Carpenter v. State

• Decision Date: 30 September 1998
• Docket Number: 1251-97,Nos. 1250-97,s. 1250-97
• Citation: 979 S.W.2d 633
• Parties: Enriqueta Diaz CARPENTER, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 633

979 S.W.2d 633

Enriqueta Diaz CARPENTER, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas.

Nos. 1250-97, 1251-97.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas En Banc.

Sept. 30, 1998.

Mark Blaess, San Antonio, for appellant.

Robert Lee Little, Asst. Dist. Atty., Eagle Pass, Matthew Paul, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.

Before the court en banc.

OPINION ON APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

MEYERS, Judge, delivered the opinion of the Court in which McCORMICK, Presiding Judge, and KELLER, HOLLAND and WOMACK, Judges, joined.

Appellant was convicted by a jury on two counts of tampering with government documents. The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed Appellant's conviction. Carpenter v. State, 952 S.W.2d 1 (Tex.App.--San Antonio pet. granted). We granted Appellant's petition for discretionary review to address whether the Court of Appeals erred ¹ in holding Appellant was properly precluded from cross-examining State's witness Rudy Pete Rodrigues regarding federal conspiracy charges then pending against him. ²

Appellant argues that evidence of the pending federal charges was admissible under this Court's decision in Carroll v. State, 916 S.W.2d 494 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). ³ In Carroll, this Court stated that "[a] defendant is permitted to elicit any fact from a witness intended to demonstrate that witness' vulnerable relationship with the State." Carroll, 916 S.W.2d at 500 (citing Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 692, 51 S.Ct. 218, 75 L.Ed. 624 (1931) and Harris v. State, 642 S.W.2d 471, 480 (Tex.Crim.App.1982)). Relying on that language from Carroll, Appellant posits that the pending federal charges demonstrated Rodrigues' vulnerable relationship with the State and thus cross-examination was improperly limited. We disagree.

Exposing a witness' motivation to testify for or against the accused or the State is a proper and important purpose of cross-examination. Parties are allowed great latitude to show "any fact which would or might tend to establish ill feeling, bias, motive and animus on the part of the witness." London v. State, 739 S.W.2d 842, 846 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). The existence of pending federal charges may be relevant to establish bias or motive, as a federal defendant's "substantial assistance" in a state prosecution may result in a downward departure from the United States sentencing guidelines. See United States Sentencing Guidelines § 5k1.1 18 U.S.C.A. The trial judge, however, has some discretion. Hurd v. State, 725 S.W.2d 249 (Tex.Crim.App.1987); Miller v. State, 741 S.W.2d 382, 389 (Tex.Crim.App.1987), cert. denied 486 U.S. 1061, 108 S.Ct. 2835, 100 L.Ed.2d 935 (1988). A trial judge may limit cross-examination as inappropriate for a number of reasons. Carroll, 916 S.W.2d at 498 (citing Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986) (for example, trial judge may exercise discretion to prevent harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, and marginally relevant interrogation)).

In order to impeach a witness with evidence of pending criminal actions, the proponent of the evidence must establish that the evidence is relevant. Carroll, 916 S.W.2d at 494; London, 739 S.W.2d at 846-48. Appellant wished to introduce evidence that, at the time of trial, the witness in question had been charged with theft in federal court (18 U.S.C. 666) and conspiracy to possess and distribute controlled substances, in an attempt to show bias or prejudice towards the State due to a "vulnerable relationship." For the evidence to be admissible, the proponent must establish some causal connection or logical relationship between the pending charges and the witness' "vulnerable relationship" or potential bias or prejudice for the State, or testimony at trial. ⁴ See, e.g., McDuff v. State, 939 S.W.2d 607, 618 (Tex.Crim.App.1997) (permissible to show serious pending state charges against accomplice witness because such situation might have affected his testimony as a witness for the State; but impermissible to "elicit the accomplice witness's knowledge or lack of knowledge of the difference in parole eligibility minimum time periods" because it "would not have any further shown his vulnerable relationship with the State or his potential motive, bias or interest").

Appellant has not established a causal connection or logical relationship between the pending federal charges and the witness' testimony at trial. Appellant does not argue, and the record does not demonstrate, why prosecution by the federal government for theft and conspiracy to possess and distribute controlled substances would tend to show that the witness' testimony in this unrelated state prosecution for tampering with government documents might be biased. Appellant asserts that "[i]t is possible the witness believed his testimony in this case would be of some benefit," but does not provide evidence to support her assertion. Indeed, even the testimony in support of Appellant's bill of exception does no more than establish the factual basis of the pending federal charges. ⁵ In addition, the federal charges pending at the time of trial arose after the witness seized the evidence that forms the basis of this case, and after the witness provided pre-trial testimony. Appellant was free to use this pre-trial testimony to impeach the witness if it was inconsistent with his testimony at trial. Appellant did not show that the witness gave inconsistent testimony. The record shows that Rodrigues, a lieutenant with the Maverick County Sheriff's Department and a certified peace officer, testified regarding the process of seizing the documents with which Appellant was accused of tampering. ⁶ Appellant has simply not provided any indication that the pending federal charges were relevant to potential bias or prejudice. Accordingly, we hold that the Court of Appeals' determination that "there was danger that allowing such cross-examination would confuse the jury, or tempt it to use the facts developed in an improper way" ⁷ is sound.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

MANSFIELD, J., joins the opinion of the Court and files a concurring opinion.

PRICE, J., files a concurring opinion.

BAIRD, J., files a dissenting opinion in which OVERSTREET, J., joins.

MANSFIELD, Judge, concurring.

I join the opinion of the Court. It is my opinion that appellant's right to cross-examine a State's witness concerning pending charges against the witness is implicated only where the pending charges have been brought by the same prosecutorial authority (or, perhaps, another nonfederal prosecutorial authority in Texas) which is prosecuting appellant. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974); Carroll v. State, 916 S.W.2d 494 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (Meyers, J., concurring, at 501). Cross-examination of the State's witness concerning the pending federal charges would possibly also be within appellant's rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment where there was evidence that the State's witness would derive a benefit from the State concerning any pending State charges by testifying against appellant or where there was evidence the State agreed to tell the federal authorities the witness had been of assistance to the State. ¹ See also, Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. at 321, 94 S.Ct. 1105 (Stewart, J., concurring). The mere possibility the witness may derive a benefit under federal sentencing guidelines by testifying in a State prosecution on the State's behalf does not implicate the Confrontation Clause, based on any reasonable interpretation of the Supreme Court's holding in Davis v. Alaska.

I join the opinion of the Court.

PRICE, Judge, concurring.

I concur in the Court's judgment, and write separately to clarify my reasons for doing so.

The witness sought to be impeached in this case was a police officer with the Maverick County Sheriff's Department. In his capacity as a police officer, he recovered evidence in the case against appellant and testified in a pretrial hearing regarding the recovery of this evidence before he himself was indicted on unrelated federal charges of theft and conspiracy to possess and distribute controlled substances. Sometime after his own indictment, he was called to testify for the State at appellant's jury trial on the merits.

Appellant argues that she should have been permitted to impeach the officer with evidence of his pending federal charges. However, there is nothing in the record to show how those federal charges could place the officer in a vulnerable relationship with the state prosecutors who called him as a witness against appellant. Furthermore, there is nothing in the record which would establish how the officer's pending federal charges were relevant to his testimony at appellant's trial for tampering with government documents. See TEX.R. EVID. 401 & 402 (formerly TEX.R.CRIM. EVID. 401 & 402) (defining "relevance" and stating that relevant evidence is generally admissible and irrelevant evidence inadmissible); TEX.R. EVID. 611(b) (formerly TEX.R.CRIM. EVID. 610(b)) (a witness may be cross-examined on any matter relevant to any issue in the case, including credibility). Finally, although it is possible that the police officer could have possessed a knowledge of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, and thus testified against appellant in hopes of a downward departure if sentenced in his federal cases, ¹ there is nothing in the record to show that he was aware of the guidelines or that he had any type of "deal" with the federal prosecutors in charge of his case. In fact, appellant never argued this point to the trial court or to this court. To the contrary, neither appellant's offer of proof to the trial court nor her brief to this court establish anything other than the fact that federal charges were pending against the officer. Given all of this, it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion in restricting appellant's...