Carroll v. Carroll

• Decision Date: 06 January 1928
• Parties: CARROLL v. CARROLL.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

262 Mass. 10

159 N.E. 517

CARROLL

v.CARROLL.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Jan. 6, 1928.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Suffolk County; F. J. Macleod, Judge.

Action by Katherine Carroll against Timothy S. Carroll. Verdict for plaintiff, and defendant brings exceptions. Exceptions overruled.W. E. Collins, of Boston, for plaintiff.

H. A. Murphy, of Boston, for defendant.

SANDERSON, J.

The plaintiff is seeking to recover for services rendered the defendant as housekeeper, and for other services, covering a period of six years. The jury found for the plaintiff. The exceptions relate to the admission of evidence.

The judge, subject to the defendant's exception, permitted the plaintiff, in cross-examination of the defendant to show that, in March, 1924, after he had been notified by the plaintiff's attorney of her claim and before action was brought, he had conveyed his home to the woman who later became his wife. A certified copy of the deed was admitted in evidence. The defendant worked for wages, and his only other income was the rent from one suite in the house he occupied and $100 a year which he received from a fraternal organization. The plaintiff testified that after this conveyance, when she told the defendant that he would hear from her claim soon, he said, ‘You are too late.’

[1][2] Upon the evidence introduced, the jury could infer that the house constituted all of the defendant's attachable property, and that it was voluntarily conveyed to avoid an attachment by the plaintiff. Portland Gaslight Co. v. Rund, 242 Mass. 272, 275, 136 N. E. 75. The testimony objected to was competent. It had some tendency to show that the defendant was ‘conscious of liability and endeavored to escape from it.’ Banfield v. Whipple, 10 Allen, 27, 31, 87 Am. Dec. 618. The fact that a promise to marry is a good consideration for a conveyance is immaterial, because there was no evidence to prove that such a promise was the consideration for the conveyance.

[3][4] An exception was saved to the admission of a conversation between the defendant and Mrs. Leonard, a sister of both parties. A part of this conversation-to the effect that Mrs. Leonard said the plaintiff would bring an action against the defendant and take the house from him for wages, with his reply, ‘She can't do it, the house don't belong to me’-was competent. The jury could have found that when the defendant was thus spoken to by his sister about the plaintiff's claim ...