Carroll v. City of Prattville

• Decision Date: 19 February 1987
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 86-D-1045-N.
• Parties: John CARROLL, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF PRATTVILLE, an Alabama municipal corporation, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

653 F. Supp. 933

John CARROLL, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF PRATTVILLE, an Alabama municipal corporation, et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 86-D-1045-N.

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, N.D.

February 19, 1987.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

J. Fairley McDonald, III, and Richard H. Gill, of Copeland, Franco, Screws & Gill, P.A., Montgomery, Ala., and Joe Macon, Jr., Wetumpka, Ala., for plaintiff.

Douglas Corretti and Jesse P. Evans, III, Corretti & Newsom, Birmingham, Ala., for defendants.

DUBINA, District Judge.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This cause is now before the Court on a motion to dismiss filed herein by the defendants on December 2, 1986. Pursuant to this motion, the defendants proffer thirty-seven separate grounds for dismissal of this cause. However, via their memorandum brief filed herein on January 7, 1987, in support of said motion, the defendants have grouped their contentions and/or grounds for dismissal into the following four categories: (1) Abstention, (2) Failure of the complaint to state a claim for inverse condemnation, (3) Immunity, and (4) Failure of the complaint to state a claim for a deprivation of substantive due process.

On January 9, 1987, the plaintiff filed herein a memorandum brief in opposition to the defendants' motion to dismiss. Having considered the defendants' motion, as well as the memorandum briefs of the parties and oral arguments of counsel heard in open court on January 16, 1987, this Court is of the opinion, for reasons expressed below, that the defendants' motion to dismiss is due to be granted in part and denied in part.

I. ALLEGATIONS OF FACT

This is a cause of action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which the plaintiff claims that the defendants have, under color of state law, deprived him of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to just compensation and substantive due process. The plaintiff's claims arise out of the alleged failure and/or refusal of the defendants to zone or rezone a particular parcel of property owned by the plaintiff so as to permit the plaintiff to develop the property as a residential subdivision.

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this cause pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(3).

The plaintiff alleges that, in 1979, he purchased approximately sixty acres of real property in Elmore County, Alabama, said property being adjacent to an existing residential subdivision known as "Scenic Hills." The plaintiff alleges that he purchased said real property for the purpose of developing and subdividing the same into residential lots and then selling those lots to third parties for the construction of single-family residences. More specifically, the plaintiff alleges that he planned to create from the subject property two thirty-acre additions to the said existing Scenic Hills Subdivision. One addition (referred to by the plaintiff as the "Second Addition") would be subdivided into approximately one hundred residential lots, while the other addition (referred to by the plaintiff as the "Third Addition") would be divided into approximately ninety-six lots. The plaintiff alleges that when he purchased the subject real property in 1979, neither the subject property nor the existing Scenic Hills Subdivision were located within the corporate boundaries of the defendant City of Prattville. Consequently, neither the subject property nor the existing subdivision were subject to the defendant City's regulations and ordinances pertaining to the zoning of real property.

The plaintiff alleges that, subsequent to his purchase of the subject property, he contacted the defendants about the possibility of connecting the sanitary sewer lines for the subject property to certain sewer lines and outfalls already maintained by the defendant City in the area. The plaintiff alleges that, following discussions with the defendants on this matter, a written agreement, dated February 26, 1980, was entered into between the defendant City and the plaintiff.¹ The plaintiff alleges that, under the terms of said agreement, the defendant City agreed to allow the plaintiff to connect the sanitary sewer lines for the subject property to the said existing sewer lines and outfalls maintained by the defendant City in the Scenic Hills area. In exchange for such, the plaintiff allegedly agreed to design and construct the subject property in accordance with design criteria, specifications and other rules and regulations of the defendant City which are applicable to property located within the corporate limits of the City of Prattville. Additionally, the plaintiff allegedly agreed to plan, develop and construct the subject property for single-family residential use in accordance with the "R-3" zoning classification of the defendant City's zoning ordinance.²

The plaintiff alleges that, in reliance upon the February 26, 1980, agreement, he proceeded with his plans for the development of the Second and Third Additions to the Scenic Hills Subdivision. As to the Second Addition, plaintiff alleges that his development efforts resulted in the sale of all one hundred lots, with houses and other improvements having now been erected thereon. As to the Third Addition, however, plaintiff alleges that unfavorable economic conditions caused him to postpone development of the same until early 1985. At that time, plaintiff alleges that he expended considerable sums of money for the preparation of a plat for the Third Addition. The plaintiff alleges that this plat proposed to subdivide the thirty acres contained in the Third Addition into approximately ninety-six lots which would meet the criteria for R-3 zoning under the defendant City's zoning ordinance. Additionally, the plaintiff alleges that his plat proposed each lot would be restricted to single-family residential use. The plaintiff alleges that "the City" gave him approval to proceed with the development of the Third Addition in accordance with this plat.

The plaintiff alleges that on or about May 7, 1985, the Alabama Legislature approved Act No. 85-473, which Act effectively annexed to the City of Prattville, not only the Scenic Hills Subdivision, but also the Second and Third Additions thereto. The plaintiff alleges that after this annexation he was advised by the defendant City to suspend the ongoing development of the Third Addition, notwithstanding "the City's" prior approval of the development of the same.³

The plaintiff alleges that in July of 1985, the Planning Commission of the City of Prattville sought to address the question of how the Scenic Hills Subdivision, as well as the developed Second Addition thereto and the proposed, but undeveloped, Third Addition thereto, was to be zoned under the Prattville zoning ordinance. The plaintiff alleges that on July 18, 1985; August 15, 1985; September 5, 1985; and September 19, 1985, the said Planning Commission conducted public meetings and hearings concerning the zoning of the Scenic Hills area property. The plaintiff alleges that at the meeting of September 19, 1985, representatives of the Central Alabama Regional Planning and Development Commission⁴ submitted three proposals for the zoning of Scenic Hills property; one of which proposed that the original Scenic Hills Subdivision be zoned as R-2 property,⁵ the Second Addition as R-3, and the as-yet-undeveloped Third Addition as "FAR" property.⁶ The plaintiff alleges that the above-described proposal was ultimately unanimously approved by the Planning Commission for recommendation to the Prattville City Council.

The plaintiff alleges that, at the meeting of September 19, 1985, he presented his plat for the Third Addition to the Planning Commission for preliminary approval in accordance with the defendant City's subdivision regulations. The plaintiff alleges that, unlike the proposal adopted by the Commission, his plat proposed that the property would conform to the requirements of the R-3 classification in the City's zoning ordinance. Additionally, the plaintiff alleges that he requested the Commission to consider the rezoning of the Third Addition from the FAR classification to the R-3 classification, with the plaintiff allegedly agreeing that he would commit to construction of only single-family dwellings, instead of multi-family units, in the Third Addition.

On October 7, 1985, the plaintiff alleges that the Planning Commission conducted a public hearing in order to consider plaintiff's request concerning the rezoning of the Third Addition and the approval of his plat for the same. The plaintiff alleges that, after receiving public comments, the Planning Commission approved a recommendation to the City Council defendants that the Third Addition property be rezoned from FAR to R-3. On or about November 12, 1985, the plaintiff alleges that the Planning Commission likewise unanimously granted his request for approval of this plat for the Third Addition.

The plaintiff alleges that on December 3, 1985, the City Council defendants held a public hearing to consider the approval of the Planning Commission's recommendation that the Scenic Hills Third Addition property be rezoned from FAR to R-3. The plaintiff alleges that, upon conclusion of this hearing, the City Council defendants convened their regularly scheduled meeting and, thereupon, unanimously approved a resolution which provided that the Third Addition remain zoned as FAR property. The plaintiff alleges that the City Council defendants gave no reasons for their actions, and, in spite of plaintiff's numerous requests, said defendants have refused to act definitively on the proposed ordinance recommended by the Planning Commission.

Upon the basis of the foregoing factual allegations, the plaintiff contends that the defendants have violated plaintiff's right to substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by arbitrarily and capriciously denying the requested zoning. Further, the plaintiff contends that the...