good operating condition. There was no specific mention by either party that a repair of the hood latch was either contemplated or completed at this time. Carlson then allegedly offered to test-drive the car for Smogard, to prove that the transmission and a 'shimmy' in the front end of the car were fixed. Carlson allegedly suffered a heart attack as a result of the hood flying open while he was test-driving the automobile at a speed of approximately 50 to 60 miles per hour on the freeway. The car was brought under control without further incident, and plaintiff and defendant returned to Quality. Carlson mentioned that he had had a heart problem, and he was then taken to a hospital. He has made a claim for workmen's compensation and pursuant to Minn.St. 176.061, subd. 5, also brought the action against Smogard.
Carlson's complaint alleged that he was shocked and frightened when the hood flew up, causing a heart attack resulting in medical expenses and disability. It was further alleged that the sole and proximate cause of the accident was the negligence and carelessness of the defendant in the installation of a homemade locking device for the hood. Judgment was sought in the amount of $100,000. Smogard denied all negligent conduct and asserted through a third-party complaint that the sole and proximate cause of Carlson's injuries was the negligent, careless, and unlawful conduct of Quality. Smogard also alleged breach of express and implied warranties, misrepresentation, breach of contract, and strict liability in tort for selling a defective vehicle. He sought indemnification or contribution.
Quality, third-party defendant-respondent, states in its brief: 'The issue presented to the court by this appeal is the question of the constitutionality of M.S.A. 176.061, subd. 10, and no further hearings can be of assistance to the court in making that decision.' It thus appears that the third-party defendant, who prevailed in the trial court by the application of § 176.061, subd. 10, is putting the issue of the constitutionality of this statute directly to this court.
On the other hand, appellant, who did not prevail because of the operation of this statute, argues that 'this case is not ripe on the basis of the present record for the Court to reach the constitutional issue,' and suggests that it be remanded to the trial court in line with Haney v. International Harvester Co., 294 Minn. 375, 201 N.W.2d 140 (1972). The appellant evidently seeks the identical relief granted in Haney on nearly indistinguishable issues. Haney was reversed and remanded in order to complete a factual setting, but this court is advised that the case has been settled and will not be brought before us again.
Aside from the surprising stands on the part of both parties, which would seem immediately contrary to their own best interests, their controversy has presented this court with the opportunity to rule directly on this troublesome and recurring problem. Therefore, the immediate and only issue before us at this time is whether Minn.St. 176.061, subd. 10, of the Workmen's Compensation Act is a violation of the due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and of Article 1, § 8, of the Minnesota Constitution. 2
In Haney we said, '(T)here may be a due process violation when the third-party tortfeasor's right of indemnity is extinguished by the workmen's compensation laws without providing him a reasonable substitute for his right.' 294 Minn. 385, 201 N.W.2d 146. A similar challenge was made to the Massachusetts no-fault insurance laws in Pinnick v. Cleary, Mass., 271 N.E.2d 592 (1971). The court held that due process was not violated since the nofault statute (1) provided a reasonable substitute for preexisting common-law rights, and (2) had a rational relation to a legitimate legislative objective. In applying § 176.061, subd. 10, where is (1) the reasonable substitute for preexisting common-law rights and (2) the rational...
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...Clause aspreventing the Legislature from abrogating recognized common-law causes of action. See, e.g., id.; Carlson v. Smogard, 298 Minn. 362, 369, 215 N.W.2d 615, 620 (1974). The exclusionary rule has no basis in the U.S. and Minnesota Constitutions.6 See Davis, ___ U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct.......
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