Steele v. Smalley.

• Decision Date: 02 October 1945
• Citation: 44 A.2d 213
• Parties: STEELE v. SMALLEY.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

44 A.2d 213

STEELE

v.SMALLEY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Oct. 2, 1945.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Cumberland County.

Action by Virginia C. Steele against Charles T. Smalley for alleged negligence. To review an adverse judgment, plaintiff brings exceptions.

Exceptions overruled.

Richard S. Chapman, of Portland, for plaintiff.

Charles T. Smalley, of Rockland, defendant pro se.

Before STURGIS, C. J., and THAXTER, HUDSON, MANSER, and MURCHIE, JJ.

THAXTER, Justice.

This is an action on the case brought by a client against an attorney. The declaration alleges negligence because of the attorney's failure to commence an action at law to recover for personal injuries suffered by the plaintiff until, it is claimed, the action was barred by the running of the statute of limitations. The plaintiff was injured in a collision between an automobile in which she was a passenger and a truck. It is conceded that the defendant represented her as attorney and that he did not bring an action for her within one year after the cause of action occurred. The plaintiff claims that the action was barred by the provisions of Rev.Stat. 1930, Ch. 66, Sec. 11, and that she was obliged to accept in settlement of her claim a very much smaller sum than she would have received had suit been brought within the year. The statute in question reads as follows:

‘Actions of tort for injuries to the person or for death and for injuries to or destruction of property caused by the ownership, operation, maintenance or use on the ways of the state of motor vehicles or trailers subject to the supervision and control of the public utilities commission, shall be commenced only within one year next after the cause of action occurs.’

The defendant filed a plea of the general issue with a brief statement setting forth that the statutory provision in question applied only to an action involving a vehicle, subject to the control of the public utilities commission, which at the time of the accident was carrying passengers for hire. The plaintiff demurred to this plea and the defendant joined in the demurrer. The presiding justice overruled the demurrer and the case is before us on the plaintiff's exceptions.

It is conceded that the operation of the truck was subject to the control of the public utilities commission. The sole question presented to us, therefore, is whether the limitation period of one year prescribed by the statute was a bar to the plaintiff's right to bring an action to recover for personal injuries arising out of the accident.

If we consider only the letter of the statute, the plaintiff's contention would appear to be sound. But, as has been repeatedly pointed out, the strict letter does not always tell the story.

A great chief justice of this state said many years ago: ‘It has been repeatedly asserted, in both ancient and modern cases, that judges may in some cases decide upon a statute even in direct contravention of its terms; that they may depart from the letter in order to reach the spirit and intent of the act. Frequently has it been judicially said, that ‘a thing within the intention, is as much within the statute, as if it were within the letter, and a thing within the letter is not within the statute, if contrary to the intention of it.’' Holmes v. Paris, 75 Me. 559, 561.

The rule thus set forth has been consistently followed in this state ever since. Landers v. Smith, 78 Me. 212, 3 A. 463; Carrigan v. Stillwell, 99 Me. 434, 59 A. 683, 68 L.R.A. 386; Sullivan, Adm'r, v. Prudential Insurance Co., 131 Me. 228, 160 A. 777; State v. Day, 132 Me. 38, 165 A. 163; Chase, Adm'r, v. Inhabitants of Town of Litchfield, 134 Me. 122, 182 A. 921; Perkins v. Kavanaugh, 135 Me. 344, 196 A. 645; Middleton's Case, 136 Me. 108, 3 A.2d 434; City of Belfast v. Bath, 137 Me. 91, 15 A.2d 249; S. D. Warren Co. v. Inhabitants of Town of Gorham, 138 Me. 294, 25 A.2d 471; Inhabitants of Town of Ashland v. Wright, 139 Me. 283, 29 A.2d 747; Beck v. Corinna Trust Co., 139 Me. 350, 31 A.2d 165.

In construing the language which has been used, the history of an enactment may throw light on the intent of the legislature. Inhabitants of Guilford v. Inhabitants of Monson, 134 Me. 261, 265, 185 A. 517 (quoting from Smith v. Chase, 71 Me. 164, 165). It is fundamental, likewise, that a particular phrase or a particular section should not be considered apart from its context. The entire statute should be considered as a whole, and all statutes on the same subject should be considered together in order to reach an harmonious result. Inhabitants of Turner v. Lewiston, 135 Me. 430, 198 A. 734; City of Belfast v. Bath, supra. Due consideration should also be given to the conditions which prompted the legislature to act.

State v. Day, supra; Rector, etc., of Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 12 S.Ct. 511, 36 L.Ed. 226.

Two recent opinions of our own court are very helpful in determining the question now before us.

In Chase, Adm'r, v. Inhabitants of Town of Litchfield, supra [134 Me. 122, 182 A. 925], the question was whether the provisions of Rev.Stat. 1930, Ch. 27, Sec. 94, known as Lord Campbell's Act, applied to an action against a town. By its terms the statute applied to all corporations without any limitation. Yet we had no difficulty in excluding municipal corporations from its operation. And the reasons for so doing were set forth in the following language: ‘If it be said and it is admitted that in a sense a town is a corporation and so comes within the strict letter of the law, yet “a thing may be within the letter of the statute and not within its meaning. * * * The intention of the lawmaker is the law.’ Smythe v. Fiske, 23 Wall. 374, 23 L.Ed. 47. * * * The real meaning of the statute is to be ascertained and declared even though it seems to conflict with the words of the statute.' Carrigan, Adm'r, v. Stillwell, 99 Me. 434, 437, 59 A. 683, 684, 68 L.R.A. 386. It is not reasonable to believe that the Legislature intended the word ‘corporations' to embrace both towns and private corporations so dissimilar and with practically nothing in common.’

In Connor v. Inhabitants of Southport, 136 Me. 447, 12 A.2d 414, the provisions of Pub.Laws 1929, Ch. 161, Sec. 3, were in question, which provided for an...