Carpenter v. Jamerson

Decision Date19 February 1982
Docket NumberNo. 81-517,81-517
Citation69 Ohio St.2d 308,432 N.E.2d 177
Parties, 23 O.O.3d 290 CARPENTER, Appellant, v. JAMERSON, Sheriff, Appellee.
CourtOhio Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

1. A proceeding in habeas corpus brought in an asylum state by a fugitive from justice arrested on a warrant of extradition is a summary proceeding and very limited in scope.

2. The term "fugitive from justice" as contemplated by the extradition statutes includes an individual who violates the conditions of his probation.

This action comes before the court upon the appeal of the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The facts giving rise to the petition are as follows:

Petitioner-appellant, Donnie J. Carpenter, pled guilty to two counts of burglary in the state of Georgia. On March 31, 1979 the petitioner was placed on probation, the terms of which, inter alia, required petitioner to aid Georgia authorities in solving other crimes and to pay a fine and restitution of $1,571. In compliance with his probation terms the petitioner testified he cooperated with the authorities and was instrumental in the imprisonment of at least ten individuals.

Petitioner and his wife both testified that in the fall of 1979 the petitioner had a conversation with the police officer whom the petitioner had assisted in apprehending the individuals mentioned above. As stated by the petitioner, the officer allegedly told him he had better "get my ass back up north where I belong around my family or one of the southern boys was gonna blow my head off."

The petitioner further testified he decided to heed the officer's warning and move to Portage County, Ohio, where his parents were residing. The petitioner stated that prior to leaving Georgia he contacted his probation officer and informed him of his intentions of leaving. According to petitioner the probation officer assented to petitioner's plan to depart and indicated he, the probation officer, would arrange to transfer petitioner's legal papers to his new location. In January of 1980, three months after petitioner's arrival in Ohio, the probation officer reportedly instructed petitioner to cease making payments on the fine and restitution until the above mentioned paperwork reached Ohio, otherwise "it would get jumbled in, on the way." In addition, petitioner testified that following his move to Ohio: he contacted his probation officer on at least five occasions; his probation officer was aware of his location at all times; and further, he never attempted to conceal his whereabouts from the Georgia authorities after leaving the state.

On May 14, 1980 approximately seven months after petitioner's arrival in Ohio and in spite of the facts as testified to by petitioner, the state of Georgia through its governor formally requested extradition of the petitioner stating:

" * * * Donnie Jay Carpenter stands convicted in Douglas County, State of Georgia, with the offense of burglary (2 counts) and thereafter breached terms of his probation.

" * * * I have made application to His Excellency, the Governor of the State of Ohio for the delivery of the said fugitive from justice * * *."

Specifically, the "breached terms" referred to in the request were a failure of the petitioner to report to his probation officer as directed and a failure to pay the fine and restitution ordered by the court.

Relying on this demand by the Governor of Georgia, the Governor of Ohio issued a fugitive's warrant and the petitioner was arrested by respondent-appellee, Sheriff Ross Jamerson, on June 2, 1980. On that same day the petitioner filed a writ of habeas corpus in the Court of Common Pleas of Portage County. In this complaint the petitioner stated:

" * * * he is not a fugitive from the State of Georgia; that the authorities knew he was coming to the State of Ohio; that their attempt to extradite him is purely for the purpose of enforcing a civil liability against him and to collect a monetary debt which he owes the State of Georgia."

On June 16, 1980 a hearing was held on petitioner's complaint. Petitioner and his wife presented the only testimony since no one appeared on behalf of the Governor of Georgia. The trial court judge denied the petitioner's writ and a stay of execution was granted pending appeal. On February 23, 1981 the Court of Appeals for Portage County affirmed the denial by the Court of Common Pleas of petitioner's writ. The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Roger F. DiPaolo Co., L. P. A., and Roger F. DiPaolo, Ravenna, for appellant.

David A. Sed, Columbus, for appellee.

KRUPANSKY, Justice.

The issue presented is whether the trial court in considering petitioner's writ of habeas corpus complied fully with all constitutional, statutory and case law requirements imposed by Ohio and federal law. We conclude the procedures followed were proper, and therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's denial of petitioner's writ of habeas corpus is affirmed.

Petitioner's major contentions are threefold: (I) the habeas corpus hearing afforded the petitioner pursuant to R.C. 2963.09 was not a full and meaningful hearing as required by due process; (II) the petitioner is not a "fugitive from justice" as contemplated by the extradition statutes since he was affirmatively advised by Georgia authorities to leave the state for his own safety; and (III) it was against the manifest weight of the evidence and error for the trial court to deny the petitioner's writ of habeas corpus because the evidence presented at the hearing was uncontroverted and fully supportive of petitioner's position that he is not a fugitive from justice. Following is a discussion of these three assertions.

I.

R.C. 2963.09 provides for a procedure whereby an individual arrested in order to be extradited may test the legality of that arrest through a habeas corpus hearing. The scope of this hearing is very limited and well-defined by case law. Michigan v. Doran (1978), 439 U.S. 282, 289, 99 S.Ct. 530, 535, 58 L.Ed.2d 521, and In re Harris (1959), 170 Ohio St. 151, 163 N.E.2d 762, together delineate the permissible extent of these hearings, which are limited to the following five determinations: (1) whether the petitioner has been charged with an offense under the laws of the state demanding extradition; (2) whether the petitioner is the individual named in the extradition request; (3) whether the petitioner is a fugitive; (4) whether the extradition is not for the purpose of enforcing any civil liability; and (5) whether the extradition documents on their face are in order.

The courts of our nation have repeatedly emphasized the abbreviated nature of extradition proceedings held in an asylum state. In Doran, supra, at page 288, 99 S.Ct. at page 534, the United States Supreme Court stated:

"Interstate extradition was intended to be a summary and mandatory executive proceeding derived from the language of Art. IV, § 2, cl. 2, of the constitution. * * * The clause never contemplated that the asylum state was to conduct the kind of preliminary inquiry traditionally intervening between the initial arrest and trial."

Likewise, as this court stated in Wilcox v. Nolze (1878), 34 Ohio St. 520, at pages 523-524:

"The governor of a state, in issuing his warrant of extradition of a fugitive from justice, acts in an executive, and not in a judicial capacity. He is not permitted to try the question whether the accused is guilty or not guilty; he is not to regard a departure from the prescribed forms for making the application, or as to the manner of charging the crime, in any manner not of the substance; and he is not to be controlled by the question whether the offense is or is not a crime in his own state, the inquiry being whether the act is punishable as a crime in the demanding state. Nor have the courts larger powers, in any of these respects, than the governor. * * * "

In State, ex rel. Toht, v. McClure (1950), 87 Ohio App. 520, 96 N.E.2d 308, the Montgomery County Court of Appeals determined, in a proceeding in habeas corpus, instituted by a fugitive from justice who is being held in this state on a warrant of extradition of a governor of a sister state, an Ohio court has no power to consider whether the constitutional rights of the petitioner are likely to be violated if he is returned to the sister state.

In order to satisfy petitioner's view of a hearing complying with due process the courts of Ohio would in essence be required to ignore the above and similar holdings and conduct a full-fledged trial to determine the validity of the charges lodged by the state of Georgia prior to allowing the petitioner's extradition. Clearly, the applicable statutes and case law do not provide for such a burdensome hearing in the asylum state. Indeed, R.C. 2963.18 explicitly mandates otherwise in its statement:

"The guilt or innocence of an accused as to the crime of which he is charged may not be inquired into by the governor or in any proceeding after a demand for extradition accompanied by a charge of crime under section 2963.03 of the Revised Code has been presented by the governor * * *."

Taking account of the relevant evidence it is apparent the first two determinations to be made according to Doran and Harris may be quickly resolved, i.e., (1) petitioner admitted he has been charged with an offense under the laws of Georgia; and (2) petitioner also admitted he is the individual named in the extradition request-e.g., from petitioner's testimony he does not focus on denial of either of the above two propositions, but rather, the thrust of petitioner's case is that he left the state of Georgia with consent.

After reviewing the pertinent authority and the scope of inquiry of the habeas corpus hearing at issue, we conclude the habeas corpus proceeding in the instant action fully complies with the requirements of due process.

II.

Clause 2, ...

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