Carroll v. City of Cedar Falls

• Citation: 261 N.W. 652,221 Iowa 277
• Decision Date: 21 June 1935
• Docket Number: 42900.
• Parties: CARROLL v. CITY OF CEDAR FALLS et al.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

261 N.W. 652

221 Iowa 277

CARROLL v. CITY OF CEDAR FALLS et al.

No. 42900.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

June 21, 1935

Appeal from District Court, Black Hawk County; G. W. Wood, Judge.

Action in equity to enjoin the city of Cedar Falls and the town of Readlyn from carrying out a contract which they had entered into. The defendants filed separate motions to dismiss plaintiff's petition on the ground that the contemplated contract was authorized under chapters 312 (section 6127 et seq.) and 383 (section 8309 et seq.) of the Code of 1931. These motions were sustained and plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

Smith & O'Connor, of Dubuque, Swisher, Swisher & Cohrt, of Waterloo, and J. R. Harmon, of Chicago, Ill., for appellant.

R. F Merner, of Cedar Falls, and E. H. McCoy, of Waterloo, for appellee City of Cedar Falls.

H. L Leslie, of Waverly, for appellee Town of Readlyn.

KINTZINGER, Justice.

This is an action commenced by a resident and taxpayer of the city of Cedar Falls against the city of Cedar Falls and the town of Readlyn, to enjoin them from carrying out a contract entered into with each other on May 28, 1934, to furnish the town of Readlyn with electrical energy from the municipal electric light system of Cedar Falls. Readlyn is about 18 miles from Cedar Falls, and under the contract Cedar Falls is to carry its high-tension wires to the county line, about 16 miles from Cedar Falls, where the town of Readlyn is to connect with it, and receive energy for its distribution system for use in Readlyn.

The petition alleges that by the terms of the contract the city of Cedar Falls would be required to build and maintain high-voltage transmission lines for a distance of many miles beyond its limits, and to generate and produce electric current far in excess of the needs required for its patrons in Cedar Falls; that, for this purpose, Cedar Falls would be required to expend large amounts of public funds, derived from taxation, for a private purpose; that the sale of such energy would be for a purely private use and in no sense for a public purpose; appellant, therefore, alleges that sections 6142 and 8310 of the Code, in so far as they authorize the sale of electrical energy to other municipalities, are unconstitutional and void, as being in violation of section 31, art. 3 of the Iowa Constitution providing that " no public money * * * shall be appropriated for local, or private purposes," and in violation of section 9, art. 1 of the Iowa Constitution, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, providing that " no person shall be deprived of * * * property, without due process of law."

Defendants filed separate motions to dismiss plaintiff's petition on the ground that the service contemplated by the contract is authorized by chapters 312 (section 6127 et seq.) and 383 (section 8309 et seq.) of the Code, and particularly sections 6142 and 8310 authorizing cities and towns to sell or purchase electrical energy to other municipalities. The court sustained defendants' motions, and plaintiff appeals.

Section 6142 of the Code authorizing the sale of electrical energy to other municipalities or persons outside the town limits, as well as to individuals within the corporation, provides as follows: " They may sell the products of municipal heating plants, waterworks, gasworks, or electric light or power plants to any municipality, individual, or corporation outside the city or town limits, as well as to individuals or corporations within its limits, and may with the consent of the board having jurisdiction thereof erect in the public highway the necessary poles upon which to construct transmission lines; and shall, from time to time in such manner as they deem equitable, assess upon each tenement or other place supplied with heat, water, gas, light, or power, reasonable rents or rates fixed by ordinance, and shall levy a tax as provided by law to pay or aid in paying the expenses of running, operating, renewing, and extending such works, and the interest on any bonds issued to pay all or any part of their construction."

Section 8310 of the Code, authorizing the condemnation of property therefor, provides as follows: " Petition for franchise. Any person, corporation, or company authorized to transact business in the state including cities and towns may file a verified petition asking for a franchise to erect, maintain, and operate a line or lines for the transmission, distribution, use, and sale of electric current outside cities and towns and for such purpose to erect, use, and maintain poles, wires, guy wires, towers, cables, conduits, and other fixtures and appliances necessary for conducting electric current for light, heat, or power over, along, and across any public lands, highways, streams, or the lands of any person, company, or corporation, and to acquire necessary interests in real estate for such purposes."

Contracts for the purchase of electrical energy and power by municipalities from others, including other municipal corporations, is clearly authorized by section 6142 of the Code of 1931; and contracts for the sale of electrical energy by municipal corporations to others, including municipalities, are authorized by the same statutes. The validity of contracts authorized by these statutes has already been determined by this court in the following cases: Incorporated Town of Sibley v. Ocheyedan Electric Co., 194 Iowa, 950, 187 N.W. 560; Meader v. Inc. Town of Sibley, 197 Iowa, 945, 198 N.W. 72; Wapsie Power & Light Co. v. City of Tipton, 197 Iowa, 996, 193 N.W. 643, and State v. Des Moines Ry. Co., 159 Iowa, 259, 140 N.W. 437.We are controlled by the rule announced therein unless these statutes are vulnerable to any additional constitutional objections raised herein and not heretofore considered.

I.

It is the well-settled rule of law in all courts, and especially in Iowa, that a statute is presumed to be constitutional unless it clearly appears to be contrary to some plain and unambiguous provision of the Constitution. The Legislature is not prevented from adopting any law it sees fit, unless it is clearly prohibited by some plain provision of the Constitution.

Section 9, art. 3 of the Iowa Constitution provides that the Legislature " shall have all powers necessary for a branch of the General Assembly of a free and independent State." The Legislature in this state, therefore, has power to enact any kind of any legislation it sees fit, provided it is not clearly and plainly prohibited by the State or Federal Constitutions. The Legislature has almost unlimited power and authority in reference to the enactment of laws governing municipal corporations. State v. Manning (Iowa) 259 N.W. 213, loc. cit. 219; Eckerson v. City of Des Moines, 137 Iowa, 452, loc. cit. 467, 115 N.W. 177; Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Otoe County, 16 Wall. 667, 21 L.Ed. 375.

It is also the well-settled rule that any doubt of the Legislature's power to adopt an act will be resolved in favor of its constitutionality. Stewart v. Board of Supervisors, 30 Iowa, 9, 1 Am.Rep. 238; McGuire v. Ry. Co., 131 Iowa, 340, 108 N.W. 902, 33 L.R.A.(N.S.) 706; City of Des Moines v. Manhattan Oil Co., 193 Iowa, 1096, 184 N.W. 823, 188 N.W. 921, 23 A.L.R. 1322; Loftus v. Dept. of Agriculture, 211 Iowa, 566, 232 N.W. 412; State v. Manning (Iowa) 259 N.W. 213; Gallarno v. Long, 214 Iowa, 805, 243 N.W. 719; Denver & Rio Grande Railroad v. Grand County, 51 Utah, 294, 170 P. 74, 3 A.L.R. 1224.

In Stewart v. Board of Supervisors, 30 Iowa, 9, 1 Am.Rep. 238, we said: " This court * * * ‘ will declare a law unconstitutional only when it is clearly, palpably and plainly inconsistent with the provisions of that instrument." ’ We there quote with approval the following language of the Supreme Court of the United States (Bennett v. Boggs, F. Cas. No. 1,319, Baldw. 60): " We cannot declare a legislative act void because it conflicts with our opinions of policy, expediency or justice. We are not the guardians of the rights of the people of the State unless they are secured by some constitutional provision which comes within our judicial cognizance."

In City of Des Moines v. Manhattan Oil Co., 193 Iowa, 1096, 1117, 184 N.W. 823, 832, 188 N.W. 921, 23 A.L.R. 1322, we said: " There is no presumption against the validity of an act of the Legislature. On the contrary, all presumptions are in its favor, and a statute will not be held unconstitutional unless its contravention * * * is so clear, plain, and palpable as to leave no reasonable doubt on the subject." (Italics ours.)

II.

With these rules in mind, we come to a consideration of the constitutional questions raised by appellant. He contends that the Legislature has no power to levy taxes or expend public money for " private" purposes, and that the sale by a municipality of " non-excess" utility products to customers outside of its own limits serves a purely private purpose and is not the rendering of a service to its own inhabitants as a community.

Appellant, however, concedes that a municipality may sell and dispose of its " excess" utility products to other municipalities without any statutory authority therefor. This rule is recognized by practically the unanimous weight of authority in this country. 5 McQuillan on Municipal Corporations (2d Ed.) 55; City of Omaha v. Omaha Water Co., 218 U.S. 180, 30 S.Ct. 615, 54 L.Ed. 991, 48 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1084; Pikes Peak Power Co. v. Colorado Springs, 105 F. 1, 44 C.C.A. 333; Fellows v. Los Angeles, 151 Cal. 52, 90 P. 137; Colorado Springs v. Colorado City, 42 Colo. 75, 94 P. 316; Larimer County v. Ft. Collins, 68 Colo. 364, 189 P. 929; City of Henderson v. Young, 119 Ky. 224, 83 S.W. 583; Rogers v. Wickliffe, 94 S.W. 24, 29 Ky. Law Rep. 587; Municipal League of Bremerton...