Carples v. Cumberland Coal & Iron Co.
| Decision Date | 05 May 1925 |
| Citation | 148 N.E. 185,240 N.Y. 187 |
| Parties | CARPLES v. CUMBERLAND COAL & IRON CO. |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Action by James M. Carples against the Cumberland Coal & Iron Company. From an order of the Appellate Division (207 N. Y. S. 624), affirming an order of the Special Term in aid of attachment, directing the sheriff of New York county, for purpose of making a levy, to open a safe deposit box rented to defendant, the latter appeals by permission, with questions certified.
Affirmed, and questions answered.
The following questions were certified:
‘1. Is there any authority, either statutory or at common law, empowering the sheriff to break open the safe deposit box of the defendant herein, in aid of an attachment after a certificate of the contents thereof had been refused?
‘2. Does the breaking open of said safe deposit box, under such circumstances in aid of an attachment, and seizing such property liable to attachment as may be found therein, violate the defendant's constitutional right of security against unreasonable searches and seizures?’
See, also, 212 App. Div. 819, 207 N. Y. S. 818.
Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First department.
Edward A. Kenney, of New York City, and Leonard Acher, for appellant.
Stanley S. Groggins, of Brooklyn, for respondent.
The plaintiff obtained a warrant of attachment against the property of the defendant, which was issued to the sheriff of New York county. He claimed that a certain box in the vault of the Safe Deposit Company of New York was rented by defendant and contained property which was leviable under a warrant of attachment. The Safe Deposit Company having refused to allow the sheriff access to the box for the purpose of making a levy, and having refused to give a certificate of the contents of such box on the ground that it was without sufficient knowledge, plaintiff applied on notice to the Safe Deposit Company for an order directing the sheriff to open said box and to take and keep such property as might be found therein which was subject to levy. While notice of said motion was served only upon the Safe Deposit Company, the defendant voluntarily appeared on said motion, and is now the only appellant from the order made as aforesaid. Under these circumstances there have been certified to us the questions in substance whether there is any statute or common law empowering the sheriff to break open a safe deposit box of the defendant in aid of the attachment issued to him, and whether any constitutional rights of the defendant will be violated by thus breaking open said box and seizing such property as may be liable to levy.
[1] In the first place, we desire to make it plain that one question argued by the defendant and another question which, under other circumstances might be argued, are not presented on this appeal. It is urged that the court has no right to order such action as was authorized in this case and which may result in the destruction of the property of the Safe Deposit Company owning the vault. As we have stated, the Safe Deposit Company which alone would be interested in that question is not appealing here, and therefore we have no occasion to consider the question suggested or to decide whether such an order as is here presented might, under some conditions, involve such a destruction of the property of others as would not be tolerated.
Neither are we concerned with the question whether a safe deposit company should be protected as against its customer by notice to such customer of such an application for leave to open his box as was presented here. Apparently actual notice of the motion was given to the customer, and it appeared upon the motion. Therefore we come simply to the questions which have been certified as they arise between the plaintiff and the defendant, and the preliminary one of appellant's right to appeal.
We shall not review at length the affidavits presented in behalf of the plaintiff and in behalf of the defendant on the motion to require the sheriff to open the box and by which these questions are to be determined. We shall content ourselves with the simple statement that in our opinion such affidavits permitted the court to find as it necessarily did that the box in question had been rented by the defendant acting through its officers, and that, presumably, at the time in question there was property contained therein which was subject to levy under the warrant of attachment.
[2] While it is challenged, we think that the defendant is a party aggrieved by the order which has been made, within the provisions of our statute, and that it therefore has a right to appeal. It is really the only party which is substantially interested. It appeared upon the original motion, and, if the order there made does improperly and unconstitutionally permit the sheriff to break into its safe deposit box, we think it quite clear that its rights have been intruded upon in a manner which constituted a substantial grievance and gave it the right to take the appeal.
[3] Coming to the merits, we think that the order complained of was a proper one for the court to make. Under the statute relating to a levy under a warrant of attachment, it became the duty of the sheriff to take into his custody and property capable of manual delivery such as it is claimed that there was in this case. Under this statutory duty, that officer was authorized to do anything which might be lawfully incidental to its discharge, and it was the duty of the court where necessary to aid him by a proper order. A safe deposit box does not give property placed therein a status...
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State v. Bruner, 10947
...F.2d 22; Thomas v. United States, 10 Cir., 154 F.2d 365; Gay v. United States, 9 Cir., 8 F.2d 219. In Carples v. Cumberland Coal & Iron Co., 240 N.Y. 187, 148 N.E. 185, 39 A.L.R. 1211, it was held that the search of a safety deposit box, without a warrant, was not an unconstitutional search......
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Stoll v. First Nat. Bank
...(Mo. App.), 112 S.W.2d 126; People ex rel. Glynn v. Mercantile Safe Deposit Co., 143 N.Y.S. 849, 159 A. D. 98; Carples v. Cumberland Coal & Iron Co., 240 N.Y. 187, 148 N.E. 185. None of cases are applicable. Without again reviewing the testimony in this case, we think it is apparent from re......
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United States v. NEW ENGLAND MERCHANTS NAT.
...First National City Bank, S.D.N.Y.1974, 388 F.Supp. 1044, 145-46, aff'd, 2 Cir. 1977, 568 F.2d 853; cf., Carples v. Cumberland Coal & Iron Co., 1945, 240 N.Y. 187, 148 N.E. 185, 186. Otherwise, a taxpayer could insulate his property from levy simply by placing it in a safe deposit box prior......
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Jimenez v. Brown
...a broad and easily accessible highway opened for escape from an effective administration of the law. Carples v. Cumberland Coal & Iron Co., 240 N.Y. 187, 148 N.E. 185, 186-87 (N.Y.1925) (citations omitted). This is most easily equated with a business owner who leases office space. Although ......