Carlton v. Shalanda Brown & the Adoption Ctr. of Choice, Inc.
| Decision Date | 25 February 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 20120268.,20120268. |
| Citation | 755 Utah Adv. Rep. 9,323 P.3d 571 |
| Parties | Christopher CARLTON, Appellant, v. Shalanda BROWN and the Adoption Center of Choice, Inc., Appellees. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Wesley D. Hutchins, West Jordan, for appellant.
Larry S. Jenkins, Lance D. Rich, Salt Lake City, for appellees.
INTRODUCTION
¶ 1 In this case, Christopher Carlton asks us to once again consider both the constitutionality of the Utah Adoption Act (Act) as well as the extent of the rights it affords to putative fathers who wish to contest adoptions in Utah. Mr. Carlton argues first that the Act is unconstitutional, both facially and as applied to him, and second, that the district court erred when, based on a lack of standing, it dismissed his Amended Verified Petition to Establish Paternity, which included his constitutional challenges to the Act as well as numerous tort claims. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
¶ 2 First, although we disagree with the district court's reasoning regarding Mr. Carlton's lack of standing to assert the constitutional claims, given the current state of the pleadings we would ultimately reach the same conclusion, albeit for different reasons. Nevertheless, because we also conclude that it was error for the district court to deny Mr. Carlton leave to amend his petition—which would have cured the standing defects identified below—we conclude that the district court's dismissal of Mr. Carlton's constitutional claims was also erroneous. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's dismissal of Mr. Carlton's constitutional claims and on remand we instruct the district court to allow Mr. Carlton to amend his petition.
¶ 3 Second, we affirm the district court's dismissal of Mr. Carlton's tort claims due to his failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, with the exception of one of his claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Mr. Carlton asserted an IIED claim against both Shalanda Brown and The Adoption Center of Choice, Inc. (Adoption Center). As to the former, we affirm the district court's dismissal due to inadequate service of process. But as to the latter, we reverse because the district court's primary reason for dismissing this claim—Mr. Carlton's failure to establish parental rights under the Act—turns on the outcome of the constitutional issues that were erroneously dismissed by the district court. Accordingly, we remand this case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶ 4 Mr. Carlton and Ms. Brown are both residents of Pennsylvania and have never been married. In 2009, Mr. Carlton and Ms. Brown were involved in a romantic relationship that resulted in Ms. Brown becoming pregnant. The relationship appears to have continued until May 2010 when, just four weeks prior to her delivery date, Ms. Brown mysteriously left Mr. Carlton without any notification or indication as to her whereabouts. Despite the close proximity to her due date, Mr. Carlton did not take any action in either Utah or Pennsylvania to protect his parental rights to the unborn child.
¶ 5 Unbeknownst to Mr. Carlton, Ms. Brown had traveled to Utah where she gave birth to a baby girl on June 24, 2010. On June 26, 2010, Ms. Brown relinquished her parental rights to Adoption Center. That same day, Ms. Brown also executed a Birth Father Affidavit wherein she stated that she was unmarried and refused to identify the birth father. Instead, she stated that the birth father had been abusive towards her and had tried to use the child as a tool to keep her in a relationship with him.
¶ 6 After giving birth, Ms. Brown returned to Pennsylvania and allegedly tried to “rekindle” her relationship with Mr. Carlton. But when Mr. Carlton asked Ms. Brown about the child's whereabouts, she informed him that the child was a boy and that he had died. Aggrieved, Mr. Carlton inquired about the location of the child's grave, but Ms. Brown refused to disclose it, and when Mr. Carlton continued to press this inquiry, Ms. Brown sued him for harassment. 1 It is undisputed that these communications occurred after Ms. Brown had already relinquished her parental rights to Adoption Center.
¶ 7 Meanwhile, on June 29, 2010, and July 20, 2010, Adoption Center requested and received verifications from the Utah Office of Vital Records and Statistics confirming that no putative father was registered with respect to the child. Adoption Center also confirmed that, as of October 15, 2010, the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare had not received an acknowledgement or claim of paternity. Consequently, Adoption Center commenced adoption proceedings for the child.
¶ 8 Once it became apparent that he was not going to get any information from Ms. Brown concerning the child, Mr. Carlton filed a paternity action in Pennsylvania on November 5, 2010. Mr. Carlton's action was sent to mediation, and on November 23, 2010, Ms. Brown “broke down” and informed Mr. Carlton that the child was actually a girl, that she was still alive, and that she had been given up for adoption in Utah. That same day, the Pennsylvania court dismissed Mr. Carlton's action for lack of jurisdiction.
¶ 9 Back in Utah, the adoption proceedings for the child were finalized on December 29, 2010. It is undisputed that, as of this date, no paternity action was pending in any state.
¶ 10 Mr. Carlton then hired local counsel in an attempt to intervene in the adoption proceedings. Counsel prepared a motion to intervene in January 2011 but could not identify the proper case in which to file the motion. Consequently, Mr. Carlton began seeking replacement counsel and hired current counsel in March 2011. That counsel immediately filed a Verified Petition to Establish Paternity (Petition) for Mr. Carlton on March 8, 2011.
¶ 11 Mr. Carlton amended his Petition on May 2, 2011 (Amended Petition) in order to add Adoption Center as a party. He also added the following claims to the Amended Petition: (1) a request to set aside the adoption; (2) constitutional challenges to the Act; (3) tort claims against both Adoption Center and Ms. Brown for fraud, tortious interferencewith parental rights, unlawful activity, civil conspiracy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress; and (4) a request for declaratory relief. Mr. Carlton admits that Ms. Brown has been served only with the Petition, not the Amended Petition, and that she has “not [been] involved in these proceedings.”
¶ 12 In response to the Amended Petition, Adoption Center filed a Motion to Dismiss or, Alternatively, for Summary Judgment (Motion) on May 24, 2011. Mr. Carlton opposed the Motion. Additionally, he filed motions for leave to amend the Amended Petition and for a rule 56(f) continuance. The district court conducted a hearing on all of these motions on November 14, 2011, and entered its order granting Adoption Center's Motion and dismissing all of Mr. Carlton's motions, as well as his Amended Petition, on February 3, 2012. Mr. Carlton timely appealed. As this case was certified to us by the Court of Appeals, we have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78A–3–102(3)(b).
¶ 13 “A district court's grant of a motion to dismiss based upon the allegations in the plaintiff's complaint[ ] presents a question of law that we review for correctness.” 2 Additionally, “[c]onstitutional issues, including questions regarding due process, are questions of law that we review for correctness.” 3 Finally, “[w]e apply an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing the denial of a rule 56(f) motion” and a motion for leave to amend, “and overturn ... only if the denial of the motion exceed[s] the limits of reasonability.” 4
¶ 14 In his Amended Petition, Mr. Carlton raised several constitutional challenges to the Act based primarily on alleged violations of both state and federal guarantees to due process and equal protection. He also asserted six tort claims against Ms. Brown and Adoption Center. The district court dismissed all of these claims on the ground that Mr. Carlton lacked standing to assert them, or, in the alternative, that he had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.5 The district court also dismissed Mr. Carlton's Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Petition and for a rule 56(f) continuance because it reasoned that, given Mr. Carlton's lack of standing, both motions would be futile. Mr. Carlton argues that both of these conclusions were erroneous.
¶ 15 Although we disagree with the district court's reasoning regarding Mr. Carlton's lack of standing to assert the constitutional claims, we agree with its ultimate conclusion given the current state of the pleadings. But because Mr. Carlton's proposed amendment to his petition would have cured these defects, and because we conclude that his motion to amend was improperly denied by the district court, we hold that the district court's dismissal of the constitutional claims was also erroneous. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's dismissal of the constitutional claims and remand this case with the instruction that Mr. Carlton be granted leave to amend his petition.
¶ 16 With respect to the tort claims, we agree with the district court's decision to dismiss these claims on the ground that Mr. Carlton has failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, with the exception of Mr. Carlton's claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress against both Ms. Brown and Adoption Center. Because we conclude that Ms. Brown was not properly served with the Amended Petition, we affirm the district court's dismissal of the claim on that ground. But with respect to Adoption Center, w...
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