State v. Legg

• Decision Date: 04 August 2016
• Docket Number: No. 20140716–CA,20140716–CA
• Citation: 2016 UT App 168,380 P.3d 360
• Parties: State of Utah, Appellee, v. John L. Legg Jr., Appellant.
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals

380 P.3d 360

2016 UT App 168

State of Utah, Appellee,

v.John L. Legg Jr., Appellant.

No. 20140716–CA

Court of Appeals of Utah.

Filed August 4, 2016

Joanna E. Landau and Deborah Kreeck Mendez, Salt Lake City, Attorneys for Appellant.

Sean D. Reyes and Jeanne B. Inouye, Salt Lake City, Attorneys for Appellee.

Judge Stephen L. Roth authored this Opinion, in which Judge Greogry K. Orme and Senior Judge Russell W. Bench concurred.¹

Opinion

ROTH

, Judge:

¶1 John L. Legg Jr. appeals the district court's determination to revoke his probation. We dismiss the case as moot.

BACKGROUND

¶2 In August 2011, Legg pleaded guilty in two separate cases to one count of possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person and one count of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, both third degree felonies. The district court sentenced Legg to concurrent prison terms of zero to five years on each count and suspended the prison terms in favor of probation. Legg's twenty-four-month probation was to be supervised by Adult Probation and Parole (AP & P), and the court required him to serve 180 days in jail as a condition of probation.

¶3 Legg was released from jail on January 5, 2012, and eight days later AP & P filed an affidavit with the district court, alleging several probation violations. At a subsequent hearing, the court found that Legg had committed three violations of his probation: (1) knowing possession of a controlled substance; (2) “fail[ing] to establish a residence of record”; and (3) failing to be “cooperative, compliant and truthful in all dealings with [AP & P].” The court revoked Legg's probation and committed him to prison to serve the sentences that had originally been suspended. Legg appealed the district court's decision.

¶4 On appeal, we affirmed the district court's determination regarding Legg's failure to be “cooperative, compliant, and truthful” in his dealings with AP & P but remanded the court's other two findings of probation violation for further consideration. State v. Legg (Legg I ), 2014 UT App 80, ¶¶ 19, 21, 23, 25, 324 P.3d 656

. With regard to the allegation that Legg had possessed a controlled substance, we concluded that “we [could not] determine from the record what evidence, if any, the trial court relied on in finding that Legg had knowledge of the narcotic character” of the substance found in his possession, and we remanded for the court “to identify the evidence it relied on and its reason for moving so quickly ... to a finding of knowledge that the substance was cocaine.” Id. ¶ 19. As to the allegation that Legg had failed to establish a residence of record, we concluded that the district court's findings did not provide us with an adequate basis for review. Id. ¶ 23. Accordingly, because we were “not confident that, standing on its own, the single violation that we affirm[ed] would have resulted in a revocation of probation,” we remanded “on the issues of possession of a controlled substance and failure to establish a residence of record for further consideration and explanation by the trial court.” Id. ¶ 25. In particular, we stated that “[o]n remand, the trial court must reassess whether, under all the circumstances, Legg's probation should [still] be revoked.” Id.

¶5 On remand, the State dropped its allegations of controlled substance and residence violations, choosing instead to move forward on the single violation of failure to be cooperative, compliant, and truthful with AP & P, which we had affirmed on appeal. The district court, through a judge who had succeeded the prior judge who conducted Legg's initial probation revocation hearing, then determined that the single violation was sufficient to justify revocation of Legg's probation. In reaching its decision, the district court concluded that our decision in Legg I

, though in part a remand “for another evidentiary hearing ... for findings as to whether or not there was a willful violation” of Legg's drug possession and residence requirements, also contemplated that the district court could determine whether the single “willful violation of probation”—the failure to be cooperative, compliant and truthful—“would ... have been sufficient” to justify revocation of Legg's probation. In that regard, the district court found that “[t]here is no question that had [it] found a violation, looking at his history, looking at the [prosecution's sentencing] recommendation, looking at the opportunity for probation that he had received, [the court] would have imposed the original sentence.” It concluded that the single probation violation affirmed on appeal “was properly a basis for revoking probation, looking at the entire history of both cases.” Legg appeals this decision. During the course of briefing on appeal, Legg was released from prison, having served his sentences.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

¶6 Legg argues that the district court abused its discretion when it affirmed the decision to revoke his probation, because its decision did not follow the mandate of our decision in Legg I

. “The mandate rule ... binds both the district court and the parties to honor the mandate of the appellate court.” IHC Health Servs., Inc. v. D & K Mgmt., Inc. , 2008 UT 73, ¶ 28, 196 P.3d 588.

¶7 The State contends, however, that because Legg was released from prison on July 15, 2015, and has served the sentence that was reinstated when the district court revoked his probation, his case is moot. Before we reach the merits of Legg's appeal, we “must be satisfied that the issue[ ] raised [is] not moot.” Barnett v. Adams , 2012 UT App 6, ¶ 4, 273 P.3d 378

. “Where the issues that were before the trial court no longer exist, the appellate court will not review the case.” In re Adoption of L.O. , 2012 UT 23, ¶ 8, 282 P.3d 977 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Because we conclude that Legg's case is moot, we dismiss this case without reaching the merits of his appeal.

ANALYSIS

I. Mootness and Its Exceptions

¶8 The State contends that Legg's appeal is moot because Legg has now served the prison sentences that were reinstated when his probation was revoked and the sentences have now expired.

¶9 Mootness is a jurisdictional issue. See Carlton v. Brown , 2014 UT 6, ¶¶ 29–30, 323 P.3d 571

(characterizing mootness as one component of “justiciability,” and stating that “[i]n the absence of any justiciable controversy between adverse parties, the courts are without jurisdiction” (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). “The burden of persuading the court that an issue is moot lies with the party asserting mootness.” Salt Lake County v. Holliday Water Co. , 2010 UT 45, ¶ 21, 234 P.3d 1105 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “An issue on appeal is considered moot when the requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants,” State v. Sims , 881 P.2d 840, 841 (Utah 1994) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), or, in other words, when the requested relief appears to be “impossible or of no legal effect,” State v. McClellan , 2014 UT App 271, ¶ 3, 339 P.3d 942 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). And appellate “[c]ourts generally will not resolve an issue that becomes moot” while the appeal is pending, where “circumstances change so that the controversy is eliminated.” State v. Black , 2015 UT 54, ¶ 10, 355 P.3d 981 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, if it is demonstrated that a case is moot, it “must be dismissed ... unless it can be shown to fit within a recognized exception to the mootness principle.” Duran v. Morris , 635 P.2d 43, 45 (Utah 1981).

¶10 Here, the State has met its initial burden to show that Legg's case is moot. Legg has requested relief from the revocation of his probation and the resulting reinstatement of his suspended prison sentences, and the State has shown that he has now been released from prison and his sentences have been served. As a consequence, providing Legg with relief from his probation revocation would be “of no legal effect.” See Black , 2015 UT 54, ¶ 10, 355 P.3d 981

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). As the State points out, “[a] new revocation hearing will not allow the district court to reinstate his probation and give him another opportunity to avoid the prison term ordered as a result of his probation revocation.” Thus, in order for Legg's appeal to survive dismissal, his case must fit within a recognized exception to mootness.

A. Exceptions to Mootness

¶11 The recognized exceptions to mootness in Utah involve cases that affect public interest, are likely to recur, and are capable of evading review, see Utah Transit Auth. v. Local 382 of the Amalgamated Transit Union , 2012 UT 75, ¶ 32, 289 P.3d 582

, and in the criminal realm, cases in which “ ‘collateral legal consequences^[2

^]will be imposed on the basis of the challenged conviction,’ ” Duran , 635 P.2d at 45 (quoting Sibron v. New York , 392 U.S. 40, 57, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) ).

¶12 The parties disagree over whether the collateral consequences exception applies. The State argues that Legg's appeal does not fall within the collateral consequences exception and that we must dismiss. In particular, the State argues that “under both Utah and federal law, the courts presume that a conviction will result in ... negative collateral legal consequences” but that courts do not presume “that a challenge to a parole revocation or any other sentence (such as probation) will result in negative collateral legal consequences.” (Emphasis in original.) The State contends that our precedent has distinguished between those collateral consequences that are imposed as a matter of law and those that merely come about through discretionary decisions by others, such as future courts and employers, and that while convictions carry actual legal consequences, probation revocations do not necessarily do so, apart from the specific consequences imposed by the revoking court. As a result, the...