Carlyle v. Palm Beach Polo Holdings, Inc., 4D02-3696.
| Decision Date | 16 April 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 4D02-3696.,4D02-3696. |
| Citation | 842 So.2d 1013 |
| Parties | John C. CARLYLE, Appellant, v. PALM BEACH POLO HOLDINGS, INC., Glenn F. Straub and Christopher Denison, Appellees. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Juan C. Enjamio, Allie Hernandez Pennie and Patricia Acosta of Hunton & Williams, Miami, for appellant.
Craig T. Galle, West Palm Beach, for appellees Palm Beach Polo Holdings, Inc., and Glenn F. Straub.
Appellant, a nonresident defendant, moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court, relying on the authority of Wendt v. Horowitz, 822 So.2d 1252 (Fla.2002), denied the motion. Because plaintiffs have failed to show a connexity between their causes of action and defendant's communications into Florida, as required by Wendt, we reverse.
This case, the third in a series of somewhat related cases, sought damages for the defendants' alleged misconduct in connection with one of the two earlier lawsuits. A brief description of those two earlier cases will be helpful.
The first lawsuit was filed in May, 1999 in Palm Beach County (the "Palm Beach County" case) by Palm Beach Polo Holdings, Inc., ("Polo Holdings") against Franklin A. Denison ("Frank") and two of his companies (referred to collectively as "Broward Marine"). The complaint alleged defendants had breached the terms of a certain Asset Purchase Agreement between plaintiff and defendants which, among other things, involved a "like-kind" exchange of real property. Plaintiff sought damages and injunctive relief. Frank retained the law firm of Holland & Knight and one of its partners, James Wing, Esq., to represent him and Broward Marine.
The second lawsuit was filed in September, 1999 in Broward County (the "Broward County case") by Broward Marine and Frank (through the voluntary guardian of his property)1 against Polo Holdings, Glenn F. Straub, its president, and a broker, Christopher Denison ("Kit"), described as Frank's step-son. Plaintiffs were represented by James D. Wing, Esq., and Heather Keith, Esq., of the law firm of Holland & Knight, LLP. The complaint alleged that Frank, while on medication in a Michigan hospital recovering from a stroke, had executed the Asset Purchase Agreement and closed the transaction (on behalf of himself and Broward Marine) in reliance upon certain misrepresentations made by the several defendants which they knew to be false and fraudulent. Plaintiffs sought rescission of the Asset Purchase Agreement together with damages, and filed a notice of lis pendens on the real property which had been exchanged.
The present case, the third of the trilogy, was filed in October, 1999 by Polo Holdings, Straub and Kit. Named as defendants were the firm of Holland & Knight, Mr. Wing, Ms. Keith, and three other individuals, one of whom is appellant. The complaint alleged the following: that even though Holland & Knight, Mr. Wing and Ms. Keith were formally retained by Frank, they were retained at the direction of appellant; that the defendants "cooked up"2 a scheme to put pressure on Polo Holdings, Straub and Kit by filing an unsupported lawsuit against them; that Holland & Knight and its lawyers, at the direction of appellant, filed the Broward County case along with the notice of lis pendens knowing the suit was baseless, all done for the improper purpose of causing the plaintiffs to incur fees and costs and to force a settlement of the Palm Beach County case. The complaint, which sought damages against all defendants, was in three counts: (1) abuse of process (filing the Broward County case); (2) slander of title (the alleged wrongful filing of notice of lis pendens); and (3) tortious interference with contract (causing Frank and Broward Marine to breach the Asset Purchase Agreement).
The complaint also alleged that appellant Carlyle, a resident of Michigan, was subject to personal jurisdiction under Florida's long-arm statute, section 48.193 Fla. Stat., because he
Appellant's timely motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction argued he did not engage in any of the acts which would bring him within Florida's long-arm statute, nor did he have the minimum contacts to satisfy constitutional due process requirements. The motion was supported by his affidavit in which he stated the following: he was an attorney with a firm located in Grand Haven, Michigan; his practice was limited to corporate transactional work and estate planning; he was licensed to practice only in Michigan; he had never been licensed to practice in Florida nor admitted pro hac vice in Florida state or federal courts; he had never owned any property in Florida; he had never been a resident of Florida; he had traveled to Florida for pleasure on four specific occasions; that he traveled to Florida for business on only one occasion, to meet at a former client's home some time ago; that he had never traveled to Florida to render legal advice there; that his firm did not maintain an office or do business in Florida; that he served as legal counsel to Frank while Frank was in Michigan, but never spoke to Frank while he was in Florida and that he counseled him only on issues relating to Michigan law; that Frank's secretary contacted him in Michigan to help coordinate Frank's legal services in connection with the Palm Beach County case; that Frank retained Mr. Wing at Holland & Knight; that appellant's only involvement was to analyze, in Michigan, a corporate transaction that was the subject of the Florida litigation, but he did not issue a written opinion in Florida; and that he exchanged a few telephone calls with Frank's Florida counsel regarding Frank's Michigan estate plan.
The plaintiffs deposed appellant on the jurisdictional issue. By and large, appellant's deposition testimony did not dispute his affidavit in any material degree: he recalled two occasions, not one, when he had met with clients in Florida; the first had been a long time ago when he went to investigate a business that a client, not related to this litigation, was contemplating purchasing; the second occasion occurred five to ten years previously,...
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