Carrigan v. Stillwell

• Citation: 99 Me. 434,59 A. 683
• Parties: CARRIGAN v. STILLWELL.
• Decision Date: 03 January 1905
• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (US)

59 A. 683

99 Me. 434

CARRIGAN

v. STILLWELL.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Jan. 3, 1905.

(Official.)

On Motion from Supreme Judicial Court, Penobscot County.

Action by William Carrigan, administrator, against Cleveland S. Stillwell, to recover damages for the death of Mary F. Carrigan, who was burned in a fire which destroyed a certain three-story building in Bangor, owned by the defendant, and in which said building the said deceased was employed at the time of her death. The plaintiff alleged that under the statute—now section 38 of chapter 28. Rev. St. 1903—it was the duty of the defendant to have provided said building with suitable and sufficient fire escapes, outside stairs or ladders, but he neglected and failed so to do. At the trial the defendant requested certain instructions to be given to the jury, but the presiding justice declined to give the instructions asked for, and the defendant took exceptions. The verdict was for the plaintiff, and thereupon the defendant filed a general motion for a new trial. Motion sustained.

Argued before WISWELL, C. J., and EMERY, SAVAGE, POWERS, and PEABODY, JJ.

B. J. Dunn, Matthew McCarthy, Forest J. Martin, and H. M. Cook, for plaintiff.

C. H. Bartlett and C. F. Woodard, for defendant.

WISWELL, C. J. This case has before been to the law court (97 Me. 247, 54 Atl. 389, 61 L. R. A. 163)—at that time on the defendant's demurrer to the plaintiff's declaration—and the questions then presented and considered were as to the sufficiency of the allegations contained in the declaration. At that time the declaration was held sufficient, and the case was sent back for trial. Now, after a trial resulting in a verdict for the plaintiff, the case again comes to the court; the questions now presented being whether the evidence of the plaintiff is sufficient to authorize the maintenance of the action, and to warrant the verdict for the plaintiff. Although the defendant has exceptions, as well as a motion, the case can be better considered upon the motion for a new trial.

On October 16, 1901, the defendant was the owner of a four-story business building in the city of Bangor. The first and third floors of this building were in the possession of a tenant who occupied the first floor as a public restaurant, and the third floor for a kitchen in connection with the restaurant. There were three persons employed in the restaurant, whose duties were generally performed in the kitchen, on the third floor— the plaintiff's intestate, called "an order cook," a man cook, and another woman, who rendered general assistance in washing dishes and in doing other work. The plaintiff's intestate also assisted in the general cooking, and sometimes did ironing and other work about the building.

On that day, at about the middle of the afternoon, an explosion of gasoline occurred in a room upon the second floor, not occupied as a part of the restaurant, and, immediately after, the building took fire and became enveloped in flames and smoke. The plaintiff's intestate at the time was ironing at a table in the kitchen, and there were also present the two other employés—the man cook and the woman assistant. After the fire was extinguished the plaintiff's intestate was found dead in the kitchen, near the place where she had been at work, and where she was last seen alive, her body being severely burned. This building was not provided with fire escapes, as it is claimed by the plaintiff it should have been, under Rev. St. c. 28, § 38—the section in the present revision of the statutes being the same as it was at the time of the fire. There is no suggestion of any other fault upon the part of the defendant, the owner of the building, and no claim that he would be liable for his alleged failure in this respect, except for the statute referred to.

Under these circumstances, this action was brought by the personal representative of the deceased to recover, for the benefit of the beneficiaries named in the statute, the damages for the pecuniary injuries resulting to them from the death of the intestate, under Acts 1891, p. 135, c. 124, §§ 1, 2 (now Rev. St c. 89, 9, 10). The defendant raises numerous objections to the sufficiency of the evidence introduced, in many respects; but, in view of our conclusion, it is only necessary to consider the one that goes to the maintenance of the action, viz., that the use of the building at the time of the death of the plaintiff's intestate was not such a3 to bring it within the application of the statute referred to. That statute is as follows, so far as applicable to the question involved: "Every public bouse where guests are lodged, and every building in which any trade, manufacture or business is carried on requiring the presence of workmen above the first story * * * shall at all times be provided with suitable and sufficient fire escapes, outside stairs or ladders from each story or gallery above the level of the ground, easily accessible to all inmates in case of fire or of an alarm of fire." The contention of the defense being that this building was not used for the purposes of any trade, manufacture, or business "requiring the presence of workmen above the first story," within the meaning of the statute just quoted.

To ascertain the true intention of the Legislature in the enactment of any statute, it frequently becomes necessary to go much further than to merely ascertain the literal meaning of the language used. "A thing may be within the letter of the statute and not within its meaning, and within its meaning though not within the letter. The intention of the lawmaker is the law." Smythe v. Fiske, 23 Wall. 374. 23 L. Ed. 47. "It has been repeatedly asserted in both ancient and modern cases that judges may in some cases decide upon a statute in direct contravention of its terms: that they may depart from the letter in order to reach the spirit and intent of the act. Frequently it has been judicially said that 'a thing within the intention is as much within the statute as if it were within the letter, and a thing within the letter is not within the statute if contrary to the intention of it'" Peters, C. L, in Holmes v. Paris, 75 Me. 559. "The results of any particular construction are to be anticipated, and if such results will be anomalous, unjust,...