Carpenter v. Chappell
| Decision Date | 01 April 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. C 98-2444 MMC,C 98-2444 MMC |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
| Parties | DAVID J. CARPENTER, Petitioner, v. KEVIN CHAPPELL, Warden of California State Prison at San Quentin, Respondent. |
The instant case arises from petitioner's conviction and death sentence for the first degree murders of Ellen Hansen ("Hansen") and Heather Scaggs ("Scaggs"), the attempted murder of Steven Haertle ("Haertle"), the attempted rape of Hansen, and the rape of Scaggs. See People v. Carpenter, 15 Cal. 4th 312 (1997). The crimes were alleged to have been committed in Santa Cruz County, and, after a change of venue, the case was tried in Los Angeles County.1 The California Supreme Court affirmed petitioner's conviction and sentence on direct appeal on April 28, 1997. Id. Petitioner's subsequent certiorari petition to the United States Supreme Court was denied on January 20, 1998. See Carpenter v. California, 522 U.S. 1078 (1998).
Petitioner filed his first state habeas petition on December 24, 1996; it was denied by the California Supreme Court on May 27, 1998. Prior to the denial of his state habeas petition, petitioner filed in the United States District Court for the Central District of California a request for appointment of federal habeas counsel and a motion for change of venue. Petitioner's motion for change of venue was granted on June 12, 1998, thereby transferring the instant habeas case to the Northern District.
Under the one-year limitation period set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), petitioner's federal habeas petition was due by May 27, 1999. The Court, however, granted petitioner's motion to equitably toll the statute of limitations for five months, to and including October 27, 1999. (See Order Denying Motion to Vacate and Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion for Equitable Tolling at 38.)2 Petitioner subsequently filed in this court a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Original Petition")3, a Notice of Additional Claims, and a Motion to Hold Proceedings in Abeyance, and filed in state court his second state habeas petition. On December 1, 1999, the California Supreme Court denied petitioner's second state habeas petition. On December 6, 1999, petitioner filed his First Amended Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ("First Amended Petition") and withdrew the Motion to Hold Proceedings in Abeyance.
Respondent subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss First Amended Petition, primarily asserting therein various procedural grounds that respondent argued required dismissal of at least certain portions of petitioner's First Amended Petition. The Court addressed all of the procedural issues in a series of orders. See, e.g. Carpenter v. Ayers, 548 F. Supp. 2d 736 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
In 2008, based on allegations in the First Amended Petition and the applicable law, the Court issued an order requiring petitioner's competency be determined in a timely manner, pursuant to Rohan ex. rel. Gates v. Woodford, 334 F. 3d 803, 817 (9th Cir. 2003). Based on the case record and the examination report of stipulated expert Dr. Robert Roesch, the Court found petitioner competentto pursue his habeas claims.4
The parties subsequently met and conferred, and agreed to a briefing schedule, subsequently amended by this Court, by which the remainder of petitioner's claims were to be addressed. The schedule also separated the claims into nine groups. By orders issued prior to the instant order, Claims 42, 43, 46, 49, 50, 51, 52, 54, 55, 59, 62 and 63 have been denied. The instant order addresses Group 3 claims 19, 20, 22, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 44, 48, 56 and 58.
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), a writ of habeas corpus is not to be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C § 2254(d).5 A federal court must presume the correctness of the state court's factual findings, and the presumption of correctness may only be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
The "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" clauses of section 2254(d) have separate and distinct meanings. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000). A state court's decision is "contrary to" clearly established United States Supreme Court law if it fails to apply the correct controlling authority or if it applies the controlling authority to a case involving facts materially indistinguishable from those in a controlling case, but nonetheless reaches a different result. Id. at 413-414. A decision is an "unreasonable application" of United States Supreme Court law if "the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle . . . but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 414. "'[A]n unreasonable application of federallaw,"however, "is different from an incorrect application of federal law.'" Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 410) (emphasis in original). "A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Id. at 786 (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 653, 664 (2004)).
Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003). "While the 'objectively unreasonable' standard is not self-explanatory, at a minimum it denotes a great[] degree of deference to the state courts." Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2003).
Holdings of the Supreme Court at the time of the state court decision are the only definitive source of clearly established federal law under AEDPA. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. While circuit law may be "persuasive authority" for purposes of determining whether a state court decision is an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law, only the Supreme Court's holdings are binding on the state courts and only those holdings need be reasonably applied. See Clark, 331 F.3d at 1070. A state court's decision need not cite to, and a state court need not be aware of federal law to pass muster under AEDPA; rather, "so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts [federal law]," the decision may be upheld. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002).
When a federal court is presented with a state court decision that is unaccompanied by a rationale for its conclusions, the court has no basis other than the record "for knowing whether the state court correctly identified the governing legal principle or was extending the principle into a new context." Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). In such situations, federal courts must conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the state court decision is objectively unreasonable. Id. Specifically, "where a state court's decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner's burden still must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief." Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784.
Even if a petitioner meets the requirements of section 2254(d), habeas relief is warranted only if the constitutional error at issue had a "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993) (internal quotation omitted). Under this standard, petitioners "may obtain plenary review of their constitutional claims, but they are not entitled to habeas relief based on trial error unless they can establish that it resulted in 'actual prejudice.'" Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637 (citing United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 439 (1986)).
In Claim 19, petitioner contends the trial court erred in finding, for purposes of Miranda, that he was not in custody at the time he made statements at a parole office. Petitioner was not read the Miranda warnings before he made his statements, which were later introduced in evidence at trial. According to petitioner, the admission of such evidence violated his rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The California Supreme Court denied this claim in a reasoned decision on direct appeal, see People v. Carpenter, 15 Cal. 4th 312, 383-384 (1997), finding there were "virtually no indicia of custody," as the "[parole] officers expressly told defendant he was not in custody and was free to leave at any time," and, indeed, petitioner did leave the parole office after he was interviewed. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (); see also Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994) () Further, as petitioner must and does acknowledge, clearly established Supreme Court law holds that a suspect is not in custody for Miranda purposes during an interrogation conducted during a required meeting with a parole officer. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 430-431 (1984).
In sum, as petitioner can...
To continue reading
Request your trial