Carranza v. Noroian

• Decision Date: 25 February 1966
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Demesio C. CARRANZA, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. George NOROIAN, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 629

49 Cal.Rptr. 629

240 Cal.App.2d 481

Demesio C. CARRANZA, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. George NOROIAN, Defendant and Appellant.

District Court of Appeal, Fifth District, California.

Feb. 25, 1966.

LeRoy J. Reinhardt, Fresno, for appellant.

Andrews, Andrews & Thaxter, by James F. Thaxter, Fresno, for respondent.

RALPH M. BROWN, Justice.

This appeal originated in an action brought by the plaintiff to recover a balance allegedly due him, as a labor contractor, for services and expenses in providing and transporting workers for the harvesting of peaches and nectarines for the defendants. The named defendants were the George Noroian Company, a corporation, and George Noroian, individually. Judgment was for the plaintiff against George Noroian individually in the sum of $2,822.48, with prejudgment interest and costs. The corporation was exonerated. George Noroian, hereinafter referred to as the defendant, appeals from the judgment and contends that the trial court erred (1) in holding him personally liable to the plaintiff; (2) in finding that there was an account stated between the plaintiff and the defendant; and (3) in excluding certain evidence sought to be adduced by the defendant for the purpose of attempting to prove an alleged offset.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the respondent and disregarding conflicts and contradictions in the evidence (Crawford v. Southern Pacific Co., 3 Cal.2d 427; 45 P.2d 183; Turner v. Mannon, 236 A.C.A. 153, 155, 45 Cal.Rptr. 831), the record discloses the following facts: About August 4, 1964, the plaintiff and defendant entered into an oral agreement whereby the defendant employed the plaintiff to provide farm labor for the harvesting of certain crops. The plaintiff was to receive an agreed amount of money for the workers, the use of his truck and a driver, and gasoline for the truck to transport the workers. The plaintiff was never fully paid but was paid various sums on divers dates which constituted part payment. As a result of not receiving full payment from defendant as the work progressed, the plaintiff was unable to pay his workers; the workers quit, and the plaintiff necessarily abandoned the labor contracting agreement. On August 27, 1964, defendant received an itemized statement showing total charges of $6,228.29, payments of $3,405.81, and a balance due of $2,822.48. No further payments were made, and suit was brought for the amount. The plaintiff testified that the defendant never disclosed to him that he would be, or was, working for George Noroian Company, a corporation, rather than for the individual defendant; that he never knew a corporation was involved but believed that he had been hired by and was working for the defendant; that, although the three checks evidencing part payment bore the company name (which did not disclose that it was a corporation) and were signed by 'George Noroian, Pres.,' he accepted the checks as he would have accepted cash, without notice of the printed material thereon; and that, in the initial conversation as well as all subsequent conversations, the defendant spoke in the first person, i. e., 'I need the people,' 'This is my problem, money,' and never told the defendant he was acting for the corporation. The defendant testified that he was president, general manager and a 50 percent stockholder of the George Noroian corporation; that the fruit was grown on a ranch owned by another corporation in which he had an interest, but that the George Noroian Company had purchased the crops in the orchards; that he told the plaintiff he was to perform the work for the company and that the defendant acted solely as the disclosed agent of a known principal.

The defendant first contends that the trial court erred in finding against the defendant on the theory of undisclosed agency. He relies upon Hayman v. Shoemake, 203 Cal.App.2d 140, 21 Cal.Rptr. 519; Automatic Poultry Feeder Co. v. Wedel, 213 Cal.App.2d 509, 28 Cal.Rptr. 795, and Peterson v. Kaufman, 100 Cal.App. 330, 279 P. 1016, for the proposition that a personal judgment against a known agent of a disclosed principal is unjustified. This is true but has no application here where the court impliedly found, on conflicting evidence, that the defendant did not disclose to the plaintiff that he was acting for a principal. The defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in this regard but argues that the 'preponderance of the evidence' supports the defendant's position. The rule of preponderance is for the trial court but has no application to a reviewing court. Upon an appeal the implied finding must be upheld if it is supported by any substantial evidence, regardless of conflicts or contradictions. (Berniker v. Berniker, 30 Cal.2d 439, 182 P.2d 557; Primm v. Primm, 46 Cal.2d 690, 299 P.2d 231.)

In this case there is ample evidence to support the finding of the trial court of personal liability of the defendant. In addition to the evidence briefly summarized above, the record indicates that not all of the work performed by the laborers furnished by the plaintiff was done for the account of the corporation, which owned the crops but had no duty of bringing the crops to maturity. The defendant testified that some of the charges related to work in 'propping' trees. The record is clear that it was not for the account of the George Noroian Company. The defendant relies upon a statement contained in Carlesimo v. Schwebel, 87 Cal.App.2d 482, at page 486, 197 P.2d 167, at page 170, that '* * * the mere self-serving statement of the third party that he did not know of the existence of the corporation is not binding on the trier of the facts.' In that case the trial court found a disclosed agency and the appellate court upheld the finding, based on sufficient substantial evidence, and stated simply that the testimony of the plaintiff to the contrary did not bind the trial court. Here the trial court found, by implication, an undisclosed agency situation based on sufficient evidence and the selfserving assertions of the defendant to the contrary are not binding on the trier of the facts. The evidence to which defendant points might support, but does not compel, a finding in his favor on this point.

Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in finding that an account has been stated between the plaintiff and the defendant. First, it is difficult to find prejudice even if the assumption be made that the defendant's position is well taken. There were three causes of action in the complaint, in form generally referred to as the common counts. The first cause of action is based on quantum meruit. The second count alleged that the defendants became indebted to the plaintiff on an open book account. The third cause of action alleged on account stated as of August 27, 1964, upon which the sum of $2,822.48 was agreed upon as the balance due plaintiff. The court made express findings in favor of the plaintiff on all three counts. Thus, even if its finding that an account was stated falls, its findings on the other two counts remain unchallenged and must stand. Either of those two findings will support the judgment. (Pearson v. Norton, 230 Cal.App.2d 1, 40 Cal.Rptr. 634; Vogelsang v. Wolpert, 227 Cal.App.2d 102, 38 Cal.Rptr. 440.) It would therefore serve no useful purpose to analyze the evidence for the purpose of showing, as it may thus be shown, that the finding under attack is well supported and there was no error in this regard.

Defendant lastly complains because the trial court refused to permit him to introduce evidence of an alleged offset or counterclaim. He relies upon general language set out in 2 Witkin, California Procedure, Pleading, section 528, subdivision (3), page 1522, that when the complaint contains common counts a general denial is sufficient to raise almost any kind of defense, including some that ordinarily require special pleading. As has been noted, the complaint contains three common counts. The answer sets out a general denial to each count, and alleges: 'These answering defendants further affirmatively allege that the said sums heretofore paid by defendant, George Noroian Company, to plaintiff were in excess of the total amount of farm labor furnished by plaintiff to said defendant, and pray leave of Court to amend the answer of defendant, George Noroian Company, herein, and to request further and additional affirmative relief by filing a cross-complaint herein upon ascertaining the correct amount of excess charges made by plaintiff to said defendant, George Noroian Company.' No cross-complaint was filed. On cross-examination during the trial the plaintiff testified that the gasoline allowance of $7.00 per day did not cover his expense in transporting the workers daily to and from Madera and Orange Cove, a distance of over 100 miles; that he discovered the defendant had a labor camp on his farm which was not in use; that he asked the defendant for permission to use the camp for the workers; that the defendant replied he was saving it for braceros who would pick his figs; that the plaintiff then agreed to pick the figs if he could use the camp; and that he did use the camp. An objection based on the grounds that the line of questioning was immaterial and irrelevant, outside the scope of the issues framed by the pleadings and outside the scope of the direct examination, was sustained after a long colloquy between the trial judge and counsel. From the colloquy it appears that the defendant believed he had a cause of action against the plaintiff for breach of...