Carrera v. People
| Decision Date | 30 September 2019 |
| Docket Number | Supreme Court Case No. 16SC966 |
| Citation | 449 P.3d 725 |
| Parties | Derrick Lee CARRERA, Petitioner, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Attorneys for Petitioner: Megan A. Ring, Public Defender, Jessica Sommer, Deputy Public Defender, Denver, Colorado
Attorneys for Respondent: Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Matthew S. Holman, First Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado
En Banc
¶1 This case requires us to interpret section 18-1.3-102(1), C.R.S. (2019), as it read between 2002 and 2012.1 That statute authorizes trial courts to place a defendant on a deferred judgment and sentence ("deferred judgment") by "continu[ing] [his] case ... for a period not to exceed four years" for the purpose of entering the judgment and sentence upon his guilty plea, "except that such period may be extended for an additional time up to one hundred eighty days" if the payment of restitution is the only condition of supervision not yet fulfilled.
¶2 The parties agree that when a defendant is placed on a deferred judgment for four years, the statutory maximum, the trial court may extend the deferral period for up to 180 days if the requirement to pay restitution is the sole condition of supervision that has not been satisfied. But what if the original period of the deferred judgment is shorter than four years? In that situation, does the statute permit the trial court to extend the deferred judgment for any reason, so long as the aggregate period of deferral does not exceed four years? The prosecution answers yes. Derrick Lee Carrera answers no and argues that the trial court is always limited when extending the original deferred judgment period—it may do so only one time, for up to 180 days, and only if the payment of restitution is the sole condition of supervision that remains unsatisfied.
¶3 In a fractured opinion, a division of the court of appeals determined that the language of section 18-1.3-102(1) is ambiguous because the parties' diametrically opposed constructions are both reasonable. People v. Carrera , No. 13CA1629, slip. op. at 7 (Nov. 10, 2016). It then concluded that "other interpretive aids must be consulted" and that "those interpretive aids refute [Carrera's] reading of the statute and support the [prosecution's] interpretation." Id.
¶4 There is no need for us "to gild refined gold, to paint the lily," William Shakespeare, King John act 4, sc. 2, line 11, because the division resolved the parties' dispute in a thoughtful and well-reasoned opinion. Thus, we affirm based on the same rationale.
¶5 We hold that section 18-1.3-102(1) does not prohibit a trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, from extending a defendant's deferred judgment for any legitimate reason and as many times as it deems appropriate, so long as the aggregate period of the deferral does not exceed four years. We further hold that when a defendant has been on a deferred judgment for four years, the statute empowers the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, to extend the deferred judgment for a period not to exceed 180 days, so long as the payment of restitution is the only condition of supervision not yet fulfilled.
¶6 Carrera pled guilty to possession of one gram or less of a schedule I controlled substance, a class 6 felony, in August 2010. Consistent with the parties' plea agreement, in October 2010, the district court placed Carrera on a two-year deferred judgment and required the probation department to supervise him. The court imposed certain conditions of supervision, including the payment of $1,183.50 in fees and costs.2 No restitution was requested or ordered.
¶7 In September 2012, Carrera and his case manager filed a joint motion requesting that the deferred judgment be extended for six months, from October 4, 2012, when it was scheduled to expire, until April 4, 2013. The motion explained that the extension was necessary "[t]o allow [Carrera] more time in which to complete his Court-ordered obligations." It then specified that Carrera still owed some of the fees and costs imposed. The prosecution did not file an objection, and the district court granted the motion and extended the deferred judgment until April 4, 2013.
¶8 On April 2, 2013, Carrera's case manager submitted a complaint to revoke the deferred judgment, alleging that Carrera had failed to pay $938.50 of the fees and costs and to complete outpatient treatment. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court found that the prosecution had proven both of the alleged violations. It thus revoked Carrera's deferred judgment, entered a judgment of conviction, and sentenced him to unsupervised probation for a period of one year. Carrera appealed.
¶9 Before the court of appeals, Carrera raised several claims. As relevant here, he argued that the district court lacked authority to extend his deferred judgment in 2012 for a condition unrelated to the payment of restitution and, therefore, it had no jurisdiction to revoke his deferred judgment in 2013. According to Carrera, the district court had authority to extend his two-year deferred judgment only once and only if the failure to pay restitution was the sole condition of supervision not yet fulfilled. Since the trial court extended the deferred judgment in October 2012 based on his failure to pay the fees and costs in full, Carrera asserted that the extension was invalid. Thus, maintained Carrera, the court lost subject matter jurisdiction on October 4, 2012, when the original two-year deferred judgment period expired.
¶10 A split division of the court of appeals affirmed. Although acknowledging that Carrera's interpretation of the statute was reasonable, it determined that the prosecution's interpretation, which ran 180 degrees counter to it, was equally reasonable. Finding the statute ambiguous, the division turned to three interpretive aids: (1) the statutory history; (2) the purpose behind the statute's enactment; and (3) the consequences of the parties' dissimilar interpretations. It then rejected Carrera's construction and embraced the prosecution's interpretation.
¶11 The division thus ruled that section 18-1.3-102(1) does not limit how many times, how long, or for what reasons the court may extend a deferred judgment, "other than to cap (ordinarily) the total continuance at a period of four years." Carrera , slip. op. at 6. In so doing, the division reasoned that the exception clause refers to an extension "beyond the statutory maximum period of four years," not to an extension "beyond the original period" of the deferred judgment (which may be less than four years). Id. at 7. In his dissent, Judge Webb sided with Carrera's reading of the statute. Id. at 27–28 (Webb, J., dissenting).
¶12 Carrera then sought review of the division's decision, and we granted his petition for certiorari in part.3
¶13 Deferred judgments are "created and authorized by statute." Pineda-Liberato v. People , 2017 CO 95, ¶ 21, 403 P.3d 160, 164. Colorado's deferred judgment statute, section 18-1.3-102, "strictly controls a trial court's authority to impose a deferred judgment, and a trial court lacks authority to impose a deferred judgment outside the statute's limits." People v. Carbajal , 198 P.3d 102, 104 (Colo. 2008). Whether the trial court had authority to extend Carrera's deferred judgment in October 2012 hinges on the provisions of the deferred judgment statute. See id. The issue in this case, therefore, presents a question of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. McCoy v. People , 2019 CO 44, ¶ 37, 442 P.3d 379, 389.
¶14 Carrera's claim—that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his deferred judgment in April 2013 because it lacked authority to extend his deferred judgment in October 2012 for a reason unrelated to the payment of restitution—is one he was entitled to raise for the first time on appeal. While "[a] party is generally precluded from raising an issue on appeal if he failed to object" at the trial court, "a challenge to a court's subject matter jurisdiction is not waivable, and may be raised for the first time on appeal." Herr v. People , 198 P.3d 108, 111 (Colo. 2008).4
¶15 We begin by setting forth the relevant tenets of statutory interpretation. We then review the pertinent language in section 18-1.3-102(1) and the parties' respective constructions. Because we determine that the parties' contrasting interpretations are both reasonable and that the statute is ambiguous, we conclude that the plain meaning rule cannot resolve the issue on review. We therefore turn to other interpretive aids. The statutory history, the purpose behind the statute's enactment, and the consequences of the parties' differing constructions persuade us to endorse the prosecution's interpretation.
¶16 We therefore hold that section 18-1.3-102(1) does not prohibit a trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, from extending a defendant's deferred judgment for any legitimate reason and as many times as it deems appropriate, so long as the aggregate period of the deferral does not exceed four years. We further hold that when a defendant has been on a deferred judgment for four years, the statute empowers the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, to extend the deferred judgment for a period not to exceed 180 days, so long as the payment of restitution is the only condition of supervision not yet fulfilled.
¶17 In construing a statute, we aim to effectuate the legislature's intent. McCoy , ¶ 37, 442 P.3d at 389. The first step in the process is to look "to the language of the statute, giving its words and phrases their plain and ordinary meanings." Id. We must read the words and phrases in a statute "in context" and "according to the rules of grammar and common usage." Id. Additionally, we must take care...
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